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Integrity and security

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Abstract

The study focuses on the importance and potentialities of integrity from the point of view of security. It states the reasons for expanding the integrity approach and offers definitions for integrity and the system of integrity management. It introduces the integrity approach developed in the Netherlands and the experiences of the first pilot survey in Hungary based on that approach. The paper reviews the methodology of the Integrity Project developed by the State Audit Office and the results of the annual surveys for identifying areas of corruption risks, with special attention to the police and national defence. In this context, it briefly specifies the objectives of the anti-corruption programmes and action plan of the Government. In addition, through surveying some of the areas, the study illustrates the multi-purpose use of integrity in the framework of state-building. It also introduces two integrity approaches of the overall evaluations of national security systems: (i) the approach applied by Transparency International, and (ii) the new approach based on evaluations of the performance of state functions and important tasks suggested by the author.

Keywords: integrity, system of integrity management, corruption, preventive approach of corruption, corruption risk analysis, gap analysis, integrity indexes, integrity "hard" and "soft" controls, political integrity

Introduction

The *aim of the study* is to present what potentialities the integrity approach and toolkit has for safeguarding and strengthening security. One of the courses within this option is of a general methodological character: integrity methodology can effectively contribute to the solution of problems threatening security in the field of preventing corruption; the other course of application involves supporting good state functioning as related to some aspects of security and facilitating monitoring the values inherent in it.

The examined topics of these options are:
- outlining the paths to integrity;
- the concept and management system of integrity;
- the development of integrity approach-based anti-corruption programmes;
- options for the multi-directional and multi-purpose application of integrity; and
- the evaluation of the national integrity system from the viewpoint of security.

Of *the paths for expanding the integrity approach that are* relevant to this paper, the role of the transitions from ethics to integrity and from integrity to good governance, as well as the role of the related changing priorities need highlighting.

Two decades ago the predecessor of this integrity approach, which predominantly followed the Hegelian concept of recognition, was called *public service ethics* in literature, wherein attention was mainly focused on whether the moral strength which guides the conduct of public servants exists and if it does, what it entails. This ethos is still reflected in the studies of the 1997 OECD symposium (OECD, 1999) and its reference document accepted in 1998 (OECD, 2000a; 2000b), which made proposals for the principles to be followed and for the methods of application of ethical and professional standards in a way that ethics appeared equally as moral philosophy, regulatory values and norms, as well as moral (practical) guidelines to be observed in public service. In the documents emphasis was also laid on the proposal of the necessity of training public servants on ethical issues as an institutionalized task.

Going beyond that, as a result of European research over the last twenty years, authors in numerous studies (see for example Cox et al., 2009) have favoured the use of the key concept of integrity as opposed to ethics. In this, a decisive role was played by the concept of integrity involving:
- not only the ethical values and thinking (perception and intention) but also acting correctly;
- the requisite professionalism and competences;
- conformity with social and legal rules (the rule of law), and
- monitoring organizational and operational aims and regulations.

It should also be noted that, regarding the role of these main characteristics, there is an appreciable difference from the facets typical of the approaches to ethics in the United States of America, where, in both literature on the subject and administrative practice, "make-things-right" ethics and placing ethical decisions at the core of good management, including naturally the consideration of related options, continue to dominate. On the basis of these differences, however, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that one approach and practice is better than the other (Cox et al., 2009). The comparison merely provides a brief description of the process as to why integrity came to be used as the priority in the target system mainly in Europe.

The first promising area for the use of the integrity approach and methodology was the development of anti-corruption programmes mainly in the Netherlands. In this activity the type of methodological conservatism represented by the approach worked well. This mainly focused on exploiting the hidden potentials in the current situation and the prudent launch of targeted changes and reforms as opposed to the ethical activism of the United States. This

aided the recognition that integrity may be an essential pillar of good governance. Its use in this way is justified by the fact that it encourages the implementation of such government activities and culture where particular emphasis is placed on understanding, commitment and an efficient, ethical decision-making practice.

Carrying through state reforms of this nature today is made particularly necessary by the continued effect of the international financial and economic crisis of 2008–09, which increases the fragility of state structures and hinders governments in creating efficient institutions and sound national economic frameworks. In the face of these challenges, taking account of international experiences, integrity-based state building is capable of effectively promoting the safeguarding and strengthening of political and social security.

The concept and system of integrity

The concept of integrity

The elements of the general concept of integrity are as follows: adherence to moral and professional rules and norms (e.g. incorruptibility, impartiality, lack of prejudice) and wholeness (completeness). From the aspect of practical application, interpreting this concept presents difficulties as there are many parallel and frequently overlapping definitions.

The word integrity is derived from the Latin *in + tag (base of tangere, "to touch"),* meaning "not" "touching". Mainly the following attributes indicate its overall contents: integrity is inviolable good behaviour that is beyond reproach and compliant with moral principles. The concept of integrity comprises *organizational integrity, personal integrity* and the *integrity of relationships and contacts,* in other words *professional integrity,* which includes these core values: respect, openness, personal responsibility and professionalism. Thus integrity means honest, fair and rule-compliant behaviour whereby the legitimacy and effectiveness of the public sector and trust in the state (public sector), and thus security, are strengthened by the activities of the institutions and employees.

In this context integrity is the application of and compliance with values and norms generally accepted in everyday practice (van den Heuvel – Huberts, 2003). *Community integrity* in the case of a country refers to compliance with and the application of social values and norms generally accepted in the everyday practice of its public sector organizations (institutions).

The system of integrity management

Considering that integrity is one of the pillars of good governance, and thus a prerequisite of security and trust in the government, particular attention is paid to integrity management in each country and in the activities of international institutions and integration.

The *system of integrity management (framework)* constituting the basis of management is an overarching, system-based methodology which, building on two decades of research and practical experience, combines all those instruments, processes and structures that

help strengthen integrity and prevent violations. The main requirements of the system are that it should:
- provide ongoing support for the improvement of good governance in the long term;
- develop cooperation between public organizations in a way that openness and broadly shared interests demonstrated in achieving common goals are enforced on the part of the institutions; and,
- be based on the logical and theoretical correlations of domestic practical experiences and already applied international best practices as well as the prudent definition of the professional and financial capacities required for the provision of the activities.

Table 1 shows the integrity management framework based on the system developed by the OECD using the summarized practical experiences of countries.

Table 1

Components of the integrity management system

Key components	Core instruments, measures	Complementary instruments, measures
Instruments	Legal codes, rules, instructions, training, advice	Integrity as a criterion in personnel selection and promotion
Processes	Continuous developmental and individual measures, programmes	Processes in personnel policy in practice
Structures (actors)	Key staff for strengthening organizational integrity	Personnel policy, contract management, financial management

Source: OECD, 2008

The first key component of the framework is comprised of *instruments* which may be used to stimulate integrity, for example to prevent corruption. These instruments exercise a beneficial effect on integrity and corruption through the other key components, the *processes of activities and organizational structures (actors) of the institutions*.

These three key components exert an effect on two layers, which contain core and complementary instruments and measures. At the heart of the framework are the core instruments (ethical codes, integrity training, etc.), core processes and cores structures (actors) whose immediate purpose is to strengthen integrity. Strengthening integrity, however, is not the immediate purpose of the complementary instruments, complementary processes and complementary structures (actors), but these may have important effects on the examined areas. Of the key components, instruments of major importance are placed in four categories in the OECD methodology (Figure 1). These are defining the purposes of integrity, guiding towards integrity, monitoring integrity and enforcing integrity.

Considering that the framework operates at the *level of individual public administrative institutions*, the components are to be interpreted in this *inner context*. In developing the *outer operational context and relational elements* of such an integrity management system, it is expedient to use the logical and theoretical interconnections described in Table 1 and Figure 1 as a basis. The outer context is also vitally important to the system of integrity management because the operation of institutions may be appreciably affected by economic, political and other outside *factors*, and there may be external *instruments*

influencing the functioning of the integrity management system (such as ethical codes and methods of accountability) and non-institutional *actors* that again may have a significant influence on the functioning of the integrity management system. Of the last of these, a particularly important role is played by legislation, political parties, the State Audit Office, the judiciary, the police and prosecutor's office, local governments, the media, civil society and international (global) institutions.


Figure 1
The instruments of integrity management

Source: OECD, 2008

Pilot survey of corruption risks in the public sector

The first decade of the new millenium did not see a reduction in corruption in Hungary. On the contrary, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)[1] compiled by Transparency International (TI), the highest score of 5.3 that the country obtained in 2001 fell to its lowest in the decade, registering 4.7 in 2010. The trend of the domestic index of the level of the perception of corruption also warrants more determined action against corruption than hitherto.

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[1] On the scale of 1 to 10 of the index, 10 means no corruption.

The existence and frequency of the phenomena of corruption are better known, albeit to an insufficient extent, from different surveys than their root causes. For this reason the targeted measures taken in Hungary tended to be of an exposing and punitive nature rather than preventive action resulting in lasting improvement. Thus, besides the necessary activity to expose and repress corruption, it was important to direct greater attention to assessing vulnerability to corruption and investigating the multiple reasons for the phenomena of corruption. To this end, we conducted a pilot survey using *a version of the Dutch risk analysis methodology adapted to Hungary*[2]. Its aim was to make the logic and essence of the methodology known to a broader professional audience on the one hand and on the other hand to use the methodology to better reveal and explore the potentials for the development of corruption in a few key areas of the public sector.

On the basis of the results of the risk analyses of the pilot survey, we also pointed out the distinctive feature of the proposed methodology to show the measures and proposals required to increase the efficiency of the functioning of the integrity management system.

Methodology

The approach of the Dutch methodology for assessing vulnerability to corruption, with regard to the "corruption triangle" (opportunity, motivation and justification), starts from eradicating opportunity, removing motivation and counterbalancing aspects of personal self-justification, and assumes that *the way in which an organization operates can be an effective tool* for this purpose. Thus public institutions themselves can play an important role in preventing corruption by increasing their *integrity.*

This approach of the Dutch methodology[3] clearly highlights the factors facilitating corruption and the resolve of the organization from the viewpoint of the fight against corruption. It concentrates in particular on measures that the organization may take to prevent corruption situations from arising and to increase its own integrity. *The methodology consists of five stages:*

1. *Identification and assessment of vulnerable areas* in the activities and processes of the organization which appear in relationships between the government and citizens (business sector) involving the conclusion of contracts, issuing documents, legislating and the application of the law as well as in the management of state property.
2. Assessment of the *factors increasing vulnerability* (growing complexity, rapid changes, management and staff).
3. *Assessment of the level of maturity of the integrity management system,* which indicates how resilient a particular organization and its organizational units are to the arising corruption risks.

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[2] The Research Institute of the State Audit Office of Hungary (until 31 December 2008, Development and Methodology Institute of the State Audit Office) and the Netherlands Court of Audit, under the European Union's Transitional Aid, conducted a *Twinning Light* type project in 2007–08 with the aim of devising a risk analysis method which can be of use in identifying the type, place and nature of corruption risks in the Hungarian public sector.

[3] For a detailed description, see BÁGER et al. (2008a; 2008b) and BÁGER (2012).

4. As the continuation of these stages, conducting a *gap analysis*, which establishes whether there is a satisfactory balance between the vulnerabilities found in stages 1 and 2 and the level of maturity or resilience of the *integrity management system* assessed in stage 3.
5. Insofar as there is not, the result of the gap analysis provides grounds to determine how to appropriately address the most vulnerable processes and *what measures are needed* to improve resilience to the risks of corruption. Thus the output of the analysis is a *management report or action plan*. This report clarifies to the management of the institution the areas where immediate action must be taken to strengthen the organization's resilience to breaches of integrity. Addressing the areas thus identified as priorities increases the efficiency of the *integrity policy*. An essential requirement for this policy is the coordinated application of the rules-based and values-based approaches (OECD, 1996). With regard to the former, the emphasis is laid on the rules and processes set by the state as an instrument to reduce violations of integrity, whereas the values-based approach focuses on understanding the ethical requirements and norms for this purpose and their actual implementation in practice. As regards balancing the two approaches, it can be noted that an ever broader range of public organizations apply this recommendation (OECD, 2000b), and that governments are increasingly shifting towards the application of the values-based approach as opposed to the rules-based approach.

As a result of these measures, a *risk map* can be compiled which illustrates the corruption risks and helps to identify the right lines of action in the public sector. This was first attempted by the Research Institute of the State Audit Office (SAO) in 2008, which requested the ministries to *participate in a pilot survey*. By completing a questionnaire, the ministries identified the corruption risks that appeared within their own department and the factors increasing them.

Main results

The survey consisted of two parts: the first strove to expose the (internal) corruption risk (vulnerability) concealed in the activity performed, and the second the (mainly external) circumstances increasing vulnerability. In the questionnaire's first part covering the relationships between the government and citizens (business sector) and the management of state property, the activities and processes presented in Table 2 were listed. We only departed from the general pattern insofar as was justified by the specific characteristics of the ministerial activities. For example, legislative preparatory activity was examined in greater detail as this is one of the most prominent primary activities of ministries.

In completing the first part[4], the ministries had to consider which of the vulnerable processes and activities listed in Table 2 were typical of them. They were also asked to evaluate whether each process of activity was primary (a core activity of the ministry) or secondary (complementary to the realization of a core activity) in the ministry. In the second part of the questionnaire, questions concerning two groups of factors contributing to cor-

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[4] Replies suitable for evaluation were received from 8 ministries.

ruption were posed, regarding firstly complexity and secondly changes/dynamics. (Table 3 provides details of the characteristics.) The ministries were asked to consider which of the circumstances listed were typical of their specific ministry and what effect the particular circumstance had on the activity of the ministry.

Based on Table 2, *three general statements* can be made:

- There are many processes in the activities of the ministries which carry the risk of corruption (concluding contracts, cash payments, preparing legislation).
- For the most part, these processes are not related to the core activities of the ministries but to their complementary activities.
- From the aspect of the primary vulnerability to corruption, the ministries do not form a single set and the tasks of each ministry are different also from this viewpoint.

Table 2

Vulnerability concealed in activities

Typical characteristics	Type	Activity	Primary process	Secondary process	Not typical
Relationship between government and citizens (business sector)	Contracts	Open tenders	2	4	2
		Restricted tenders	3	5	
		Engagement contracts		8	
		One-off procurements		7	1
	Payments	Aid to businesses	1	3	4
		Benefits and allowances for individuals		3	5
		Sponsorship of civil sector	3	3	2
	Authorization	Permits	4	1	3
		Approvals	3	1	4
		Certificates	2	3	3
	Drafting legislation (content)	Requirements related to products	4	1	3
		Defining aid conditions	7		1
		Defining authorization conditions	6		2
		Defining technical requirements	6	1	1
	Applying the law	Supervision	5	1	2
		Control	5	1	2
		Investigation	1	3	4

Managing state property	Information	State secret	3	2	3
		Professional secret	3	2	3
		Trade secret	2	4	2
	Money	Bonds and shares			8
		Portfolio management	1		7
		Handling cash/transfers		5	3
		Premiums, reimbursement of expenses, bonuses, employee benefits		8	
	Assets (moveable, immoveable)	Sales and purchases		4	4
		Asset management	1	5	2

Source: Own compilation

Table 3
Circumstances increasing vulnerability

1. Complexity	**Yes**	**No**
Innovation/advanced computer systems	5	3
Complex legal environment	8	–
Special (legal/fiscal) constructions	5	3
Bureaucracy	6	2
Relations systems	5	3
Lobbying	4	4
Political influence/intervention	6	2
Mix of public interests and private interests	1	7
Necessity of involving outside experts	7	1
2. Changes/dynamics	**Yes**	**No**
Young organization	4	4
Frequently changing legislation	8	–
Strong expansion or downsizing	3	5
Outsourcing, PPP	4	4
Crisis (reorganization, serious threats, danger of dissolution of organization or losing jobs)	3	5
External pressure (pressure to perform or pressure due to expenditure, potential pressure of time or political pressure, scarce or lack of resources for tasks)	8	

Source: Own compilation

Based on the responses, *drafting legislation was the most vulnerable area*, and in particular:
- defining aid conditions (7 ministries indicated this to be a primary process);
- defining authorization conditions (6 ministries indicated this to be a primary process), and
- defining technical requirements (6 ministries indicated this to be a primary process).

In the opinion of the ministries, the area which carries the *second greatest risk* of corruption is the *application of the laws,* and in particular:
- supervision (5 ministries indicated this to be a primary process), and
- control (5 ministries indicated this to be a primary process).

The *vulnerability concealed in authorization activity was also significant:* issuing permits (4 ministries indicated this to be a primary process) and approvals (3 ministries indicated this to be a primary process). The *risk of corruption in concluding contracts was heightened in* restricted tenders (3 ministries indicated this to be a primary process and 5 ministries a secondary process), engagement contracts (every ministry indicated this to be a secondary process), and one-off procurements (7 ministries indicated this to be a secondary process).

The answers given to the *existence of circumstances increasing the possibility of corruption* are summarized in Table 3. It can be established that *circumstances related to complexity* constituted factors seriously increasing risk at the majority of the ministries. At the same time, only one ministry indicated that the mix of public interests and private interests was such a circumstance. By contrast, all ministries gave an affirmative response to the *complex legal environment,* and all but one ministry to the necessity of involving outside experts. Most ministries indicated *political influence/intervention and relations systems* as existing circumstances increasing the risk of corruption. The written explanations, however, revealed that the ministries interpreted different forms of behaviour as political intervention. This ranged from influencing individual decisions to the political prescription of the development of policy.

Regarding *changes/dynamics,* the ministries clearly perceived *frequently changing laws and other regulations as factors significantly increasing the risk of corruption.* The opinion that decision-makers ought to devote special attention to these factors is justified. An amendment to the law which is in itself constructive serves no purpose if a multitude of changes confuses the application of the law and gives rise to individual interpretations.

Every ministry thought that *pressure to perform* was a *factor increasing the risk of corruption.* Attention also deserves to be given to this because experience shows that meeting demanding expectations to perform when the resources available for tasks are scarce frequently and easily brings respite from compliance with the rules and undergoing checks, and thus becomes a source of corruption.

In Table 4 – without naming the ministries – we tried to convey a summary of the different ways in which each ministry perceives the corruption risk to their own activity. It is important to stress that vulnerability is an objective category and does not mean that corruption will occur in fact. However, awareness of this is required in order to prevent or eliminate corruption more effectively.

The data in the table below show that the ministries judge the degree of vulnerability to corruption of their activities very differently. As can be seen, there were ministries that

identified all the factors increasing the risk of corruption in their environment but there were others that indicated that their regular activities included all the activities carrying the risk of corruption in themselves. Apart from these extremes, the figures indicate that *the activities of ministries are exposed to numerous corruption risks*. Consequently, regularly revealing these risks and the factors increasing the risks has a significant role in preventing and reducing corruption.

Table 4

Characteristics of vulnerability in the ministries

Number allocated to ministry	Number of vulnerable activities			Number of factors increasing vul-nerability
	Total	Primary	Secondary	
1.	20	3	17	14
2.	26	13	13	12
3.	9	6	3	11
4.	20	11	9	10
5.	18	9	9	8
6.	22	7	15	8
7.	21	11	10	6
8.	15	8	7	6
Maximum value	26	26	26	14

Source: Own compilation

The experiences of a trial self-assessment

The *Ministry of Economy and Transport* involved *appropriations for small and medium enterprises* in the self-assessment[5]. These funds provide financial support by tendering for this business sector, which plays an important role in the development of the economy. In this area, factors increasing corruption included the difficulties of special legal interpretations, lobbying, political influence as well as pressure to perform. These above all drew attention to the broader application of the principle of transparency and the importance of providing versatile information about changes in the law.

In the case of the *Szigetszentmiklós Local Authority*, the trial involved the Building Control Department and in particular issuing building permits. Here the high risk of violating the rules of integrity was primarily caused by the inadequacy of the IT system and the shortage of labour. In this area, mixing public and private interests could also pose a threat.

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[5]   The self-assessment was performed by employees familiar with the organization's functional processes. Naturally, for this a representative employee group to conduct the self-assessment needs to be chosen whose members know their own work environment, the managerial measures and their implementation in practice. Like this, a relatively accurate picture can be gained of the risks and risk-increasing factors.

One important lesson of these two pilot schemes was that the concept of integrity is little known among the employees of public institutions. Thus, in order for self-assessment to be efficient, special attention must be paid to raising awareness of the method (identical usage of terminology, interconnections between the different parts of the methodology and simplifying the method of scoring applied) and to the preparations for application (written information material, training, providing a trained moderator). With the right managerial support, *self-assessment is feasible* as the participants took part in the joint work with interest and responsibility, and expressed their willingness to participate in the future as well.

The State Audit Office's integrity project

Based on the experiences of the pilot survey of corruption risks, the first extensive and large-scale application of the integrity risk analysis methodology was carried out in the frame-work of the integrity project of the State Audit Office (SAO) in 2011 and subsequent years. The overall purpose of the priority project launched on 1 December 2009 with European Union funding was to promote the establishment of corruption-free public administration that functioned within legal limits on a professional basis, and to lay the foundations for shaping awareness at the level of society by the widespread dissemination of the integrity approach. This goal was consistent with the requirement for audit offices, in addition to their control tasks, to undertake a forward-looking, preventative approach and practice to avoid the errors experienced in the process of using public funds.

To this end, the SAO undertook, for the purposes of the integrity project, to conduct a nationwide survey on a voluntary basis using an online questionnaire for 7 years between 2011 and 2017 with the participation of budgetary organs selected in advance annually. The answers are used to create a database which can help in defining the corruption vulnerability and internal control indexes of state organizations.

Method of the first integrity survey

For the first survey conducted between 8 February and 31 March 2011, the State Audit Office selected 4 111 budgetary organs from the 14 409 operating in Hungary by proportionate stratified sampling, to which an electronic questionnaire of 155 points assessing corruption risk characteristics was sent by post and/or through the online Office Gate system together with information about completing it.

The project office formed the target group through proportional sampling according to region (small region) and institution type involving, in addition to traditional public administrative bodies, institutions providing healthcare, social, scientific, educational, cultural, sport and leisure public services. The range of target institutions fully covered independent state authorities, central and regional public administrative bodies (484 organizations), the offices of the local government representative bodies (1 223 organizations), regional clerk's offices (680 organizations) as well as judicial bodies and law enforcement agencies.

Access to the questionnaires, completing the form and sending it in the right format was aided by the staff of the Integrity Info Line established for the project as well as information material and electronic Help applications on the Integrity Portal. The project office measured 10 411 visits and 34 991 downloads on the Integrity Portal during the survey period. The first national survey was supported by a broad information campaign and a series of regional events throughout the country. As a result of the regional press conferences following the events, the integrity project registered almost 200 media mentions, which proved very useful in conveying the meaning of integrity and its dissemination to a wider audience.

The questionnaires completed by the respondent budgetary organizations were received via the SAO's document management system by the electronic survey, processing and mapping system devised within the integrity project, which calculates vulnerability indexes by running predetermined mathematical algorithms. These *indexes, however, do not indicate the existence of corruption but corruption vulnerability and the type of controls the institution uses in order to eliminate and handle the existing situations exposed to corruption*. In this way the values of three outcome indexes were defined:

1. The *inherent vulnerability factors (IVF) index* reveals the organizations' vulnerability factors dependent on their legal status and areas of duties. If, for instance, an organization issues official certificates and passes, exercises authority over the infringement of regulations and imposes fines, these are identified as corruption risk factors and the value of the index rises accordingly.

2. The *vulnerability increasing factors (VIF) index* shows components dependent on the functioning of the given institution which increase inherent vulnerability. If, for example, the respondent body received EU grants in the examined period, participated in the preparation or arrangement of a public procurement procedure, utilized one of its properties, or had the right of disposal over securities or property rights, these are identified as factors increasing vulnerability to corruption.

3. The *risk reducing control factor (RRCF) index* reflects whether there are institutionalized controls at a given organization, and whether these actually work and fulfil their function. Here the existence of controls such as rules on conflicts of interest, accepting gifts, public procurement, the involvement of an outside expert or the selection of new labour is examined.

As opposed to the identified inherent vulnerability and vulnerability increasing factors – as we can see –, there are the controls (RRCF index) on the other side of the scales which the institution in question *may use in order to be able to counterbalance vulnerability to corruption.* If this option does not exist or the available controls are not suitable for this purpose or are insufficient, the vulnerability factors related to activities and situations which may lead to committing acts of corruption are identified. Thus, through the analysis of the applied indexes, the survey method enables the areas of the *security gaps* requiring attention to be ascertained. The related *gap (RÉS) analysis*[6] has the following stages (State Audit Office–Ministry of Interior, 2015):

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[6] The method used was an adaptation of the gap analysis devised to assess the integrity maturity level of Dutch public administrative bodies and was given the acronym RÉS, formed of the initial letters of the Hungarian words for Systemization + Assessment + Regulation (establishing need for regulation). The Hungarian word *rés* means "gap".

1. Identification of all recognized risks related to the functioning of the organization and the control suitable for handling these at an organizational level and at the organization's managerial level (systemization).
2. Defining the rules containing controls[7] applied by the given organization or which are not applied but possible (expedient and necessary) for the given organization. This is the second stage of the analysis, which identifies potential gaps between
   – the risks and controls, and
   – the controls and their appearance in the regulations (assessment).
   A recognized risk for the handling of which the organization has no appropriate control is to be interpreted as a gap.
3. Defining further regulations necessary to eliminate the gaps identified as well as the necessity of changing existing regulations. A necessity to regulate exists when the conditions for the functioning of the control suitable for handling the risk identified are not defined by the organization's regulations.

Main results

In the fifth *survey* in 2015 *the number of institutions completing the questionnaire was* 2 557 compared to the 1 095 institutions which took part in the 2011 survey. Thus the number of respondents more than doubled and grew by 61% in 2015 compared to that in the previous year (Figure 2).


Figure 2
Trend in the number of respondent institutions, 2011–15

Source: Domokos et al., 2016

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[7] *Applied control* is to be interpreted as the control actually operated and regulated by the organization. *Possible control* covers all expedient and necessary tools which are suitable for handling an identified risk but which are not regulated by the organization and for which no conditions of application have been created.

Interest in participating in the survey was boosted by the establishment of the Circle of Integrity Supporters in 2013. The Circle includes public institutions which undertook to take part in the integrity survey every year until 2017. At the 2015 survey 2 172 institutions belonged to the Circle, corresponding to 84.9% of all respondents. The evaluation of the data aids the annual distortion-free comparison of the results of the respondent institutions and the direct measurement of changes (Domokos et al., 2016). The trend in the *organizational integrity of public institutions* in 2013–15 is reviewed using the three indexes by defining the average values of indexes calculated for the range of institutions which took part in the surveys of previous years weighted by the 2015 participation data for better comparison.

Figure 3

The 2015 index values and the 2013 and 2014 indexes weighted by the 2015 participation data

Source: Domokos et al., 2016

As shown by Figure 3, in the three-year period the IVF indexes represented a risk level about 10 percentage points higher than the VIF indexes. In other words, the role of the inherent vulnerability factors in the development of organizational integrity was greater than the role of the factors increasing vulnerability to corruption. It can also be stated that the IVF and VIF indexes showed a downward trend in all three years, which is particularly important as regards the inherent vulnerability factors, where the 2015 value was 3.3 percentage points lower than in 2013.

The value of the *risk reducing control factor (RRCF) index,* counterbalancing vulnerability to corruption, rose on average by 1 percentage point each year over the three years, indicating a gradual expansion of the toolkit opposing corruption. From this viewpoint, the result of the SAO based on the survey over the last two years showing the controls that were most frequently applied in the 779 respondents' opinion is particularly valuable (Figure 4).

Figure 4

Special anti-corruption systems and processes applied by institutions participating in both the 2014 and 2015 survey, 2014–15

Source: Domokos et al., 2016

This shows that the control factor with a very high frequency of application was public access to the organization's financial data (94%). Next came the control applying the four-eye principle with 51.3% in 2014 and 55.9% in 2015. This control was followed by the ethical code, a system handling external complaints, a whistle-blowing system and anti-corruption training organized for employees over the last 3 years. The result of the survey also provides information about the low use of the options for workplace rotation and corruption risk analysis. A highly sensitive shortcoming is that the percentage of institutions conducting a corruption risk analysis is very low and indeed this rate even fell in 2015 compared to the previous year. This draws attention to the fact that the number and standard of anti-corruption training courses must be raised significantly.

Apart from the mentioned controls, the SAO also examined the opinion of the above-mentioned 779 respondents with regard to the development of the *rate of application of soft controls*. Soft controls (measures) are intended to influence in-house behaviour, the working environment and organizational culture as opposed to hard controls, which have an effect mainly through legislation, procedures and technical issues.

With regard to the rate of application of soft controls, the SAO's experts (Domokos et al., 2016) established a rise in the number of institutions which
- have regulations for the conditions of accepting gifts, invitations and travel,
- imposed an obligation for employees to declare their business or other interests relevant to the organization,
- have a publicly accessible strategy which includes the improvement of the organizational culture, strengthening integrity and anti-corruption action, and
- regulate the issue of conflicts of interest (Figure 5).

Figure 5
Trend of soft controls, 2014–15

Results measured in the institution group of national defence and law enforcement agencies

In addition to providing an overview of corruption vulnerability, the survey also allows *separate analyses for each institution or group of institutions* to be made about the maturity and functioning of the integrity controls intended to handle corruption risks. Such an analysis was made about the results measured in the group of national defence and law enforcement agencies (State Audit Office, 2016). The purpose of the analysis was to provide help to the national defence and law enforcement agencies in systemising the corruption risk factors and assessing the necessary controls more efficiently.

The survey in 2015 included the agencies with the following NACE codes: 8422 defence activities, 842260 civil defence activity, 842340 prison administration, 842410 public order and safety administration, 842420 police activities, 842460 intelligence activities, 842470 alien policing activities, 842480 disaster response activities and 842510 fire protection administration.

In 2015, in the national defence and law enforcement agencies group, the rate of response of those taking part in the voluntary survey was 88.8%, the number of organizations

which returned a completed questionnaire being 119, almost twice the number of respondent organizations in the previous years: 63 institutions in 2013 and 60 in 2014. As regards the number of agency staff, the breakdown of employees was almost the same for the 200 to 500 persons group and the over 500 persons group at the respondent national defence and law enforcement agencies. At 68.9% of all respondents, the number of employees exceeded 200 persons.

Table 5 provides information about the indexes (IVF, VIF, RRCF) for this institution group determined based on the index values of 119 agencies.

Table 5

Trend of overall index values in 2015 (%)

Institution type	IVF	VIF	RRCF
National defence and law enforcement	32.4	26.3	78.9
Index calculated for all respondents (2 557 organizations)	31.8	21.9	60.4

Source: State Audit Office, 2016

Based on the index values of this institution group, the following statements can be made:

- *The institution group's inherent vulnerability (IVF) level* somewhat exceeded the level of inherent risk calculated for all respondents. The reason for this is the role of the increased influence of exercising public authority powers on the one hand, and on the other the complexity and occasionally contradictory nature and deficiencies of the external regulatory environment. Based on the answers, 8.4% of the 119 agencies have legislative powers, and 42.9% have individual official powers, i.e. apply the law. In this group 86.3% of the agencies had powers of authorization.

- *The vulnerability increasing factor (VIF) level* was 4.4 percentage points higher than the value calculated for the whole range of respondents. This is related to the fact that this institution group has a greater than average share of EU funds and cooperates to a large extent and continuously with non-state bodies. Moreover, the number of criminal proceedings and ethical proceedings due to breaches of obligations instituted against the employees of the agencies is large.

- *The established control (RRCF) level* for the group of national defence and law enforcement agencies exceeded the average control level of the whole range of respondents significantly, by 18 percentage points. This is largely due to the fact that procurements not reaching the public procurement ceiling are regulated to a greater than average extent in the case of this institution group and the practice of inviting three quotations is more frequent as is the application of a systematic risk analysis and individual performance assessment system. The favourable situation is also due to the fact that the agencies have a public strategy, more efficient internal control and regulations concerning the involvement of outside experts, and conduct anti-corruption training and corruption risk analyses.

As regards factors increasing the risks of corruption, the fact that there was a change in the organizational structure over the last three years at two thirds of the national defence and law enforcement agencies, and on more than two occasions for 20.2%, played a vital role.

Another significant factor increasing vulnerability to corruption was European Union aid considering that 37.8% of the agencies received such funding, half of them being granted not more than HUF 100 million and a quarter of them between HUF 101 million and HUF 1 billion. The third important factor increasing the risks of corruption was public procurement as 64.7% of the agencies took part in preparing and arranging public procurement procedures. In the case of 12 agencies, the public procurement procedure was challenged by the Public Procurement Arbitration Board, which ruled against the agencies in eight cases. Vulnerability was also increased by the fact that over the last three years, of the agencies involved in public procurement, a public procurement procedure with less than 3 tenderers was conducted by 29.9% on one to three occasions and 16.9% on more than three occasions. Finally, engaging outside experts and the use of outsourcing are also to be mentioned among the important factors increasing risks. In 2014, 34.5% of the respondent institutions indicated the use of such engagements although the activities concerned were among the functional duties. The survey also revealed that 19.3% of the national defence and law enforcement agencies received a financial gift or other material support directly or indirectly from private individuals. Regarding controls reducing risks, a result of outstanding importance is that 89.9% of the agencies conducted risk analyses systematically and 95.3% of them recorded the revealed risk factors in a database, while 97.2% assessed the results of the risk analysis. Internal control is likewise a well-functioning system for 96.9% of the agencies. A strategic control plan was drawn up by 96.5% of the respondent agencies and 97.4% had an annual control plan based on the risk analysis.

In summary, it can be established that in the national defence and law enforcement institution group the State Audit Office's survey presented the most important risk factors and the strengths and weaknesses of the control system in a variety of ways. This information may help the agencies' leadership to correctly identify the development pathways to enhance integrity. Thus the level of organizational integrity is satisfactory in national defence and law enforcement, and indeed as regards the established controls this area exceeds the national average. All these are indispensable conditions for organizational integrity to efficiently strengthen security and trust.

The performance of Hungarian law enforcement is also satisfactory at a European level. According to an international survey, in 2013 in Hungary a minority of the population (31%) was of the opinion that the police offered preferential procedures to certain groups of the society as opposed to the Central and Eastern European countries (39%), and, as specific examples, Croatia (54%) and Slovakia (50%). The rate of the Hungarian index is close to the European Union average of 30% (CHARRON, 2013).

The government's anti-corruption programmes

In the light of what has been said, it can be regarded as natural that the Public Administration Corruption Prevention Programme (2012–14), which was adopted in 2012, follows the approach that, going beyond the almost exclusive use of criminal instruments, *the spread of the integrity approach, already tried and tested in international practice, is necessary in order to advance successfully.*

The *overall aim of the programme* is to bring into being a public sector that recognizes, condemns and rejects the phenomenon of corruption by strengthening the resilience of state organizations to corruption and to create solidarity throughout society in order to facilitate the consolidation of ethical values and a value-based approach in practice. In this way public administration and public services could provide a model to be followed by business, reinforced by the government's targeted awareness-raising programmes to prevent economic abuses in the business sector, thereby indirectly also reducing economic corruption. In order to facilitate this, it was the task of the *Ministry of Public Administration and Justice to outline the path of and provide state coordination for corruption prevention*. In this regard it should be noted that the preparatory works of the programme were also done by the Ministry.[8]

The programme's basic principles enabled the achievement of its most important targets in the period between 2013 and 2014. These are that the public administrative bodies:

- *devise a yearly corruption prevention action plan based on the assessment of their integrity and corruption risks* in order to handle the risks identified;
- prepare annual integrity reports about the performance of the current year's *corruption prevention action plan*;
- through their managers have to ensure the receipt and investigation of *reports* of violations, irregularities and corruption risks (whistle-blowing) concerning the organization's functioning, and devise procedures for this purpose;
- appoint integrity advisers[9] for public administrative bodies with more than fifty employees;
- *oblige all officers and managers to take part in training on the subjects of integrity, corruption prevention and ethics*.

From the viewpoint of implementation in practice, an important *rule providing a guarantee* is that the assessment of the integrity and corruption risks, drafting the annual integrity reports and devising the procedures for handling reports are the *personal liability of the head of the organization*. In supporting the implementation of the programme, an important role was played by the *Ministry of Public Administration and Justice in association with the National University of Public Service launching a priority project with a budget of HUF 680 million in December* 2012 under the State Reform Operational Programme (ÁROP) with the title of *Prevention of Corruption and Overview of Public Administration Development*.

The project implemented the following three training courses, each with a different focus, for the prevention and reduction of corruption:

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[8] Under this scope, on 18 November 2011 the President of the State Audit Office, the President of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General, and the Minister of Public Administration and Justice issued a joint statement of their commitment to act against corruption.

[9] The *integrity adviser* cooperates in assessing the integrity and corruption risks related to the functioning of the public administrative body, and in drafting the action plan to handle these as well as the integrity report about the plan's implementation; makes proposals for holding vocational ethics and anti-corruption training at the public administrative body, and participates in its implementation; provides advice and information to the managers and employees of the organization in any vocational ethics issue that may arise. In the possession of authorization granted by the head of the organization, the integrity adviser performs duties related to receiving and investigating reports about violations, irregularities and integrity (whistle-blowing) and corruption risks related to the functioning of the organization on behalf of the organization's head, and may also perform the activities of the data protection officer, equal opportunities officer and disciplinary commissioner.

- *Integrity adviser specialized further training* for government officials organized by the *National University of Public Service's Institute of Executive Training and Continuing Education*. The training course is a classified further training programme under the government decree on the further education of civil servants. Until 31 May 2014, 120 people passed the exam in this specialization. The training is supported by the president of the SAO.
- One-day mini-training sessions dealt with the subjects of public administration ethics and integrity. A total of 8 375 people took part in the training series.
- On 4 September 2013 the 2.5 day *integrity management* training was launched for senior government officials with 751 participants.

As a continuation of the programme, the government's *National Anti-Corruption Programme for 2015–18* also started from the premise that corruption is the degradation of organizational operation that takes the form of various irregularities, crimes and unethical acts the opposite of which comprises integral operation based on accountability, developing professional and managerial competences, and abiding by undertaken values, in other words integrity. The application of efficient preventive measures, however, can only be expedient if the effective anti-corruption action is based on the balance of repressive (retaliatory) and preventive (precautionary) instruments.

An important measure in the management of the realization of the programme was that, after the Ministry of *Public Administration and Justice was abolished* in 2014, the continuation of the anti-corruption policy was transferred to the remit of the Interior Minister and its implementation became the responsibility of the *National Protective Service*. In the framework of government duties related to anti-corruption activity, the Service

- prepares the government's anti-corruption strategy and submits it to the minister responsible for law enforcement,
- devises methodological aid supporting the preparation of the corruption prevention action plan and the integrity report, and submits it to the minister responsible for law enforcement,
- conducts integrity and corruption risk assessments,
- continually evaluates the corruption situation and the situation of the anti-corruption government activity, and informs the government via the minister responsible for law enforcement,
- cooperates in the development and synchronization of the integrity management system of public administrative bodies,
- prepares anti-corruption communication materials and
- takes part in fulfilling the reporting and representation obligations arising from international cooperation and national agreements.

Under the auspices of the National Protective Service, on 1 October 2014 a new organizational unit called the *Corruption Prevention Department* directly subordinate to the chief director *started work, whose activity is extended to improving the quality of organizational operation in addition to individual prevention*. Processing feedback received from the Service's other units as well as actual cases aids the Department's work and contributes to incorporating practical experience into policy concepts (for details see Váradi–Varga, 2015).

Options for the multi-directional and multi-purpose application of integrity

After the multi-faceted presentation of the anti-corruption role of integrity, it is necessary to draw attention – albeit briefly – to certain areas where its application may form an increasingly important part of security policy considerations. These include political integrity, the integrity of law enforcement agencies and the integrity of the water sector.

Political integrity

The political integrity system, interpreted as an opposite of multi-faceted political corruption, is the sum of interrelated measures (tools and processes) through which the destructive effect of political corruption on the transparency and accountability of the government can be reduced. Although these measures vary greatly from country to country, they have three basic characteristics in common:
- they regulate and direct the behaviour of politicians;
- they prevent or at least hinder abuses of power as regards obtaining community resources;
- they increase public trust in political processes by ensuring greater social (civil) participation in decision processes (Casas-Zamora et al., 2003).

In order to achieve political integrity, countries need to take measures increasing transparency, to strengthen accountability through control and broader coordination, and to facilitate through measures the resolution of conflicts of interests among political decision-makers. In relation to such necessary measures, a real global challenge is the lack of adequate regulation as well as shortcomings in implementation with regard to existing regulations. These restrictions are particularly significant in the transitional countries where the institutional system of democracy only has a short past.

     In Hungary – after lengthy debates – there has been progress in the area of political party and campaign financing in recent years. It is now forbidden for parties to accept contributions from domestic legal entities or organizations without legal personality (previously the ban only applied to legal persons linked to the state budget). Neither can parties accept any financial support from other states or foreign organizations or natural persons who are not Hungarian nationals. In accordance with the regulatory provisions, all donations exceeding five hundred thousand Hungarian forints received in the course of one calendar year must appear in the financial statements with the name of the donor and the sum given indicated. Accepting support whose origin cannot be identified is also forbidden. The media which agree to publish political advertisements must report the costs of the advertising service within five working days to the SAO, which will make this information public. Every candidate and nominating organization must make public the sum, source and method of use of state support, other funds and financial support devoted to parliamentary elections in the official journal *Magyar Közlöny* within sixty days of the parliamentary elections.

Integrity of law enforcement agencies

Due to lack of space, only some characteristic features of law enforcement integrity are illustrated by the examples of two countries.

In the Netherlands, the integrity of law enforcement units can be regarded as strong. In general, they are well-equipped, have the requisite financial resources, are sufficiently independent and work in a transparent manner. At first glance, the number of offences breaching police integrity seems high. One factor that plays a role in this is that the Dutch police has a well-functioning integrity system and thus any violations come to the surface quickly. In the fight against corruption, a key role is played by the activity of the police, and in particular the Special Investigation Unit of the Dutch National Police. The unit is an independent institution and its tasks include the investigation of corruption cases which affect civil servants. (Conducting similar investigations within the police falls within the competence of different internal services.) Of the 120-member unit, 90 people work as detectives in close cooperation with other investigatory bodies.

This organizational unit of the police deals with investigating the most serious crimes. In the course of investigating corruption cases, the activities and positions which are most exposed to abuse of power are examined. In the unit's experience, activities and positions that have public powers are the most vulnerable as regards corruption. In the course of analyzing the corruption risks, the degree of harm and the impact on public powers caused by the offences is considered. Accordingly, the incidents are placed on a scale of one to five. The degree of the harm caused is indicated separately on the scale (Table 6) in the case of the government (public administration) and economic losses.

The unit's risk analysis primarily serves the prevention of cases causing the most harm (grade five). Such a case is, for example, when an incident gravely harming the rule of law takes place (bribing judges or members of parliament). The unit most often experienced corruption crimes committed within local governments.

Table 6

Degree of corruption risks based on the harm caused

Degree of harm	Impact on government, public administration	Economic impact
	Harmful impact	**Harmful impact**
V	on legislation	on free competition in the whole of the economy
IV	on the government's exercise of power	on free competition in a main sector of the economy
III	on the activity of a government institution	on free competition in markets or local areas
II	on the activity of a government institution for a period of time	on free competition with regard to some enterprises
I	on the area of competence of a civil servant	on free competition in the future if it is not defined

Source: Rijksrecherche, 2007

As regards the *United States of America*, it is worth noting that certain police survey results that were conducted in relation to misconduct and corruption are valuable. In the past, the experience of surveys and studies showed that police misconduct was attributable to the personal behaviour of individual police officers. Later studies indicated that Afro-Americans are inclined to view this as more of a structural and political problem, while others believe that misconduct is only episodic and isolated.

The most recent research emphasizes that shortcomings in the management and culture of police units are the real reason for police misconduct. Thus, in order to maintain integrity, efficient measures are needed in the following areas:

- accountability of police supervisors and managers,
- equal treatment of all members of the police,
- better citizen accessibility to police units,
- more efficient inspections and audits, and
- quality training of police personnel in order to raise the standard of ethical and cultural awareness.

Based on a series of interviews conducted with 3 235 police officers, the following recommendations can be made:

- police officers should respond not only to minor offences but discipline major offences as well,
- disciplinary proceedings should be open to the public and
- police officers should be put in shifts on a rotational basis to avoid the formation of bonds that may encourage connivance.[10]

Integrity of the water sector

A new development related to integrity in recent years is that, in addition to applications of a functional nature, sector-type applications have also appeared, for example in the form of the integrity of the water sector. This first occurred at the 6th World Water Forum (Marseille, 2012), where the OECD Water Governance Initiative was adopted. Of the six objectives of the initiative, one proposed that by 2018 thirty countries should support the application of the integrity approach in the water sector. Consequently, the OECD Ministerial Council adopted the principles of water governance (Figure 6) in 2015.

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[10]   U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice – NIJ.gov.

Figure 6
OECD principles on water governance

Source: OECD, 2015

The diversity of the guidelines also suggests that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to water challenges worldwide but rather a menu of options arising from the different features of the countries. It should also be noted that the source of the guidelines is in the principles of good governance, where integrity and transparency are basic requirements.

The *integrity of water management* means the application of values, principles and norms which are essential from the viewpoint of water supply and managing water sources. As can be seen, *this integrity is a broader concept than the one used in connection with anti-corruption* as it embraces three important correlating areas. These are:
- *transparency,* which enables openness and clarity in relation to political and professional decisions affecting the sector;
- *accountability,* which ensures that stakeholders have to report concerning the political, administrative and financial dimensions of water processes; and
- *engaging stakeholders* in devising water policies and in the implementation processes of such policies (OECD, 2014).

This broadly interpreted integrity is expected to contribute in large measure to eliminating or lessening the gaps (Figure 7) which are constant accompaniments to water management, as was recognized, among others, by the 2013 Budapest Water Summit. In this sector the importance of strengthening integrity is increased by sector-specific circumstances such as the capital-intensive nature of development especially regarding budgetary investments; the large number of stakeholders; the resulting asymmetric difference of information related to conditions and financial options for the participants, and the high degree of monopolization in the sector.

Figure 7

OECD's multi-level governance framework: "Mind the Gaps, Bridge the Gaps"

Source: OECD, 2011

Security assessment of the National Integrity System

The comprehensive assessment of the National Integrity System from the viewpoint of security can be conducted using two approaches. One is based on the institutional concept of the *National Integrity System (NIS)* devised by Transparency International, and the other, as a new methodological proposal, on the evaluation of the standard of service of performing state functions and duties.

National Integrity System

The purpose of the NIS is to enable Transparency International, and mainly its national integrity workshops, to comprehensively assess the given country's system of integrity. The NIS country case studies are based on 13 pillars (institutions) which are the most important components of the system of integrity (Figure 8).

Figure 8
The components of the system of national integrity

The authors of the studies, partly using information of key importance gained from in-depth interviews conducted with participants, assess the components (institutions) from the following three aspects:

- *the soundness of institutional capacities:* resources and the legal status of the institution forming the basis of institutional efficiency;
- *internal management rules and practices:* with special attention to the ability of a transparent institution functioning in an accountable and fair manner to prevent the development of corruption; and
- *the institution's ability* to adequately perform its duties related to action against corruption, in other words, whether it ensures efficient control by the government (legislation) and acts against corruption cases (executive power, law enforcement agencies).

The *institutional analysis* following these aspects (dimensions) is embedded in the comprehensive political, socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions in which the governing institutions operate. Based on the necessary data for this gathered from several sources and using several methods (qualitative research tools, document analyses, in-depth interviews, etc.), the researchers determine the point values of the classifying indicators (about 12 indicators for each pillar) used in the course of the analysis, thus enabling the research groups of countries to form their positions with regard to the scores, check their validity, and formulate priorities and recommendations for the institutions and political and lobby organizations to strengthen the anti-corruption fight. National integrity studies with this approach and of this nature are currently being made in almost one hundred countries worldwide. They can contribute to security considerations by indicating the degree to which each pillar preserves and protects integrity.

Assessment of the performance of state functions

The assessment considering the standard of performance of state functions and priority tasks compares the effectiveness of performing certain state functions (Table 7) and duties with the value of a specific and acceptable norm (sustainable development strategy objectives, programmes), and provides an assessment classifying the security of state functioning based on whether the actual standard of service corresponds with, falls behind or exceeds the value of the norm.

In performing this task, special attention is given to the domestic and foreign professional conditions and circumstances influencing the performance of state functions and tasks on the one hand and to identifying weaknesses important from the aspect of the changing security environment on the other. The following reasons may appear among factors causing the fragility of state operation:

- the unfavourable effects of economic and financial crises and crisis management solutions on income, employment and society;
- *large* difference in income between groups of the population that is *socially unacceptable* (e.g. between the lower and upper income fifths);
- the large-scale shortage of capacities ensuring community satisfaction (health, education, etc.) services;
- the insufficient nature of community (e.g. water) services even if the requisite capacities for producing state services are available, only in their use the state institutional system does not take the population's requirements into account;
- apart from formal state institutions, non-formal institutions also exist but the borders between their activities as regards the public and private sectors are not regulated, which hinders efficient cooperation (OECD, 2009);
- the government lacks necessary public support;
- the impact on individual countries of unexpected extraordinary international events (e.g. international sanctions, large-scale unregulated migration);
- unilateral, possibly exaggerated international expectations arising in connection with such international events.

Table 7
State functions and their groups

Minimal functions
Public services
Protection, legality and order
Ensuring and protecting property rights
Macroeconomic management
Providing public health service
Social cohesion (improving the situation of the poor)
Strengthening international (global) cooperation

Intermediate functions
Enforcing externalities in education and training
Enforcing externalities in environmental protection
Ensuring the appropriate quality of education
Regulating competition and monopolies
Providing pensions, family and unemployment benefits
Activation functions
Strengthening competitiveness
Income redistribution
State (financial) control

Source: Own compilation

Destabilization processes potentially threatening security can be detected and identified using diverse and continuously conducted risk analyses based on the above and similar aspects. Risk analyses can be particularly efficient if they extend to state functions and the range of the most important related state duties in addition to actual well-defined security vulnerability situations.

In order to be able to define measures to reduce or eliminate the weaknesses identified from the viewpoint of security in the previous phase, *the functioning integrity management system's ability to perform from the aspect of security must also be assessed,* in other words, whether the system is suitable for counterbalancing the weaknesses by adapting or regrouping its tools and processes. The findings of the survey are indispensable for judging the areas where and the extent to which executive decision-making can be effective.

Inasmuch as the current tools and processes of the integrity management system prove to be insufficient for counterbalancing the weaknesses, *the introduction of the necessary new tools and processes* and their order can *be determined* based on the *difference* between the performance of the functions compromising security and the maturity of the management system. In the course of this, the expedience and proportion of the application of rules-based and value-based tools requires separate consideration, paying special attention to the environment of state functions and key tasks.

An expert survey conducted in 2008–09 in the Research Institute of the State Audit Office to classify the performance of state function groups using the Delphi method, for example, produced the result that the standard of such important functions as social cohesion (improving the situation of the poor), macroeconomic management, and the provision of education and a public health service lagged significantly behind the social and government norms. This circumstance also had a considerable impact from the viewpoint of national security over the past years.

The application of the security and integrity assessment methodology employed in this way allows a programme strengthening and developing security to be devised that fits into the frameworks and forms an integral part of state building. In this way the question of security is turned into a public issue in the broadest sense by organically linking the public, business and private sectors.

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