

*Péter Dely*

## **Combating Terrorism in the Western World: Is it Warfare or Law Enforcement?**

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### **Abstract**

The essay deals with the definition of terrorism, highlighting the criteria of terrorism and examining who can be called a terrorist. It compares terrorism with guerrilla warfare. The paper also provides examples for the different theories, while also focusing on the possible government reactions. With the help of statistical data, it delineates the possible ways of eliminating terrorist groups. Based on historical examples, the paper offers recommendations to change the current system, especially in the field of use of force, and counter-terrorist operations.

*Keywords:* terrorism, guerrilla warfare, law enforcement, use of force, counter terrorism, military operations, community policing

### **Introduction<sup>1</sup>**

The fact that the battle against terrorism is a fundamental interest of every democratic state, does not, I think, need to be proved. If we want to see how the state can respond to terrorism, we first have to define the concept itself. While many have tried to find numerous ways to define it, there is currently no fundamental description of what we mean by the word terrorism, and most of all who we consider to be a terrorist. Alex P. Schmid: *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (SCHMID, 2011) presents 250 different definitions. Almost all of these definitions have the following characteristics: terrorism is mostly directed against non-combatants; commits crime and violence against society; politically motivated, and thus refers to religious and other ideological goals. However, if we want to use law enforcement agencies in a state based on the rule of law to fight terrorism, a legal category is also needed.

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<sup>1</sup> Here I wish to emphasize the difference in terminology in the English language which is non-existent in Hungarian. Counter Terrorism: the intelligence gathering on and averting of terrorism, that is, the national security aspect dominates, while Anti-Terrorism: the physical, armed struggle or operation itself. In this paper, in most cases I use counter-terrorism in the sense of operational activities falling under anti-terrorism.

In Hungary, Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code defines the concept of terrorism in Section 314. When clarifying the political and legal category, it is also important to mention that a person who can be linked to terrorism is not the same as the legal and criminal category of a person suspected of perpetrating an act of terror.

## **Wars, guerrillas, terrorists**

Attila Ágh, in his book entitled *Conflicts and Wars* (ÁGH, 1989: 186.) mentions several types of war and conflict. Of these, let us take a look at what he says about the destabilization war: “The type of local war in which the focus has already shifted towards the non-military means and goals of the conflict is called a destabilization war... The main effort is no longer aimed at the direct military defeat of the opponent, but at exhausting him in a protracted conflict and to force its collapse by all possible means.”

Terrorism is a war activity following the logic of asymmetric warfare. The declared strategy of the present-day groups that we consider to be terrorist groups, that of the Muslim religious groups, in particular, is the same as the objectives of destabilization wars. Whether someone counts as a terrorist, or a group counts as a terrorist organization, is not a result of a system of criteria based on a scientific criterion, but a decision by the political leadership of the states concerned.

We can definitely and with certainty declare that perpetrators of terrorist acts are waging war on the party attacked. If we consider the clearest wording of the interpretation of war, according to which “war is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will” (CLAUSEWITZ, 2013: 39.), then there is no question that terrorism is war, fighting which is a military task.

## **Possible operational counter-measures**

There is no problem in the interpretation of terrorism in the crisis management mission areas of NATO and EU member states, which is considered as combat operations and is countered with counter-insurgency operations. The situation is different with regard to terrorist acts committed in the territory of European countries.

With regard to recent events in Paris, Brussels, London and Boston, terrorism was considered a criminal category, and consequently the state can only respond to them in accordance with the rules of its own criminal law and criminal procedural law. The problem arises in the perpetration of violent, often suicide attacks aimed at taking the life of the victims. During such operations, the average police response, based on the experiences of recent events, is inadequate and ineffective.

If we consider all these operations to be those of an existing terrorist organization, then it follows logically that terrorist acts in Western countries fit into the category of destabilization warfare, only the theatre of war is shifted. Nowadays, it is a trend that perpetrators of terrorist acts are individuals who are not in personal contact with the terrorist organizations, often they do not receive any material support from them, only ideological guidance. The

term “proxy war” equally fits the acts committed by these people just as it fits the operations of insurgent groups supported by the great powers.

## The use of force

Nowadays, the operational and professional dilemma is becoming more and more prevalent that the operations of the police units determined by the legal framework fall short of the desired result, and the effective solution of the military special units is contrary to the legal regulation.

At the same time, international trends, in particular in recent developments, show that Europe is drifting towards a military response. Both in Hungary and in the EU countries there is strict control over the use of service firearms by the police. Although there are differences, but in general it can be said that the relevant regulations allow only aimed single shots at the person against whom the legal criteria of the use of deadly force are met.

Nevertheless, during a recent police operation in France, for example, when the authorities tried to arrest an individual named Merah (suspected of committing terrorist acts) (Index, 2015), approximately 5,000 shots were fired, and this is against the French police regulations. Tactical techniques used in military combat, such as suppressive fire, are inadmissible in the spirit of the law during the use of police service firearms, but effective tactics of counter-terrorism require their application.

All European countries have modern counter-terrorism SWAT teams equipped and trained to meet the requirements of the age, which typically operate as part of the police. However, if it is about a pre-planned operation based on intelligence (such as the arrest in Paris mentioned above), first response police units not specially trained/equipped get involved in a combat engagement with terrorists. Another problem to be mentioned is the fact the tactical techniques of the police and counter-terrorist units are based on the Christian European approach, namely the assumption that people do not usually want to die, they choose to surrender in a hopeless, unequal situation. As a result, many police methods, primarily designed to protect human life, are ineffective against the fundamentalist terrorist prepared for suicide martyrdom, the only and effective solution is the immediate and accurate use of force.

In 2008, the RAND Corporation published a study on the disappearance and liquidation of terrorist groups, in which 648 terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006 were analyzed. According to their findings, 244 groups are currently active, 136 have ceased to exist on their own. Out of the remaining 268 groups, 27 were victorious, 20 were liquidated by using military forces, 107 groups were liquidated by police forces, 114 groups were transformed into political movements (JONES-LIBICKI, 2008).

Reading these figures, we can definitely say that the police methods have been successful. However, if we look at the numbers in detail, we can make the following statements. Out of the 107 groups wiped out by police, there were 47 extreme leftist organizations with a membership of a couple of tens of individuals, maximum 100 individuals. 38 of them were active in the 1970's and 1980's. 14 groups were extremist right-wing organizations, and only three operated after the millennium. 33 terrorist groups were based on nationalist ideologies,

of which only 7 were established in the early 2000s, the rest were active earlier. There were altogether 14 religiously motivated groups, and only 3 were formed after the millennium.<sup>2</sup>

It is even more interesting to analyze groups with a membership of more than 1000 and 10 thousand individuals separately. At the closing date of the study, 49 terrorist groups with 1,000 members and 13 groups with more than 10,000 members were recorded. 16 groups with 1,000 members and 16 groups with 10,000 members have become political movements. 7 terrorist groups with 1,000 members and 6 groups with 10,000 members were victorious. Three groups with 1,000 members and 2 groups of 10,000 were disbanded on their own. 6 terrorist groups with 1,000 members and 1 group with 10,000 members were liquidated by military means. There were 1 group each that were liquidated with policing means. In the case of groups with a larger mass base, therefore, the failure of the police solution becomes apparent and the military and political solutions will come to the fore.

Even more shocking is the analysis of data if we want to draw a parallel between past events and the current fight, that is the fight against the Islamic State. During the period under review, a single terrorist group with a mass base of more than 1000 people was organized on a religious basis, whose declared aim was to overthrow the prevailing system and set up a new social model on a religious basis. This was the Algerian “Armed Islamic Group”, which operated between 1995 and 2000 and was ultimately eliminated by military means (JONES–LIBICKI, 2008).

## Is there a solution?

As can be clearly seen from the foregoing, a community policing model so successful in everyday life is ineffective against the terrorism of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It may, however, be worthwhile to observe the methods of countries where police forces are exclusively responsible for countering terrorism. Such an example could be the subdual of the Sikh uprising in Punjab, India between 1980 and 1994 and the related terrorist acts. Police Major General Kanwar Pal Singh Gill was appointed head of the counter-insurgency operations in 1988. Upon assuming the assignment, General Gill declared that since terrorism and insurgency are not a law enforcement problem, but a form of war, so ordinary law enforcement techniques are insufficient to deal with the problem. There is a need to reformulate the rules of “use of force”<sup>3</sup>: it cannot be used only in the ultimate case, striving after minimal use of force. In his view, the use of force must be proportionate to the threat, and it is necessary to approach this method when it produces effective results. It is important that the armed units and the logistic support base of the movement or terrorist organization should be destroyed or made inoperative at a rate that exceeds its regenerative capacity. At the same time, he also stated that this was only possible with strong political support. If politics are about to make concessions or initiate negotiations with the terrorist group, it means the beginning of the road to defeat.

<sup>2</sup> As the study was prepared in 2008, the Islamic State and several successors of the Al-Qaeda are not included in the analysis.

<sup>3</sup> *Use of force*: in English terminology: “use of service firearms”

As a result, a number of amendments to the law were introduced. The first and, in my view, the most incompatible one with European democratic principles, is the amendment of the National Security Act that suspended many restrictions on the operation of law enforcement agencies and allowed detention up to two years without judicial decisions, that is, even in the absence of evidence of the confirmed perpetration of criminal acts. They also alleviated the rules of the use of deadly force (service firearms) by law enforcement agencies and have created a separate apparatus and organisation for combating terrorism (RESPERGER et al., 2013).

In Hungary, Act CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services and Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police also provide for combating terrorism. They both designate several organizations in the area of intelligence and internal security, but only the general police service has investigative powers. It is worth noting that the Police Act refers back to the National Security Services Act in relation to a counter-terrorist organization and authorizes research and screening work on the basis of authorizations included in this law. Thus, there is a duality in the activities of the Counter-Terrorism Centre: it is authorized to act both as a police unit and a national security service. The problem is with the police operations that may be involved in the fight against terrorism, which is subject to the use of force. In these cases, the relevant regulation is the same as the one for the community policing police model, which is described in the Police Act.

In my view, therefore, it may be worthwhile to consider amendment of the rules of “use of force” (use of force cannot be authorized as the ultimate action, minimal use of force should not be pursued), as well as the complete separation of counter-terrorism from the community policing model. However, this regulation can only be implemented against really aggressive terrorists who are committed to the perpetration of violent crimes against life. This raises two problems. On the one hand, it is not expected from a highly trained counter-terrorist unit to operate under double standards, that is to say, according to civilian police regulations on one occasion and according to regulations on counter-terrorism on another. In other words, it is not fortunate to use a police officer trained for the fight against terror in a community policing role. The other problem is that even the criminal law definition of terrorism is too broad, so it allows us to see a person as a terrorist who did not intend to commit or aid a crime against life. It is natural that in the fight against terrorism it is equally important to detect and eliminate funding and the propaganda background, but not necessarily with the most serious and most violent methods.

## **Conclusion**

Overall, we can say that domestic counter-terrorism activities (both in Hungary and in the EU) are ripe for a paradigm shift. New equipment, techniques, training methods and new legislation allowing this to happen are needed. The separation of the community police and counter-terrorism in both organizational and regulatory areas will become indispensable. The starting point for the changes should be research done to academic standards and based on the analysis of facts and events, also using the theoretical knowledge of the military sciences. Following the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism strategies set up by David Galula, but later hallmarked by General Petraeus, a military-based anti-terrorist strategy

based on military principles must be established before some regions in the European Union become crisis zones themselves.

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*Péter Balogh*

## **New Millennium – Emerging Challenge? Empirical Analysis of the Global Terrorism Operative Cooperation Network**

*“certain connections may develop between the previously separate types  
of terrorism”*  
(HASKÓ, 2002: 24.)

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### **Abstract**

In this paper, our aim is to empirically explore the emergence and the challenge of terrorist actions realized in cooperation by multiple organizations in the new millennium. We analyze the development of collaboration among terrorist groups describing the trans-regional network constituted by cooperative attacks. We demonstrate the desirable outcomes of partnership for the terrorist organizations concerned and highlight how collaborative terrorist actions have become a major threat for the wider social sphere. In our research, we carry out secondary analysis of statistical data. In the process of data analysis we employ mainly descriptive and some other statistical methods. Furthermore, we apply basic social network analysis tools. According to our preliminary results, terrorism in the new millennium has become globally embedded through cooperative terrorist attacks. This international terrorist network is segmented regionally and certain actors gain greater importance in the structure than others; however, cooperation proves to be advantageous for the terrorist groups concerned.

*Keywords:* terrorism, cooperation, network embeddedness, empirical research, social network analysis

### **The problem**

Parallel with the cross-border flows of the new millennium, integrating the world into an inter-connected system (ROSTOVÁNYI, 2002: 72.), to a major extent owing to the information logistics and replacement system covering more than one continent (JÓZSA, 2002: 100.),

security and terrorism also took a new term (HASKÓ, 2002: 14–15.). A global space (KISS, 2002: 39.) and global threats (ROSTOVÁNYI, 2002: 77.) were developing, in which the challenge caused by the cross-border terrorist networks (KISS, 2002: 40.) became greater and greater. A threat emerged spreading in all directions globally and cannot be associated with a particular territory (KISS, 2002: 47.). Besides the spread of conflicts (KISS, 2002: 42.) it also meant that they became interconnected through the cooperation of terrorist organizations and social actors (KISS, 2002: 42.), i.e., on the basis of the transnational relations between terrorist organizations, the terrorist actions also became international (ROSTOVÁNYI, 2002: 80.). A global anti-terrorist coalition (KISS, 2002: 44.) was formed to combat this transnational form of terrorism (ROSTOVÁNYI, 2002: 80.) and the internationalization of terrorist organizations (N. RÓZSA, 2002: 270.), so a community of states confronts the network of the terrorist organizations (ROSTOVÁNYI, 2002: 82.).

In the framework of our research outlined in this study, we search empirical answers (1) to the occurrence and spread of operative terrorist actions performed in cooperation.<sup>1</sup> We intend to (2) explore the network structure of the trans-regional integration of terrorism through multi-actor terrorist cooperation (GRANOVETTER, 2006), identify the main actors in this global market of terrorism (TÁLAS, 2006: 8.) and the role of the weak bridging connections in macro-level integration (GRANOVETTER, 1991). We shall also refer to the effectiveness of such cooperative terrorist actions (3) and, in relation to them, their hazards.

## Methodological outline

Our research is based on the secondary analysis of statistical data extracted from the records of the *Global Terrorism Database*. The analysis was conducted on two different levels: on the one hand (1), some main versions of the records – relevant for the topic – were used in their *original form* as contained in the database, yet (2) we also formed a *social network database* with the data of organizations taking part in multi-party terrorist actions and the relations between them. During the data analysis, we use primarily descriptive statistics and simple, two-variable comparisons. The cooperation patterns of terrorist networks are illustrated with graphs, while the structures are indicated with simple network indicators.<sup>2</sup>

## Data analyses

### Diffusion of cooperative terrorist actions

0.7% of the terrorist actions analyzed in this study were executed in cooperation; on the basis of the information of the dataset, in total 930 such events were identified (Table 1).

<sup>1</sup> In our analysis, we look at a terrorist action implemented in cooperation as some special *innovation*, where there is a new form of organization behind the innovation (SCHUMPETER, 1980: 111.), so we aim to investigate the dissemination and diffusion of that innovation.

<sup>2</sup> The statistical calculations were made with SPSS 20, and the social network analysis was prepared with the Ucinet 6 and NetDraw software products.



However, the distribution of such cooperative attacks shows very special patterns both in terms of the dynamism in time and regional proportions.

Table 1  
*Distribution of cooperative terrorist actions by region*

| Region                                    | %     | Colour code |
|---|-------|-------------|
| North America                             | 5.1   |             |
| Central America and the Caribbean Islands | 1.4   |             |
| South America                             | 13.8  |             |
| East Asia                                 | 0.0   |             |
| Southeast Asia                            | 5.3   |             |
| South Asia                                | 29.7  |             |
| Central Asia                              | 0.4   |             |
| Western Europe                            | 4.9   |             |
| Eastern Europe                            | 0.4   |             |
| Middle East and North Africa              | 28.9  |             |
| Sub-Saharan Africa                        | 10.0  |             |
| Austral(as)ia and Oceania                 | 0.1   |             |
| Total (N = 930)                           | 100.0 |             |

Source: Own calculation and editing based on GTD data

It is a characteristic feature of the dynamism in time of cooperation-based terrorist actions that one-tenth (11.1%) of such attacks were registered until 1990 and only slightly more than one-fifth (23.4%) of all cooperative attacks were made until 2000, too. Consequently, in terms of diffusion in time it may be concluded that *cooperation, as an operative tactic of terrorist organization has become a dominant feature in the new millennium*. However, the regional affiliation of global terrorism is another important factor. Such form of violent activities did not appear at all in the central and eastern regions of Asia, in the Australian region, in Eastern Europe or in the central region of the American continent at all, or only in a negligible proportion (Table 1). Approximately 5% of the cooperative terrorist actions took place in Western Europe, North America and Southeast Asia, while at least one-tenth of such actions could be observed in the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and South America. *The majority of cooperation-based terrorist actions occurred in the regions of the Near East/North Africa and South Asia* as, practically, those two regions provided the scenes of more than half, almost three-fifth (58.6%) of all the related terrorist attacks. Taking into account both the differences in the global space and diffusion in time, other notable tendencies can be observed (Figure 1).




Figure 1

*Diffusion of cooperative terrorist actions by region<sup>3</sup>*

*Source: Own calculation and editing based on GTD data*

It may be concluded that the cooperation-based terrorist actions occurred in North America first but by the end of the analyzed period, i.e., 2014, the number remained lower than 50. As time went on, in the middle of the 1980s cooperation as a special form of carrying out attacks appeared first in South America and then, around 1990, among the organizations of Western European region. However, with the exception of South America, in the former regions the number of cooperative terrorist actions remained relatively low. The next milestone occurred in the second half, and at the end of the 1990s and around the millennium, when that type of attack began to spread in the regions of Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by a sudden and extremely rapid increase, as a result of which, by the end of the analyzed period, the number of cooperative terrorist actions was by far the largest in the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia. In summary, it may be concluded, that by 2014, *the organizations using cooperation early reached a relatively low level with some moderate increase and primarily the organizations adapting that method later applied this “innovation” extensively.* A special tendency was that the growth in South Asia and the Near East/North Africa began parallel with the slowing and end of the growth in North America and that growth has been unbroken in the latter regions, where the diffusion curve is not getting any flatter, suggesting a further rise in the number of cooperative actions and the continuation of this very special innovation.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> For the sake of more clarity, the figure only shows the regions which are associated with a higher number of actions, i.e., terrorist markets with major cooperative actions.

<sup>4</sup> The events of the last two years presumably indicate the continuation of these tendencies, but we do not have any data suitable for analysis in that regard.

## Structure of the cooperation network

The global network structure of terrorist actions executed in cooperation is<sup>5</sup> not at all consistent: there are significant differences both in the number actors,<sup>6</sup> and in the relations between participants (Figure 2). As an example, the only terrorist action executed in cooperation in Australia and Oceania remains fully isolated in this map, but the situation is also similar in the East European terrorist market and its network relations, where the number of organizations is also rather low.




Figure 2

*Graph of the global network of terrorist actions implemented in cooperation*

Source: Own editing

<sup>5</sup> We wish to stress that our analysis concentrates on the operative form of terrorism, interpreted at the level of actions and that any alliance between the organizations is disregarded in this work. The latter is a large area and naturally an extremely interesting part of global terrorism, but here our objective is to identify the network system of globally integrated terrorism developing on the basis of specific cooperation in actions.

<sup>6</sup> The network constituting the subject matter of the analysis consists of 435 organizations that can be clearly identified or distinguished in the cooperation structure, i.e., the name of the organization is known (those included in the database as "other" or "individual" were left out), and their region of operation can also be identified (lack of information and unclear location were also considered missing data).

There are similarities between the central region of the American continent (Central America and the Caribbean Islands) and North America as well as the former Eastern Europe as basically a small number of not very significant organizations operate in the regions, yet they have bridging connections (GRANOVETTER, 1991), i.e., they have relations with organizations from other regions.<sup>7</sup> Such an example is the South American region, which has the most widespread and, to a certain extent, *differentiated* cooperation network, where there are a number of actors that have relations with multiple organizations. Similarly, among those taking part in the network of terrorist actions observed in the region of Western Europe some major actors stand out; however, this region is still also isolated because it only has one common tie connecting it to the global network.

In that respect the Central Asia region is a kind of *contrary one*, which has a relatively high network integration with other regions, yet relatively few actors. However, at regional level the global cooperative network of terrorist actions is still *dominated* by the organizations of the Middle East/North African and South Asian regions, i.e. “*international*” terrorism according to the EU typology (VINCZE, 2006: 119–120.) both in terms of numbers, network connections and their importance in the entire structure. These two regions, complemented by the Sub-Saharan and South East and Central Asian terrorist actors who have (multiple) relations with them, can be identified as the *dominant segment of the international terrorist network*. The *organizations* that are *most important* within the global system, i.e., have the most connections, operating the *South Asian region*, but the number of relatively important organizations stand out from the cooperation network in the Middle East, too.

Before identifying the central actors, let us briefly look at the whole global cooperation structure. In the sub-system formed by the interconnected actors of the network the geodesic distance<sup>8</sup> is 5.34 – which results in low compactness (= 0.040) and significant fragmentation (0.96). The centrality of the network is also low (Freeman’s degree centrality = 0.27%); only 0.27% of the possible connections exist in the network. There are significant differences between the terrorist organizations in terms of the number of connections: the average degree is 5.17, i.e., on average one actor has this number of connections, which is coupled with high standard deviation (10.16). *Fourteen terrorist organizations* are above the average degree plus two standard deviations – 25.49 connections, i.e. high centrality (Figure 3) –, which therefore have *outstanding importance* in the global cooperation network of terrorists compared to the other organizations. These actors *cover one-third of the connections of the entire network* (32.28%) although represents only a fragment of all organizations (~3%). In terms of composition, this upper segment of terrorist groups is rather homogeneous as half of the network elements come from the terrorist organizations of the Middle East and North African regions and another four are also affiliated in the rather large South Asian region. One or two South American organizations and one Southeast Asian actors have also made it to the top.

<sup>7</sup> The importance of weak or bridging connections emerges at *macro level* in relation to the integration of the particular structure: the closely related high density sub-groups emerging from strong connections build a relationship through the weak connections (GRANOVETTER, 1991).

<sup>8</sup> In a particular social network the geodesic difference between any two points is the shortest path between them, i.e., “the number of actors through whom the points can have any interaction” (LETENYEI, 2006: 247).




Figure 3

*Major organizations of the cooperation network and their regional affiliation*

Source: Own calculation and editing

### Outcome indicators of cooperative terrorist actions

Cooperation provides considerable advantages to the participants: *the success rate of terrorist actions is also higher in attacks* executed in cooperation (Table 2). Approximately every ninth (90.9%) of the single actions – claimed by single organizations – is successful, but if cooperation evolves between the organizations, the ratio of successful attacks also becomes higher (93.9%).<sup>9</sup> Results also suggest that terrorist actions have *a more robust destructive force* when they are implemented by multiple actors in cooperation. Among the multi-actor terrorist events there are more<sup>10</sup> actions resulting considerable material damages (8.2% compared to 2.6%) and there are fewer cases leading to small and material damage (91.8% compared to 97.4%). Beside physical infrastructure, a terrorist attack implemented in cooperation is also *a more serious threat* in terms of *human losses*. While in actions executed by one organization on average 2.29 people die (not including suicide bombers), the attacks implemented by terrorist organizations in cooperation may claim 6.39 fatalities.<sup>11</sup> Similar and even stronger influence can be observed in the case of the wounded ones (again not including potentially wounded terrorist): cooperation raises the average 3 wounded observed in single actions on average to 10.25.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> The difference is statistically significant:  $\text{Chi}^2 = 9.828$ ;  $p = 0.002$ .

<sup>10</sup> The difference is statistically significant:  $\text{Chi}^2 = 33.434$ ;  $p = 0.000$ .

<sup>11</sup> The difference is statistically significant:  $d = -7.245$ ;  $p = 0.000$ .

<sup>12</sup> The difference is statistically significant:  $d = -7.434$ ;  $p = 0.000$ .

Table 2  
 “Benefit” of cooperation

| Type of the terrorist action | Successful (%) | Negligible material damage (%) | Significant material damage (%) | Fatalities (persons) | Wounded (persons) |
|------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| single                       | 90.9           | 97.4                           | 2.6                             | 2.29                 | 3.02              |
| cooperative                  | 93.9           | 91.8                           | 8.2                             | 6.39                 | 10.25             |
| cooperation multiplier       | 1.03           | 0.94                           | 3.15                            | 2.79                 | 3.39              |

Source: Own calculation and editing based on GTD data

In total, therefore, focusing only on the most important effects, cooperation almost triples the average number of fatalities of terrorist acts (cooperation multiplier factor = 2.79) and increases significant material damages and the average number of the wounded by more than three times.

## Concluding remarks

As a general consequence of our analysis, the thought selected as the motto of this study *may be put into past tense*, as we have empirically proved that by 2014 a kind of connection *evolved* between the previously separate types of terrorism’ (HASKÓ, 2002: 24.). Consequently, on the basis of our research results, we can state that (1) *terrorist actions implemented in cooperation* as a special type of the attacks are in fact a *western invention* as it emerged and spread first in the Northern region of the American continent, and (2) this form of cooperation *began to grow intensively* at the beginning of the new millennium and has become a mass phenomenon, predominantly in the *Middle-East/North African and South Asian regions, over the past two decades*. The (3) *social network structure of the attacks implemented in cooperation indicates global integration*, as on the basis of multiple (bridging) connections cooperative actions involve *inter-connectedness*, embeddedness *between regions*, as well as tight and dense internal networks. Finally, (4) the network embeddedness of terrorist actions has favourable consequences for the initiators and participants (greater probability of success, more significant material damage, more fatalities and wounded), yet these higher outcome indicators make this special form of cooperation an *outstanding social challenge* – spreading and diffusing according to the data – for the external environment and the potential targets.

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