Paradigm Changes in the Hungarian National Security Institutions (1990–2016)

Zoltán András Kovács PhD, Associate Professor
Imre Dobák PhD, Associate Professor of the National University of Public Service

Abstract

This study explains the development of the Hungarian national security structure – with emphasis on the civilian services – between 1990 and 2016 along with the major challenges and changes during this period. It highlights the establishment of a new democratic national intelligence structure, its modifications, the periodical changes and the security policy factors influencing the organizations and their tasks, as well. Although we did not intend to give a historical overview, this is the best way to understand the national intelligence community – with its numerous ties to society – as a result of the historical heritage and the legal, social and, finally, security-political framework.

Keywords: national security, Hungarian secret services, national security system


Numerous studies have been published that describe the changes in the history of the Hungarian secret services, primarily established to meet the challenges of the Cold War and accustomed to the atmosphere of the bipolar world order, and the road leading to “state security and national security” (Baráth, 2010). Apart from the structural changes in the various directorates, and from the organisational units under the direct command of a director general, MOI General Directorate III (State Security GD) – in a structure¹ (Urbán,

¹ The definition of the basic structure for the Hungarian secret services until the regime change can be attributed to the first Imre Nagy Government (1953), which at the time – with the dissolution of the State Protection Authority, which previously controlled the entire Hungarian secret service structure, directly under the supervision of the Rákosi party leadership – was reshuffled with the exception of Military Intelligence (Hungarian People’s Army General Staff -2, HPAGS-2) reorganized under the Ministry of Defence, the state security organizations were again integrated into the Ministry of Interior. The structural model of general directorates established a decade later in 1962 essentially carried on this structure. For further details see a publication
2007) divided into intelligence, counter-intelligence, counter-“internal reactionary forces”, military counter-intelligence and covert operational technology areas – continued to work unchanged from the restructuring in 1962 for almost 30 years, until January 1990 (Cseh, 1999). However, it was not only organizational structure, but also professional-methodological elements and internal operating mechanisms that defined the work of Hungarian state security organizations for decades, essentially until 1990. The so-called basic orders issued in the early 1970’s created the groundwork for all this.2

By the end of the 1980s, the secret services with good insight both into world events and domestic politics had increasingly been overwhelmed by uncertainty which manifested itself at the lower levels of the hierarchy in seeking better positions and the destruction of documents (especially within Directorate III/III), and in pursuing different “reform ideas” at the higher (professional and political control) levels. An important driving force behind the preparation of the regulation on state security (secret service) activities and the professional-academic debates initiated within the area of interior and justice affairs was the enactment of Act XI of 1987, whose Section 5 (b), stipulated the need to regulate the limitation of personal freedoms in an Act of Parliament.3 It is likely that never before or after this have there been so many, sometimes quite differing, concepts developed about the future of Hungarian secret services, as in 1988–1990, in an organization that apparently tried to adapt to the process of political transformation.

By the autumn of 1988, at the latest, a workshop was launched with the aim of modernising (and saving) the state security system. A team of young staff members was isolated even within the MOI so that the team members could perform their work with less control. The group operated directly under the guidance of the Secretariat of the MOI Deputy Minister for State Security. Its members studied the known Western models (organization/regulations), paying particular attention to organizations (such as the post-Franco-Spanish or South African secret services after the apartheid regime) where the political transformation resulted in a significant change in professional work (Kovács, 2011: 69). Little is known about the activities of the workgroup. It was headed by Major General József Horváth (1985–1990), Colonel Árpád Sillai, Major General Ferenc Pallagi (15 January 1990 – 14 February 1990), then Major György Szövényi, Chief of Secretariat.

by Attila Urbán (Urbán, 2007), to whom we hereby express our gratitude for his irreplaceable assistance in writing this article.

2 The legal framework for the contemporary operational work was created by Law Decree No. 17 of 1974 (on state and public security) of the Presidium of the People’s Republic, further by Decree No. 6000/1975 of the Council of Ministers (CoM) – as a classified legal regulation – (on tasks related to state security) and by Directive No. 1/1975 of the Vice Chairman of the CoM (on the means and methods applicable in the protection of state security). These legal regulations were later supplemented by MOI Directive No. 005/72 establishing the basic principles of network operation, and by MOI Directive No. 0010/1973 on the preliminary vetting and confidential investigative operations of the state security agencies.

3 Following the enactment of the law, the Prosecutor General’s Office repeatedly addressed the Minister of the Interior by letter, requesting the legal regulation of the order of the procedures imposing restrictions on privacy and civic rights. On 16 November, 1988, in a lecture given at an academic conference, a staff member of the prosecutor’s office criticized the fact that in many cases not only the means and results of covert information gathering, but also the existence of such investigations are concealed from the prosecutor involved in the investigations (Nyíri, 2000: 9).
At the end of the 1980’s, General Directorate III was a competitive organization compared with Western European counterpart services of the era, which effectively coordinated the intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, which is rarely mentioned in the literature on the topic, mainly because of the constant presence of the “informant issue” in the public discourse after 1990. Social revulsions against the Hungarian state security services veiled the fact that of all the counterpart services of the Warsaw Pact (WP) countries – as a result of the “Carlos Case” – the Hungarian state security services held a leading position in the development of anti-terrorist capabilities (Beke–Hegyes, 2015), as well as the fact that – through the Daily Operational Intelligence Report (DOIR)\textsuperscript{4} system, they had been operating as an intelligence-demand-driven organization since the late 1970s, and also that they were working in the socialist bloc with a state-of-the-art, centralized registration architecture that they had just begun to convert to computer systems.

Much as they tried to keep the workshop away from professional and political influences, the conflicts of interest between the directorates were already visible, and finally the concepts were essentially the two alternatives that, to date, accompany the professional debate on the structure of the national security services. One of them was construed in terms of a uniform service (in this centralized version, the term National Security Office was first published in March 1989), while the other was outlined in the form of a functionally fragmented structure (January 1989), with an Intelligence Office and a Counter-Intelligence Service (Baráth, 2010: 14–15.). In essence, centralization vs. decentralization and how it is implemented stands at the core of the discussions about the national security system from 1988 to 1989.

As a conceptual turning point, the Minister of the Interior submitted a proposal to the Council of Ministers on 3 July 1989 on “Issues of state security in the present domestic political situation”. On the one hand, it proposed the reintegration of the military counter-intelligence into the Hungarian People’s Army (after that the separation of the military service(s) was practically no longer in question) (Tömösváry, 2012) and the assignment of the national economy and youth protection tasks to the National Police Headquarters (HNPHQ). On the other hand, the proposal – in line with the political changes, without mentioning a specific organizational model – proposed the gradual redirection of the “Intelligence [III/I], Counter-Intelligence [III/II] and Internal Security Service [III/III] for the new concepts, tasks and directions” (Révész, 2015: 31.).

By early autumn of 1989 at the latest, as a result of the work done by a professional body independent of the working group, the drafts for the full re-regulation of state security work had also been prepared. The professional processing and analysis of these drafts has not been done to date, so, apart from the structural ideas, we still have no comprehensive knowledge

\textsuperscript{4} The system of daily operational intelligence reports is governed by MOI Directive No. 22/1978 that regulated the information briefing for the political leadership. The DOIR was compiled by the Secretariat of the Deputy Minister for State Security on the basis of daily reports submitted by the Directorates. From January 2, 1979 to January 12, 1990, the political leadership – in addition to the MOI Information Reports – was mainly briefed from these reports focused on operational, military and external intelligence and internal intelligence, and then (also) based on these they set tasks (intelligence requests) for the services. The evolving turnaround and the change in the demand for information indicate that, while in 1985 32% of all information needs were related to domestic/internal intelligence, the percentage of intelligence coming from the domestic counter-intelligence service was 62% in 1989 (Müller 1999, 2003).
of what modernization ideas in the field of daily operations and methods (e.g. running agents, databases, etc.) were born within the Hungarian secret service of the late 1980’s.

The issue of state security was also on the agenda of the National Round Table talks. The state party did not support the opposition proposal that suggested the separation of the state security service from the police or the one that initiated the subordination of the services directly to the Council of Ministers. On the opposition side, between the various parties and within the parties, the debate was not about the need for secret service(s) in Hungary, but whether it was to be established with the preservation of the existing staff, and how, and in what system, under what political control the services should operate.5

At the end of 1989, it was stated within the ranks of Fidesz that the state security service should be built in the same way as the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) (German Federal Constitution Protection Bureau), not by the executive power, but rather as an independent security organization reporting to the National Assembly. It is an interesting coincidence that at a Home Affairs Academic Conference on March 1, 1989 – which focused partly on the new responsibilities and transformation of the state security organization – even Major General Horváth, Head of Directorate III/III, argued for the necessity of a unified organization and change of name, and the designation “Constitutional Protection Office” was also included in his proposals (Baráth, 2010: 12). (In view of the intelligence work affecting the opposition, it is not excluded – but at the level of data it cannot be directly verified that ideas within the regime change parties, parallel to the study of Western patterns, also affected the workshops within the MOI General Directorate III).6

Finally, the National Round Table negotiations did not produce a meaningful agreement on state security, but as a result of the conciliation, a new conceptual decision was made which is in effect to date. As the opposition urged the separation of state security from the police, after the entry into force of the new constitution, the MOI Directorate III/1 (Investigation) Department of the state security service with open investigative powers was abolished on November 1, 1989. Its powers and staff were transferred to the HNP HQ Investigation Department. This has essentially thwarted the possibility for the new security service to operate as an organization, like the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also with so-called investigative powers. This possibility, however, did not arise either from the members of the Home Affairs Working Group or from the later concepts.

From the summer of 1989, the MOI leadership had been trying to give a new direction to the state security service, not only at internal meetings but also in public, with an emphasis on changing the terminology and methodology. For example, on 4th July 1989, the daily newspaper Népszabadság, reporting on the national leadership meeting of the MOI, quoted István Horváth, Minister of the Interior, who made a conceptual change in state security work. He stated that the task of the service was primarily to investigate acts affecting

---

5 For a detailed overview of the issue see: Révész, 2000: 420–481.
6 It is interesting to note that during the period of the transformation and disintegration of the German Democratic Republic, the GDR also prepared state security reform plans. In one version of these, the Ministry of State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit – MfS, or shortly “Stasi”) would operate under the name “Amt für Nationale Sicherheit”, i.e. National Security Office. In the ideas of the Hungarian opposition at the time, the British model is essentially, though indirectly, reflected which at first served as a model for the national security structure of the democratic German state, and secondly in the emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.
national security, and within that the protection of constitutional powers and institutions and of the economic infrastructure (Baráth, 2010: 21).

This is the first public evidence that the state secret service had increasingly shifted to the use of the term national security instead of state security. Concepts had changed within the internal reporting system, as the evaluations of daily operational intelligence reports increasingly referred to national security risks. While the term was coined by state security (saying they now acted in the interests of the whole nation, not only of the state), it was rooted in the legal language a few months later and subsequently adopted in the National Security Act and, most recently, in the Fundamental Law. The concept of national security is the subject of professional debates to date, on the one hand due to its roots in the one-party state and due to the possibility if its broader interpretation, on the other. At the same time, it should be noted that, as far back as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the term “secret service,” in the institutional sense, had never appeared in the designation or regulations of the Hungarian secret services.

Although the leadership of state security was increasingly trying to “navigate” the services towards the changes, they didn’t reckon with the outbreak of an internal scandal within the organization. The surveillance case, or as it was later named, the “Danube-gate” defined the country’s national security structure in a striking way, partly up to the present. The Danube-gate upset both the party-state’s and opposition’s ideas about the future of (civilian) secret services. On the one hand, it increased social and opposition revulsion against the service(s), and on the other hand narrowed room for manoeuvre of the Németh government, which quickly split up the unified structure of the services that existed until then.

Not waiting for the results of the investigation of the Military Chief Prosecutor’s Office and the internal inquiry of the Ministry of the Interior, before the spring elections and the inauguration of the new government, the Council of Ministers abolished all legal norms regulating state security activity on January 21, 1990, thus the creation of an Act of Parliament on regulating the use of court authorized techniques became a matter of urgency. This is how Act X of 1990 on the Temporary Regulation on the Special Covert Means and Techniques, and Council of Ministers (CoM) Decree No. 26/1990 (II. 14.) on the Provisional Regulation of National Security Tasks were created, after whose entry into force two civilian services (Information Office – IO, National Security Office – NSO) and two military services (Military Intelligence Office – MIO, Military Security Office – MSO) started their operation.

Since the domestic political atmosphere did not allow the creation of a fully mature secret service/national security concept in January 1990, the most obvious solution was chosen when the one-time Directorates of MOI General Directorate III (State Security General Directorate), and Directorate 2 of the Defence General Staff (HPA GS Directorate 2) were reorganized or were restructured, respectively, as independent services. Directorate III/III of the MOI (responsible for countering “domestic reactionary groupings”) was disbanded without a legal successor in January 1990, its tasks that were relevant even under conditions of the rule of law (e.g. constitution protection) were outsourced, its personnel were partly

7 For the interpretation of (and debate on) the concept of national security, see: Révész, 2007; Izsa, 2009b; Kurtán, 2009.
8 The most complete exploration of the details of the case has been published by Béla Révész (Révész, 2004; 2005a; 2005b).
retired, partly reassigned to other areas Kovács, 2011: 70). (In spite of this, the activities of the National Security and later the Constitution Protection Office were followed up by the fact that the public often considered them – mistakenly or due to a deliberate “mistake” – as the successor to Directorate III/III.)

In order to ensure the stability of the government, primarily the protection of the position of the head of government, which was reinforced by the constructive motion for a no confidence vote, the first freely elected National Assembly, by creating Act LI of 1990, placed the military service under the authority of the Minister of Defence and the Civilian Services under the authority of a designated Minister Without Portfolio. The Antall government, despite the fact that a large number of its members and the prime minister himself were once major targets of General Directorate III (Tóth, 2016, Rainer, 2008), decided that instead of calling the personnel to account collectively and making them redundant, to retain part of the personnel of state security services whose expertise could be relied on during the transformation and/or building of civilian national security organizations. This decision by the government, in particular during the political storms of the 1990s, came under criticism by many. It should be added that the personnel of the state security services belonging to the Eastern Bloc were “thrown to the wind” in the Czech Republic only, where pre-1990 documents – including personnel files – are almost completely public. The case of the Ministry of State Security (Stasi) of the former GDR, which has often been referred to as an example, needs to be shaded. Firstly, because the files prepared by the personnel and the intelligence – that is, not by Stasi, but by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung – are still being protected from the public (Cseh, 2010), and secondly because the GDR and the Stasi ceased to exist without legal successors, and in the five provinces requesting accession to the Federal Republic of Germany, experts from the West built the constitution protection organizations.

In the foregoing we do not wish to give a full picture of the (now partly historical) process leading to the creation of civilian national security services; our aim was primarily to clarify the points of decision and the background that defined the starting point for the establishment of the four national security services in 1990 which has an impact on the institutional development of the next decades or on its limitations, for that matter. The development of state security into national security was not a planned process. The catalytic event was, ultimately, a political scandal that was paradoxically launched by one person – Police Major József Végvári, whose professional assessment shows a mixed picture – many of his peers referred to him only as a “scandal-monger” (Kovács, 2011: 67.).

The professional challenges of the first turning point in the history of the Hungarian secret service community, in the main lines can, be summarized as follows:

• *Diversification of political oversight and professional control*. Political control was divided: civilian secret services were supervised by a minister without portfolio, while military security services were supervised by the Minister of Defence. Out of the previous two services four services were created (two military and two civilian services), led by four director generals. There was a new challenge that conflicts of interest and co-ordination between the Directorates, which were periodically emerging, but which could be previously resolved at the level of Head of General Directorate or of the Ministry of Interior, had to be settled in the coordination system of the government which was occasionally burdened by sectoral disagreement.
• **Separation of the services from the internal affairs sector.** This has in part led to a gradual deterioration of co-operation with the police, particularly in the area of civil counter-intelligence. Most notably perhaps, the organized crime investigations in the 1990’s, and later the inquiry into the lessons learnt from the investigation of the so-called “serial murders of Roma people” attracted the attention of the public.

• **Support for government decisions.** Until 1990, the importance of governmental decision-making – police, border protection and, last but not least, state-security information – was concentrated in one place at the organizations under the Ministry of the Interior, and therefore the ministry established a unified, government-wide information system covering all sources. It was headed by the MOI Secretary of State for State Security (in addition to compiling MOI reports, this body operated the DOIR system). The system was disrupted after 1990, and decision-makers subsequently sought information from reports that were separately prepared by the services, which were not always consistent with each other.

• **Segregated databases.** The previously unified database of intelligence (including the Uniform Computer-Based Screening System (UCSS)9) was virtually broken down into three branches (IO, NSO, MSO), and its development and operation were within the competence of the individual services. Subsequent innovations affecting the databases went along separate paths.

• **Changes in the “image of the adversary.”**10 In our view, the image of the adversary in 1990 did not change in polarity, but in its traditional interpretation it ceased to exist and was gradually replaced by the protection of the values of the Constitution of the Republic created by Act XXXI of 1989, and by the so-called government “intelligence needs” based on the practices of the national security organizations operating within the frameworks of the rule of law and in line with the Government’s priorities. (The executive power identifies the main directions of information gathering by means of formulating their intelligence needs, with respect to which the tasks were periodically set by the supervising, then controlling ministers.)

• **Separation of the HR Service, Education/Training and Logistic functional areas.** In addition to the need to organize the administrative areas (legal affairs, resource management, HR policy) in the newly established services, the real challenge was to find a solution to recruitment of new personnel (selection and education/training).

---

9 The utilization of the Uniform Computer-Based Screening System (UCSS) was defined in MOI Order No. 09/1974 issued by the Minister of Interior, according to which the development of the electronic system had been completed, its utilization was to commence on 1 May 1974. The database provided personal, material, facility-based, data and, above all, a possibility to search for these aspects. As a relational database, content elements were merely summarized, basically showing which of the systems, organizational units had matches for the queried facility. Up-to-date IT support for the UCSS began at the end of the 1980s, and one of its results has become known as the “magnetic tapes”.

10 The set of tasks issued by the political leadership to General Directorate III (so-called intelligence needs, but in those days this term was not in use) was conceived in the early 1980s (e.g. the MOI Order issued in 1982 on the selection and monitoring of adversarial persons posing a threat to society), and a significant part of it was still in force in 1989. Neither the political leadership nor the regulatory machinery could keep up with the acceleration of domestic and foreign political events, so the conceptual clarification of the image of the adversary was made up to 1990 in the form of oral guidelines. That is to say, all the orders that applied to the monitoring of the democratic opposition and the activities of the NATO member states were in force.
The hitherto uniform training system had ceased to exist by the dissolution of the State Security Faculty of the Police Officer Training College in the spring of 1990 and by reassigning its students to the other Faculties where they were allowed to complete their studies.

- Changes in terminology and methods. The basic professional methods of one of the oldest occupations in the world did not change in content, only in name. From this area to the public, in addition to the dichotomy of state security vs. national security, the term “operational” may be familiar to have replaced the term “operative” [used as an adjective – translator’s note]. It is not the result of intensification of international cooperation, but the gradual emergence of Anglo-Saxon acronyms at the end of the decade. For example, before 1990, the term network, later called the contact system, and more recently the HUMINT (human intelligence), were/are used to denote human source intelligence.

In addition to the above-mentioned professional challenges, the government faced a multilateral political challenge with the national security system. In addition to (1) having to address the above-mentioned question with respect to former state security personnel (complete break vs. gradual modernization), (2) having to strike a balance between the effectiveness of secret services and democratic control, while (3) having to meet complex challenges presented by a changing world order (international terrorism, environment of the forming alliance, increasing organized crime) (Kurtán, 2009: 3.).

In this context, it was inevitable that a process of stabilization should start. Today, there is an increasing consensus that the complete transformation, that is, the dismantling of the system and its structure would have set back the preventive intelligence capabilities for years, instead, the change, in addition to the internal institutional change, had to be primarily embodied in a regulation receiving comprehensive, broad political support.


Hardly had the four secret services started working independently, when they began to prepare the normative text regulating the activities of the services comprehensively. The draft National Security Act, submitted by the Antall government in autumn 1991 (T/1462), had only been drafted, and Parliament had not yet put it on its agenda. Because of the differences between the parties and the social anxieties linked to the state security of the past, it was clear that the entry into force of the law could only take place through a strong political mandate.

Upon the initiative by the Horn government, which was formed in 1994 and now had a qualified majority, Act CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services (hereinafter: National Security Act, NSA) was finally adopted by the National Assembly on 19 December 1995. The NSA detailed the rules governing the mission, legal status and principles of national security work, the rules of covert information gathering and the parliamentary control of national security activities.  

11 For more on the National Security Act, see: Dezső–Hajas, 1998; Hajas, 1999.
legal regulation was to try to establish a balance between the effective functioning of the services and the control of national security activity, and the protection of rule of law and democratic fundamental values by incorporating wide-ranging safeguards against possible abuse of power.

The Act substantially confirmed the structural foundations established by the Németh government in 1990. It meant an organizational change that the Special Service for National Security (hereinafter referred to as SSNS) of the Service and Operational Technical Directorate of the National Security Office (formerly Directorate III/V) was established as an independent institution. The possibility of institutional outsourcing of technical intelligence tasks had emerged already before 1990 in debates on the transformation of the secret service institutional system. The decision was partly governed by budget policy and partly by professional considerations since the SSNS collects data for all organizations (currently nine) authorized to conduct covert information gathering, so the skills and expenditures do not appear in parallel but are concentrated.

The NSA essentially stabilized the established practice of interaction between the services and politics by retaining the position of minister without portfolio, but now with directive rather than supervisory powers, and this change of legal status had primarily administrative and regulatory reasons (Hetesy, 2011: 22.). In the spirit of breaking with the legacy of state security, the rule was that it excluded the role of those ministers who typically were in charge of the governmental control and inspection of secret services in the states of the Euro-Atlantic area. As a result, the Hungarian model was different from the superstructure of all international intelligence organizations.

Even the drafting of the law was accompanied by political debates, in the forefront of which, while the establishment of the NSSS was agreed upon, stood the reduction of the number of services (three out of five). Two models of centralization were outlined. One (enjoying support from FIDESZ in particular), the so-called functionalist model was construed as a coherent structure of intelligence (IO-MIO) and counterintelligence (NSO-MSO) services while the other (supported by MSZP), a unified political direction model urged the consolidation of the military (MIO-MSO) and the civilian secret services (IO-NSO).

Over the next decade, these two models for the Hungarian secret service community defined the policy thinking surrounding the national security institution system, and there was a consensus on reducing the number of services – both politically and (perhaps) professionally. Parliamentary debate of the NSA Bill of 1995 was eventually resolved by Parliamentary Decision No 47/1996, (VI.7.) issued by the legislative body to the Government, calling upon the Government to review the functioning of the system and, if appropriate, suggest any amendment of the law, within a year of the entry into force of the NSA. The Horn government, while in less than a year it could scarcely have been able to gain substantive experience, finally stood by the functionality of the five-service model (IZSA, 2007: 2., BALLA, 2001: 14–21., HETESY, 2011: 23., KURTÁN, 2009: 3.).

Although the Act defining the Hungarian secret service institutional system for nearly 15 years can be evaluated in an international comparison as a thorough regulation, yet it preserved the existing relations, practically completing the process begun by the Németh government, which resulted in the organization of former state security directorates into independent services. It is therefore debatable that the national security law was indeed a
milestone as a whole, in the evolution of the Hungarian services that can be considered an independent era, a real paradigm shift.

The NSA comprises the political and professional experience of the “under-regulated” period until 1995 and, while addressing a number of (partial) issues, it paid close attention to the relationship between society and national security services, parliamentary control, and embedded in the long term the policy debates on the intelligence organization system as well. Due to the permanent presence of structural issues, the law has caused instability from time to time and indirectly has resulted in greater political exposure in the operation of the relevant services (mainly IO, NSO, MSO and MIO).


During the tenure of the first Orbán government taking office in 1998, different concepts emerged behind the scenes about the future structure of the services. All these ideas were outlined at a conference organized in autumn 2000, which was attended, besides Hungarian decision-makers and specialists, by invited foreign guests. In addition to the two modalities of the merger, as mentioned above, the idea of the reintegration of the civilian counterintelligence service in the Ministry of the Interior and the elimination of the ministerial post without portfolio were also raised as an alternative.

It should be added: as a result of intensifying organized crime and corruption, at the end of the decade, in professional circles (too), the question was raised more and more often whether it was right to maintain the independence of civilian counter-intelligence from the MOI from the point of view of cooperation with the police. Following the conference, there was no further substantive policy dialogue concerning the reorganization of services until 2006. From the second half of the 1990s to 2010, in an organizational structure unchanged in its core elements, the law enforcement agencies and the secret services faced complex challenges that, together, gradually exerted influence on the evolutionary path of the sector. The external and internal “indicators” of the era can be summarized as follows.

---

12 The proceedings of the conference on National Security was published in 2001 (On National Security. Presentations made at the conference on the National Security Structure of the Republic of Hungary and on the Tasks of the Services in Budapest, 26–27 October 2000) and was classified for 15 years, until 31 December 2016, so we rely on Zsolt Hetesy’s PhD thesis (Hetesy, 2011) with regard to what was said there.

13 Between 2002 and 2007, the temporary cessation of the institution of a minister without portfolio brought about a change, upvaluing the role of the Political State Secretary (then András Tóth) contributing to the performance of control functions, and – from the summer of 2006 – the role of the Head of the National Security Office at the Prime Minister’s Office, working together with the Minister in charge of the Prime Minister’s Office, tasked with directing the services. In the summer of 2007 the Government re-established the posts of the minister without portfolio in charge of the civilian national security services (Dr. György Szilvásváry) and the post of State Secretary contributing to the performance of control functions.

14 Not wishing to go deep into the professional debate on the relationship between national security and law enforcement agencies (for a summary see Hetesy, 2011: 11–12), we for our part consider civil security services, both in line with the spirit of the Fundamental Law and the NSA and in accordance with the international professional perception, as a special sector of the law enforcement organization system.
Organized Crime

The strong presence of organized crime at the end of the decade required complex responses from the government. One element of this was the creation of an analytical, coordinating body to provide a solution to the development of police and national security cooperation and data exchange. The purpose of the Organized Crime Coordination Centre (hereinafter referred to as OCCC), established on 1 January 2001 (Act CXXVI of 2000), was exactly that. Its personnel were reassigned from cooperating agencies who, on the one hand, systematized and stored the information received from different organizations, and supported the work of the investigative agencies by analyzing them, drawing the attention of these agencies to possible duplications of efforts.\(^{15}\)

In Europe, Hungary was one of the first countries where an organization was created that coordinated the law enforcement and national security service and integrated analysis of their data as a third party. The information (or by their later professional name: fusion) centres in 2003 were typically created in the Euro-Atlantic area not in the context of increasing organized crime, but in response to the spread of international terrorism. It is common for them to evaluate their creation essentially as a (policy-based) political response to a serious security challenge that has a direct impact on society, focusing on the internal coordination risks of articulate and substantially non-changeable law enforcement and intelligence structures in a given political environment.

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the activities of the OCCC did not change substantially. Among the compulsory data provision services, the number of offenses in the focus of analytical work only increased significantly after 2010 (partly due to the murder of Roma people in Hungary).

International terrorism

The purpose of this study is not to give a detailed description of the changes in the domestic and international security policy thinking generated by 11 September. We do not intend to engage in the controversy about how much the “intelligence services grown comfortable in bipolar thinking” were, or could have been, shocked by the fact that the hitherto pervasive image of the adversary had been replaced by a permanent risk of unprecedented dimensions in human history. All these issues, as well as the faux-pas of the secret services (e.g. Iraq, 2003) and the recurrent conflict of domestic religious radicalization (e.g. London, 2005) at the beginning of the new millennium and the recurring conflict between human rights and fundamental rights and security needs have determined to a large extent the next decade of secret services.\(^{16}\)

The impact of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and later in Europe (Istanbul – 2003, Madrid – 2004, London – 2005) has partly contributed to the fact that, with significant political support/expectation, cooperation is conducted both at national and at international

\(^{15}\) For the operation of the OCCC see more in: BÁLINT, 2012: 131–137.

\(^{16}\) For the impacts of September 11, in addition to a number of studies published since then, see more in TÁLAS, 2002.
levels. Numerous multilateral organizations have made substantial exchanges of data and experience, and the foundations of common international databases have also been created.

The recognition of the risks inherent in national information sharing has led to NATO and EU member states establishing the so-called (anti-terrorist) fusion centres, which basically have two types. One type includes newly established, permanent organizations whose main profile is integrating, analysing data affecting the security community in a given country, strengthening coordination between organizations, and screening possible duplication of efforts. The other type is made up of fusion agencies that operate in an essentially ad hoc (advisory) function, their function primarily being to cover the coordination of the actions/tasks and making professional (senior and mid-level) decisions. Of course, there are overlaps between the two types and, based on the individual practice of each country, some centres have specialized or have received specialized extra tasks (e.g. open information search, political decision support/government information) (Gill, 2010: 209–219). In 2003, the institution established under the name of Anti-Terrorist Coordination Committee (ATCC) was in the latter category. By 2010, its work had been coordinated by the National Security Office, since then by the Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC), and all the police and national security organizations involved in the fight against terrorism belong to its members. As a non-permanent body, its activities were fundamentally determined by changes in the security environment, and accordingly, the ATCC later conducted discussions not only on security issues directly related to terrorism. Since the Organized Crime Coordination Centre formally had the necessary powers and capabilities, the ATCC was established in parallel with the organization’s intensified involvement in the development of national co-ordination of counter-terrorism (Tarján, 2004: 45). The function of terrorism analysis came to the forefront of the centre’s work ten years after the establishment of the OCCC, as a result of a new wave of terrorism, along with significant legislative changes to be demonstrated later on.

**National security strategy**

With the efforts related to the transformation of the institutional system of the Hungarian secret services over the past decade, the process of creating a strategy for services has been linked at several points. Government Decision of May 2002 [GD No. 2144/2002. (V.6)] based on Parliamentary Decision No. 94/1998 (XII.29.) on the Basic Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary and then in 2004 [Government Decision No. 2073/2004. (IV.15.)] and updated in 2012 [Government Decision No. 1035/2012. (II.21.)], The National Security Strategy (hereinafter referred to as NSS) identified the government’s expectations of the role of national security services alongside identifying security challenges in the country.

Although the NSS in 2004 asked the government to develop the tasks arising from the implementation of the national security strategy in a sectoral strategy, but the national
security strategy in the list was not submitted to the Government before the parliamentary elections in April 2010. In the course of the preparation of the national security sector strategy, the Government no longer appointed either responsible officials or deadlines, so its final drafting is currently waiting to be completed. Only the Ministry of the Interior made attempts at creating a national security strategy in 2012, but not in relation to the NSS, but independently of it, mainly as the medium-term concept of national security agencies under the direction of the MOI (Solti, 2014: 49–50).

**Budgetary pressure – attempt at reform**

The second Gyurcsány government found itself in a difficult budgetary situation after taking office in 2006. Reform ideas driven by the need for savings reached the national security services in the summer of 2006, when the government, in its Government Decree No 2118/2006 (VI.30) on organizational transformations and the underlying measures to promote the effective functioning of public finances, formulated the intention of the institutional transformation based on the “tri-service model.” In order to develop detailed suggestions and possible directions, the minister in charge of intelligence services requested an expert committee (Izsa, 2009a: 51; Homonnai, 2007: 12). The reform agenda became concrete in January 2007, after the government, in Government Resolution No. 2010/2007. (I.30.), outlined the possible directions of integration that contained the already mentioned (functionalist vs. uniform governmental) models that had already been present in policy thinking essentially since 1995 while retaining the distinct position of the National Security Service.

Finally, the government did not support the consolidation based on unified control advocated by the HSP, but the functional consolidation (IO-MIO, NSO-MSO) proposed by FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats), and thus, despite the complex internal political environment, there was a chance to implement the reform (Hetesy, 2011: 23.). Although the process was fundamentally driven by financial considerations, the professional representatives were aware of its necessity. Almost 10 years after 2006, enough experience has accumulated in relation to the National Security Act to show the system’s shortcomings. (The experiences of the national security institution system are summarized in Jenő Izsa’s SWOT analysis published in 2007: Izsa 2007.)

Finally, the 2007 national security reform attempt failed not because of a lack of agreement with the opposition, but in the absence of a compromise within the MSZP, as the defense ministry did not support the functional consolidation of the services. At the hearing before the National Security Committee in June 2007, the Minister without portfolio had already informed that he considered it necessary to strengthen the OCCC in order to coordinate between organizations and asked the State Audit Office (SAO) to review the issue of merging civilian and military services (Fazekas, 2007). The report of the SAO

---

18 Gergely Szentgáli’s statement that the 2006 concept of secret services was driven by the crowds protesting in the streets and by increased efficiency. In the background, as stated by the government in its decision, financial policy considerations were in the beginning, although it is beyond doubt that the lessons learnt from the events subsequently contributed to the transformation that was ultimately only implemented at the institutional level (Szentgáli 2015: 48).

was finalized in October 2007 and the fundamentally budget-based inquiry did not raise any objections to the foreseen changes, but, while it did not hold a position on national security issues, stressed that the planned transformation would realistically bring about a return on the budget over a four-year period.

By this time, however, it had become clear that reform attempts, due to the conflicts of interest within the governing party, stalled, and ultimately only institutional changes were made. The National Security Office was reorganized with effect from 1 September 2007. According to some reports, the number of organizational units dropped by a third, while nearly twenty Heads of Division were dismissed. The question of reorganization soon came to the forefront of political debate, and several people considered the process as “cleansing” (Lencsés, 2007: 2., Szakály 2007: 17.). It is a fact that in 2008, with the usual budget allocations, NBH managed nearly HUF 2 billion more, which covered both development goals and the severance pay and benefits of the laid-off personnel.20

The extreme right gaining strength – serial killings of Roma people

As a result of domestic events, the extreme right-wing movements and the post-2006 emergence of organizations showing signs of paramilitary features presented reshaping challenges for the Hungarian law enforcement agencies and the civilian national security agencies. Both the society and the political leadership were shocked by the fact that the intensification of the activities of extremist organizations had led to the perpetration of terrorist acts and then serial killings.

The Arrows of the Hungarians National Liberation Army, linked to György Budaházy, entered the scene in 2007, with at least nine counts of attempted assassinations/attacks perpetrated with Molotov cocktails and explosives. Although the attacks were basically carried out for the purpose of a warning/intimidation and not linked to any demands, the Arrows of the Hungarians in several respects bore the characteristic features of terrorist organizations (Boross, 2013: 8-12). (At the time of writing this study, on 30 August 2016, the Budapest Metropolitan Court sentenced Budaházy to 13 years in prison at first instance, while his 14 accomplices received prison sentences of 5–12 years.)

While the world’s security organizations focused primarily on religiously-driven, internationally-motivated terrorism, the attention of Hungarian national security forces was increasingly concentrated on mapping internal, political (terror) risks in this period. Both the public at large and the law enforcement agencies were shocked by the series of crimes that lasted for one year since the summer of 2008, which became known as the serial killings of Roma people. In a total of nine racially-motivated assassinations, six people were killed (Boross, 2013: 13–19). Early on during the investigation, the dysfunctions between the police and the civilian security services became apparent, which were not only confirmed but further specified by the subsequent investigations conducted by the competent parliamentary committee, as well as by the internal investigations of the MSO and the NSO (Rényi, 2013).

20 In 2008, the National Security Office managed an exorbitant budget of HUF 10,107.8 billion in comparison with the previous years. In the previous year (2007), 8,846.7 billion HUF and in the following year (2009) 8,796.5 billion HUF were available for operating costs. (For more details, see Act CXXVII of 2006, CLXIX of 2007 and Act CII of 2008 on the Budget of the Republic of Hungary.)
In the case of the Arrows of the Hungarians and the serial killings of Roma people, the evolution of extreme organizations in Hungary entered a stage that had a direct impact on the activity of the civilian security organizations. The fact-finding inquiry conducted by the National Security Committee of the National Assembly on the civilian security service (NSO) identified serious malfunctions focusing on the problems of coordination within and between organizations, institutional information management and analysis, and the shortage of staff and professionals (40% on average)\(^2\) due to the autumn restructuring of the relevant organizational units. Inquiries related to the role of the Military Security Office later found, among other things, that one of the perpetrators helped the military counterintelligence as a covert source (commonly known as “informant”).\(^2\) All in all, the circumstances, therefore, showed the failure of the Hungarian secret services responsible for counterintelligence.

The recognition that the perpetration of a crime could have been prevented if the cooperation between the police and civilian (NSO) and military counter-intelligence (MSO) had existed at an appropriate level indicated the need for fundamental change in the system. It is also a remarkable parallel that the investigation of hate crimes linked to the National Socialist Underground (NSU) in Germany\(^2\) came to similar conclusions. In addition to revealing the failings of the German Constitution Protection Office (BfV) and establishing personal responsibility, the measures taken in Germany strengthened cooperation between BfV and the police, in particular the cooperation between the BfV and the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BKA). In a professional sense, this meant that some areas had “brought closer” the national security and criminal intelligence work done with a preventive purpose.

By the end of the first decade of the millennium, due, among other things, to the experience of the Arrows of the Hungarians and the serial crimes, there was no question for both political and professional leadership that, on the one hand, the members of the Hungarian law enforcement community, in particular the national security services work in an “island-like” manner, especially the national security services, and that in this context there are significant risks in the cooperation at national level, on the other. Due to delays and distances between the police and the national security agencies, before the elections in 2010, there was the possibility to develop the same political control of civilian security and thereby the possibility to develop internal security cooperation. The lessons of the tragic events seemed to overwrite the symbolic significance of the achievement of the regime change (20 years ago), namely that the services were separated from the police and the Ministry of the Interior was excluded from ministries exercising direction and control over the services.

---

\(^2\) Fact-Finding Inquiry Report. Evaluation of national security service work assisting the investigation into the serial murders of Roma people based on the investigative work of the Fact Finding Working Group established by the National Security Committee of the National Assembly (17 November 2009).

\(^2\) Report. The professional activity of the MSO of the RoH in the investigation of the crimes perpetrated against Roma people.

\(^2\) From 2000 to 2007 the NSU perpetrated (at least) ten murders (killing nine immigrants and one police officer) and two bomb attacks (killing 23 victims) in Cologne. The group maintained itself from proceeds of bank robberies, and several of its members were on the radar screen of the German security services. Nevertheless, the NSU was eliminated not as a result of intelligence/investigative efforts and police coordination, but because one of the members, after two of his comrades had committed suicide, turned himself in in 2011. The trial of the case is under way and some details are currently being clarified.
Information society (2010)

Formed on May 28, 2010, the second Orbán government, with a parliamentary majority required to amend the NSA, introduced fundamental changes in the area of government control of civilian national security services, some division of tasks between organizations were changed and the civilian national security organization was restructured. Apart from the integration of national security and police capacities into the Ministry of Interior, the divided nature of the Hungarian national security structure was further strengthened, as the tasks of the governmental control of the national security services were divided between three ministries, instead of the former two ministries.

In the current Hungarian national security system, a national security model including five services is now in operation, which by the beginning of July 2016 acquired the current framework, with the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Information and Crime Analysis Centre (CTICAC). (The five-service model was already present in the Hungarian system between 1995 and 2011, but in two periods, between 1990–1995 and 2012–2016, respectively, the Hungarian structure embraced four services.) The political guidance of the services is still tripolar where the Government directs the Information Office through the Minister in charge of Civilian Intelligence, the Constitution Protection Office, the Special Service for National Security, and the Counter-Terrorism Information and Crime Analysis Center, through the Minister in charge of the civilian national security services, and the Military National Security Service through the Minister of Defence in charge of national defence.

Two of the three poles – that is, the areas of the civilian intelligence service in charge of foreign intelligence and that of the military secret service – can be interpreted as a professional direction following individual, partly international models, while the third pole, which is considered the most complex, provides an all-internal-affairs approach while performing tasks related to national security. The steps leading to the development of the current organizational system, i.e. the major changes affecting the national security sector between 2010 and 2016, can be summarized as follows:

- In addition to the abolition of the former post of minister without portfolio in charge of the National Security Office renamed Constitution Protection Office (CPO) as a civilian security service, and the appearance of the Special Service for National Security as the technical/support service for covert information gathering, the supervision and control of these two government agencies was delegated to the Ministry of Interior, thereby strengthening opportunities for cooperation with the police. The organizational change aimed at modernizing the Constitution Protection Office was started in May 2015.

- The entry into force on 25 April 2011 of the new Fundamental Law replacing the Constitution brought about changes for the national security services as well. The most significant of these changes is the fact that the Fundamental Law raised the activities of the national security services to a constitutional level and defined the

---

24 The renaming of the National Security Office to the Constitution Protection Office indicated the rapprochement with the German model. The German and post-2010 Hungarian internal security services refer to the protection of universal constitutional fundamental rights (territorial integrity, national sovereignty, fundamental human rights, etc.), while in both countries the Constitution is called the Fundamental Law /Grundgesetz/.

25 MOI Order No. 7/2015. (V.15.) on the appointment of a Ministerial Commissioner.
basic frameworks for their missions. (Paragraph 3, Article 46: “The core duties of the national security services shall be the protection of the independence and lawful order of Hungary, and the promotion of its national security interests.”)

- Looking beyond the national security organization in the traditional sense, the events of the last decades indicated that terrorism must be reckoned with in the long term, so in 2010 the government, for purposes of performing its task of safeguarding security and the specific tasks of combating terrorism “in an efficient and unified organizational framework and at a high professional level” issued Government Decree No. 295/2010 (XII. 22) on the designation of the agency responsible for countering terrorism and the detailed rules of the performance of its duties; the government established the Counter-Terrorism Center, thereby restructuring the tasks of countering terrorism.

- In mid-2010, the Organized Crime Coordination Center was also placed under the direction of the Minister of the Interior. The amendment was intended to strengthen the capabilities of responding to external and internal challenges, indicating the need to combat terrorism, to combat organized crime more effectively and to cooperate more effectively with the police.

- The direction of the Information Office responsible for intelligence activities and listed among the civilian national security services also changed. In mid-2010, the position of the minister without portfolio in charge of the former civilian national security services was removed, and the office was reassigned to the minister for foreign affairs. From 2012 onwards, the direction of civilian intelligence activities was included in the duties and powers of the Secretary of State in charge of the Prime Minister’s Office, and from 2014 onwards in the duties and powers of the Minister in charge of the Prime Minister’s Office.

- To make the picture complete, it is necessary to note that in addition to the transformations affecting the civilian national security sector, the two military secret services responsible for intelligence and counter-intelligence were merged in 2012 and the Military National Security Service was established. As a result, the former five-service model became once again a four-service one. The reasons for the merger include, among other things, increasing efficiency and more cost-efficient task management, a unified command and coordination of intelligence and counterintelligence activities, and the avoidance of duplication of efforts (Kovács, 2013).

- In 2011, the Government, upon the initiative of the MOI, reorganized the National Security Cabinet, whose meetings were again led by the Prime Minister. The heads of the Interior and Defense Ministries jointly coordinate the work of the Na-

---

26 Bill No. T/10307 on the amendment of certain laws relating to countering terrorism.
27 In July 2012, Parliament passed Act XCVI 2012 on the Amendment of certain laws related to the direction of civilian intelligence activities, thereby amending the direction of the IO in the NSA. The responsibilities of the Minister in charge of the Prime Minister’s Office for the direction of the IO were established in Government Decree No. 152/2014 (VI.6.) on the Duties and powers of the members of the Government. (Subsection 13, Section 4).
28 The National Security Cabinet was established in 1990 by the Antall government. Its meetings were attended by heads of ministries with responsibilities for tasks related to security policy issues. (The political body was headed by the Head of Government until 1998, by the minister of interior during the term of office of the first Orbán government, by the minister of defence during the Medgyessy and the first Gyurcsány government, by
tional Security Work Group, which provides professional background support and prepares decisions for the Cabinet, and whose meetings are attended – in addition to the heads of the national security services – also by the national commanders of the law enforcement agencies.

- At the end of 2011, a Bill on the establishment of the National Information and Crime Analysis Center (NICAC) was submitted, according to which the planned new task of the emerging national security service would be to “monitor the security and criminal situation in Hungary, inform the government and perform analytic and evaluation activities.”29 The bill also proposed the subordination of the Information Office (IH) to the Ministry of Interior. Finally, because of the different opinions on policy issues within the governing party, the Bill did not pass.30

- The massive migration wave, which also affected our country to an unprecedented degree, and the terrorist acts perpetrated in Paris in November 2015, accelerated the development needs of the counter-terrorism and civilian security services capabilities, at the forefront of which, both internationally and domestically, stood the strengthening of coordination within the law enforcement sector. In December, the government asked the Minister of the Interior to “set up an inter-ministerial working group to evaluate and analyze the new types of security challenges [information] and to identify possible directions for improvement.”31

Following the terrorist acts in Brussels on 22 March 2016, in April that year, the Ministry of the Interior submitted for general debate to Parliament a Bill32 amending the laws related to counter-terrorism, followed by extensive political consultations after the necessary professional preparation. The focus of the Bill was a proposal for the creation of a body responsible for coordinating and analyzing information at national level, the creation of a Counter-Terrorism Information and Crime Analysis Center.

By adopting the law33 that affected the national structure of national security services, CTICAC could be established as a civilian national security service. Its direction is carried out by the Minister in charge of the civilian security services, in line with CPO and the NSSS. CTICAC’s organization, created in the rising atmosphere of the fight against terrorism, points out that, considering international trends, besides the gathering of information done by the services, it is essential to have a sort of aggregated capability of analysis and evaluation of the information available in different places, increasing the efficiency of the whole system. The fusion centre is the general successor of the OCCC.

---

29 Bill No T/5004 on the amendment of certain laws on law enforcement and on further related amendments to the law.

30 Several amendments were submitted to the bill, which concerned inter alia the issue of direct linking of databases (www.parlament.hu/irom39/05004/05004-0024.pdf) and (www.parlament.hu/irom39/05004/05004-0004.pdf) Finally, on 30 December 2011, Members did not pass the Bill. See http://hvg.hu/itthon.parlament/20111230_Pinter_NIBEK_Demeter_modosito.

31 Government Decision No 1988/2015. (XII.28.) on the revision of certain legal regulations related to the new types of challenges and the possible directions of improving those legal regulations.

32 Bill No T/10307 on the amendment of certain laws related to counter-terrorism (April 2016).

33 Act LXIX of 2016 on the amendment of certain laws related to counter-terrorism (07 June 2016).
Among the primary reasons for the creation of the new body was the argument that in Hungary there had been no such organization in the security structure, “which aggregates and synthesizes data and information related to terrorism, crime and national security risks at government level, and assists in the making of the Government’s decisions by providing all-inclusive security perspectives, tactical and strategic analysis and suggestions.”34 As explained in the general justification part of the bill, “CTICAC is responsible for compiling the most comprehensive picture of the country as a result of the processing and analysis of data related to national security, law enforcement, public security or other core security interests, other threats, the internal security situation, the state of public security. It operates an information system, prepares evaluation reports and submits them to the Government via the competent Minister.”35

An important difference compared to other national security services is that the organization is not authorized to conduct covert information gathering activities and it acquires the data needed to perform its activity through a direct electronic data link. As an “Information Fusion and Information Sharing” centre, it can provide a “total security” approach to issues related to terrorism, crime and national security risks, and at the same time, the ability to promote national security. On the basis of the justification, the centre should also be able to “provide broad support for the investigative and intelligence activities of the cooperating government agencies, which includes tactical support of covert information gathering and prosecution from the initial stage, as well as providing or preparing start signals and analyses, respectively, that initiate procedures.”36

Answers to Challenges (1990–2016)

Tendencies of organizational responses so far

The quarter-century-long developmental path of the Hungarian national security community described in the previous chapter is no different from other countries in that the changes affecting the national security sector, not counting the decisions resulting from the freedom of the government to shape its own organizational structure, can be evaluated as political responses to the event giving rise to the society’s attention. Professional/policy-driven decisions (e.g. the merger of the two military national security services) were only applied locally to one organization, just as the upgrading processes were implemented only at organizational level (e.g. NSO 2007 and then CPO 2015). The reform according to the classical policing theory (FINSZTER, 2003 – quotes HETESY, 2011: 20.), i.e. in the policy thinking encompassing the whole organizational structure and with the itemized transformation or re-creation of legal frameworks, has not taken place in Hungary (for the time being).

Due to the two-thirds regulation on the Hungarian institutional system of national security, the major changes could be implemented when the government had a qualified majority in the legislature. As a result, the 1994–1998 and then post–2010 government cycles

---

34 Bill No T/10307 on the amendment of certain laws relating to countering terrorism, 37.
36 Ibid, 36.
were decisive in the evolution of the national security system. Based on the organizational history overview presented in the first chapter, the following summarized findings can be made for the period 1990–2016:

- The Hungarian national security system (with respect to its fundaments) was predominantly built on the foundations of the pre–1990 party-state secret service system. A significant part of its strengths (continuity of professional knowledge base) and weakening factors (issues related to the party-state/state security history, which adversely affect the social support of the services on the domestic agenda) can be put down to this basic feature.

- After 2010, the Hungarian structure was adapted to the national security systems of the allied environment (Börcsök–Vida, 2014: 85.) by the government’s endeavour to delegate the direction of civilian national security services to the ministries whose activities can best be supported by the service through information gathering. Until 2012, the Hungarian practice followed arrangements of the UK model, with the civilian intelligence service working under the ministry for foreign affairs, then those of the German model by placing the IO directly under the head of government. (The latter direction is indicated by the renaming of the civilian security service.)

- The removal of the post of the minister without portfolio can be evaluated in light of the fact that the professional divisions of the past have also been accompanied by a diversification of political direction and thus the Hungarian model has basically developed towards decentralization, while security challenges have affected the organizational cohesion of secret service work in other European countries. However, this process can be evaluated in a different light by placing a given secret service under the ministry in which the information gained can best be utilized, either through support for political decision or by supporting the work of other organizations working under the ministry.

- With regard to civilian security services, this can be further illustrated by the fact that the acquisition of information necessary for supporting political decision-making (high policing) and acquisition of information for law enforcement (low policing) are present simultaneously and the two are difficult to separate.37 Both domestic and international experiences show the rapprochement of covert information gathering for criminal and intelligence services (with special emphasis on counterintelligence) and the need for closer co-ordination.

- The overarching reform ideas that have arisen over the past decades have not been able to gain ground not because of disagreement between the opposition and the government, but because of disagreements within the governments. It is noteworthy that the two political parties that played a decisive role in the development of the organizational structure endorsed each other’s concept in their ideas. (While the HSP previously supported functional consolidation, its 2006 proposal finally concerned the model supported by Fidesz, the merger of IO-MIO and NSO-MSO, and vice versa:

---

37 This approach to policing theory comes from Jean-Paul Brodeurt (1983), who distinguished information gathering in support of law enforcement decisions related to the higher interests of the state (high policing) from information gathering related to traditional police (criminal investigation, public order, etc.) tasks (low policing). Cf.: Kurtán, 2009: 2.
the merger of the military services in 2012 indicates the – half-way – implementation of the so-called HSP functional model).

- The Fundamental Law is a significant milestone. First, because it interprets national security services as an agency under the direction of the executive power and indirectly avoids the ideas that have raised or raise the potential of alternative direction of the service (e.g. by the head of state or by Parliament). Secondly, because national security services are essentially described as one (special) sector of the law enforcement agencies (see justification to Article 46), perhaps ending the decade-long debate that is/has been going on about the relationship between civilian national security services and law enforcement agencies.

- In Hungary’s security policy thinking, both at the political and professional level, the need for developing cooperation at national level was recurrent. Successive governments tried to compensate the complex nature of the national security system with coordination mechanisms. At the organizational level, however, parallel to the international trends, the controlling-coordinating bodies (OCCC, CTCC Counter-Terrorism Coordination Committee) have emerged, but their creation as a national security service – despite the submission of the NICAC concept in 2011 – only took place as a result of the trauma caused by the terrorist attacks in Paris and then in Brussels, in 2016.

The actual effects of the CTCC concept – the organization was established at the time of writing the study – can only be prognosticated, at most. Ultimately, the legislator’s expectation is that the operation of the fusion centre providing institutionalized coordination of national security and criminal information should move the so-called “competitive” national security system towards being “cooperative” and play a decisive role in creating a law enforcement/national security community system which preferably is professionally independent from the system of the prevailing political direction.

**Basic activity – decision support**

While the political (policy) responses to the challenges of the past quarter century structural processes have been relatively traceable, the operation of the various services, i.e. the so-called “evolutionary process involving the intelligence cycle”\(^38\), naturally, went on under the surface. The present study focuses only on the cornerstones and major trends, specifically discussing in the following subchapters the development of technical information gathering implemented within the National Security Special Service and primarily the development

\(^{38}\) Basically, the term “intelligence cycle” is used in the Anglo-Saxon professional terminology, and it essentially covers the entire process of intelligence. The intelligence cycle can be interpreted chiefly in the context of the political decision-making function of the secret services (i.e. not for the activity used in police co-operation). For this reason, and since, according to some approaches, the concept no longer covers the intelligence work altogether, there is a lively discussion about its use today. The classical elements of the Intelligence Cycle are: 1. Receiving request for news/intelligence, 2. Acquiring data, 3. Data Processing, 4. Analysis, and 5. (Government) information. See more: Vida, 2013: 47–53.
of national security human resources management within the National University of Public Service in particular.

As regards the core activities of the national security agencies, i.e. operational information gathering and evaluation-analysis, it should be emphasized that their operation can only be successful if they are able to adapt to the environment more effectively than any other organization. The pre–1990 world order, as far as the challenges were concerned, meant a permanent medium, so internal structures also changed slowly. Today’s challenges, however, require a faster internal adjustment of the national security organization, which, as the concept of intra-institutional stability thus gains another meaning, also requires a different attitude from the personnel.

The decision support (government information) activity of the services was the decisive factor in the development of the Hungarian national security system after 1990. From the second half of the 1960s, the processing of state security information, as well as informing the MOI, the state and the government agencies were already on the all-internal-affairs level. This changed with the separation of services, and the four national security organizations (NSO-IO and MSO-MIO) developed their information systems along separate paths. (The NSA defined independent government information tasks only for the two intelligence services, among others it identifies the minister without portfolio, then the [MOI] as the minister in charge of the civilian national security services, and the minister [PM] in charge of civilian intelligence as those responsible for informing the government.)

The consequences of the disintegration of the uniform state security organization, and thus of the disintegration of the single institutional reporting system, have been recognized by the political leadership, as it may have been possible to receive reports from each of the four services that were synthesized at the decision-making levels and, where appropriate, contradictions were resolved. The issue of government information was therefore a virtually constant element of the dialogue on the Hungarian national security system, and the initiatives aimed at making the decision-making a single-channel and uniform structure were recurring all the time. The initiative to create an analytical-information unit within the National Security Bureau operating beside the minister in charge, which is still operating in 2010, may be evaluated as such, but from time to time the OCCC was also expected to play a greater role in coordinating government information.

Along with the coordination of decision support, services at both national and international levels are challenged by a feature of the information society as the information that was formerly only obtainable through the use of secret service means is now virtually accessible with just a few clicks on the computer. The scissors are thus locked in that the secret services should actually obtain the special information that cannot be obtained by other means and then put it on the table of politics. (According to a somewhat “more flexible” professional view, by placing the data in a national security context and analysing it in that context does it become secret service knowledge. However, there is a consensus that

---

39 By the reorganization of the Information Processing Directorate under the direct control of the Minister, the MOI Data Processing Directorate was founded in 1977, which compiled, on the basis of a summary of information submitted by the MOI authorities – including the state security services – daily, monthly, quarterly and semi-annual reports for party and state leaders since 1982. In order to reduce previously existing duplication of efforts and to coordinate the information tasks, a regular consultation between the MOI, MOFA, MOD and the Information Office of the Council of Ministers was initiated from the early eighties.
in the reporting work the ratio of the data from the operations and from legal and/or open source are now approximately 20% vs 80%.

In longer historical perspectives and in the past 25 years, it is true that in addition to the acquisition of information based on the classical human source of information, the use of various technical devices has become increasingly popular. Already in the last decade of General Directorate III, it was observable that in the daily operational intelligence reports, how the source components have changed, and the knowledge gained from the operational technical data collection has become increasingly pronounced. State security agencies reported 66,868 pieces of information for nine years after the establishment of the DOIR system in 1979, of which 34,905 were included in the Daily Summary Report of the Heads of Government. Their distribution shows the following picture (Table 1).

### Table 1
*Trends in information gathering by state security services, 1979–1988*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of information</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Network” members (human sources)</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undercover intelligence/counterintelligence officers</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official, social, one-off operational contacts, reports/notifications</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of operational technical equipment (eavesdropping, bugging, wiretapping)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept of mail/postal parcels</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sources (information from other government agencies, open sources, etc.)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Urbán, 2007: 64.

The process has accelerated with the spread of the information society. It is aptly demonstrated by the fact that following the terrorist attacks in 2001, the great powers, and in particular the US intelligence community, have spent significant amounts of their budget on the development of technical and cyber-related data and information acquisition areas (Anglo-Saxon terminology: SIGINT, CYBINT) pushing the classical method of Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT) into the background. The belief in the omnipotence of technical data acquisition was hampered by later acts of terrorism and the recognition that the broad and inexpensive availability of communication technology allows continuous adaptation and developing conspiracy by target groups. Among the lessons learned after Paris and Brussels, the need for a return to classical intelligence methods has been highlighted.

Following the trauma of the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, the political leadership, on the other hand, as in the case of earlier terrorist acts (Madrid, London), advocated the development of international information exchange and cooperation. The idea of creating

---

40 SIGINT: Signals Intelligence, radio detection, signal detection. COMINT: Communication Intelligence, Communication Detection. ELINT: Electronic Intelligence, Electronic Detection. CYBINT: Cyber Intelligence (Intelligence collected from Cyber Space) (Béres, 2014: 122–125.). Along with the development of technology, new methods have emerged, such as SOCMINT (Social Media Intelligence), which deals with the use of social media for intelligence purposes.
a common European secret service has emerged as a new element in the security dialogue, primarily as an idea raised by the Belgian government. It is unusual in that respect that a multilateral service with active operational capabilities has yet to be seen in history.

Similar political considerations do not take into account the fact that there is a permanent (IntCen) and temporary secret service cooperation (Club de Bern, Counter-Terrorism Group – CTG) within the EU; on the other hand, and more importantly, the need to create a joint secret service is incompatible with the fact that the services are essentially designed to protect national interests and have their tasks (e.g. counter-intelligence) that can only be interpreted at Member State level. Although the establishment of a joint secret service is not suitable for the EU institutional system, the need to develop international cooperation in some areas and to an appropriate extent cannot be questioned (Bilgi, 2016: 57–67.). In addition, the issue is further shaded by the fact that in connection with the Paris bombings the French authorities have repeatedly referred to the fact that the lack of external and internal cooperation, rather than the lack of concrete information preventing it, led to the disaster. They stressed that obtaining the necessary information cannot be imagined without risk-optimized capacities (Macaskill, 2015).

In the process of acquiring operational information and analytical work, especially in view of international terrorism gaining ground, the perception that intelligence activity is not only limited to the narrowly interpreted direct risk factors, but also the identification of background processes, and, where appropriate, should also be extended to a deeper understanding of the social roots. The background to this was primarily the development of predictive and preventive capabilities required of the secret services. For example, the need for the underlying understanding of the primary risks has led to the fact that the services are now paying more attention to the possibilities for radicalization of the individual within society, because it was mainly people who were socialized in the given country who could be linked to the assassinations/terror attacks perpetrated in the past decade.

After the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 2001, debates flared up on the extent to which the individual’s need for security could override the freedoms that are limited by the authorities, especially the secret services, as part of the measures introduced. This dialogue is likely to have an impact on policy thinking for the next years or even decades, so much so that the debate after the Paris and Madrid bombings, it is in the forefront of public interest in Europe, and in relation to certain proposals of the terrorism package, also in Hungary.

The place, role and application of technical elements

In the complex system of national security activities, technical areas are indispensable in addition to the elements related to human sources. They look back on a broad historical background both internationally and domestically, emphasizing that the build-up and use of capabilities are the result of a long process of development. Their operation cannot be

---

41 For a summary, see: Dahl, 2011.
42 As part of the defence preparations due to the imminent threat of World War I, as well as in response to armed conflicts in the Balkans, the Parliament – for the first time in the history of Hungarian parliamentarianism – adopted Act LXIII of 1912 on Exceptional Actions in Times of War. Section 8 of the Act authorized the
separated from processes in the external environment, as technological changes and changes in the range of sources of information prompt organizations to keep up to date with changes. The necessary legal frameworks, economic-budgetary resources, knowledge base, the availability of highly qualified human resources (Boda–Dobák, 2015: 17), and the adaptation of organizational structures to changing circumstances are the preconditions for development.

The technical capabilities of national security in Hungary also play an important role in detecting threats to security and in providing the necessary response that cannot be ensured without modern technical equipment and toolkits. Their application, beyond the intelligence and counter-intelligence functions, can contribute to the “timely detection and prevention of risks and threats, and the foundation of governmental decisions.” Examining the “secret service” elements of technical relevance, we can find a variety of practices in the international arena both in terms of their place within the national security structures and in terms of their integration. There are countries where the relevant background and tasks are shared between organizations, and in other cases they are concentrated in organizations.

We do not want to discuss the conceptual classification of technical issues in detail, but it can be seen that while the intelligence-reconnaissance technical areas and capabilities represent distinct categories (e.g. SIGINT) and divisions typical of western (basically military) structures, this classification in the case of conditions in Hungary, although there are mutually matching elements due to historical development and sectoral differences, do not cover the characteristics of civilian national security services. Taking into account Hungarian characteristics, technical issues are basically examined in relation to specific areas of covert information gathering regulated by the National Security Act. In addition, however, the technical elements can be interpreted more broadly, thus in the case of the foregoing:

- overt and covert information gathering of various technical nature;
- information processing (analysis, evaluation) areas supported by technical solutions;
- technical development areas;
- (technical) expert functions;
- organizational elements responsible for information security and cyber security.

Based on the above, the national security system today regards the technical environment as one of the areas of information gathering required for the performance of its tasks, and on the other hand, the creation and continuous development of its capabilities also presents exceptional technical development as a major challenge.

For a brief description of current domestic conditions, it is worth looking back, to some extent, to the historical threads of technical information gathering capabilities and other technical areas. In Hungary, since the years before World War I, the means and methods of interception of radio transmissions and telephony were readily available, which were

---


44 For example, in the US, the NSA (National Security Agency) or the GCHQ organization of the British structure is an example of intelligence services that combine complex technical capabilities. Behind the combined capabilities, in addition to historical development, the need for military/civil or cross-border intelligence capabilities can also be sought.
subsequently expanded with technical solutions which made the bugging of a room possible (Urbán, 2012: 261–276.). These capabilities could be the basis for the emergence of separate, “technical security related” areas of state security after World War I (Müller, 2011). The development tasks and the need to create equipment for gathering information have come to the forefront, but development was only given real momentum from the mid-1950s. The scene for development was contemporary bilateral and multilateral co-operation with the European socialist countries, which (and their modified agreements, respectively), changed the direction of state security all the way to the political transition, utilizing various technical solutions.45

A real turning point in the development of technical areas was the establishment of the structure of the State Security General Directorate in 1962, when operational technical areas had already been given an independent directorate structure. Over the next thirty years there was a significant technical progress, wherein the development of device systems and capabilities, just like today, was a rather costly and, last but not least, a highly demanding area. Due to the isolation from the modern Western technologies, technical developments in state security were conducted in the framework of co-operation with the socialist countries and on the domestic base (including the involvement of the military/civil companies, scientific research institutes related to the state security sector). (Dobák, 2013)

Operational-technical regulations and methods requiring specific technical-engineering knowledge have been developed, thus the so-called Rule 3/a (wiretapping a phone line), Rule 3/e (bugging a room), Rule 3/r (covert photography, optics, video recording or CCTV recording) (Bikki, 2010), and the rules of their application46, which ensured very strong secrecy in a classified form. In line with its rules of procedure, the Operational-Technical Directorate supported and served both the MOI State Security and the law enforcement and military intelligence, performing technical tasks for them in a substantially centralized manner.47 The activities of the Directorate have been extended48 at the national level from the provision, operation of (operational) technical equipment and conditions, to the specialization tasks, to the design and production of operational equipment, to the development of specific methods and procedures, or even to the training of the personnel concerned.

45 In international practice, technical intelligence has evolved, among others, along the professional concepts of SIGINT, COMINT and ELINT, in the socialist block countries, they became significant capabilities under the terms of radio detection/radio jamming or even operational technology. Operational Technology: “In a broader sense, the covert investigative (operational) means of state security law enforcement work […] in a narrower concept it is the totality of the technical – physical and chemical – means and methods used by state security and criminal investigative authorities during their covert investigative actions, which regularly obtain targeted, reliable information “(Gergely, 1980).
46 Their application was regulated in Orders No. 0017 and 0018(1971 and 1972) and No. 35/1982 of the Minister of Interior of the Hungarian People’s Republic
47 According to the wording of the Regulations of General Directorate III (State Security General Directorate) established in 1972 and its subordinate units, among the tasks of the Operational-Technical Directorate is “the provision of operational technical equipment necessary to carry out tasks of the General Directorate, other criminal investigative organisations of the MOI and of Directorate 2 of HPA GS (Hungarian People’s Army General Staff, Military Intelligence)”. Source: Regulations of General Directorate III of the Ministry of the Interior.
48 Regulations of Directorate III/V of the Ministry of Interior
The question of decentralization of capabilities emerged during the change of the regime, but, in parallel with the changes in the legislation affecting the application, decision-makers at the time decided to keep the technical areas together. Looking back over the past decades, this proved to be the right decision, as it enabled the cost-effective, targeted operation and continuous development of the Hungarian intelligence capabilities. In 1990, the technical basis of the state security structure being dismantled was transferred to the civilian national security services, to the National Security Office in particular, where it operated under the name of SSOTD (Special Services Operational-Technical Directorate) until the establishment of the National Security Special Service in 1996.

As far as its development is concerned, the initial period of the operation of the SSNS, as described in the publication published by the NSSS (Boda–Horváth, 2011), it was a period of the service becoming self-contained, a period of its realignment, of the creation of its internal regulations, of the establishment of the data management and registration system and of the replacement or upgrading of the earlier, outdated technical equipment. In terms of technical capabilities, the reconstruction of monitoring fixed-line digital, then mobile networks and the establishment of a national smart system, the development of a radio monitoring system responding to changes in the external environment, and the establishment of a data reporting system (Dinya–Raáb, 2011: 17–23.), but the development of an IP-based communication monitoring system and the upgrading of the technical level of the wiretap system in the mid-2000s can also be included here.50

Even after this, the deployment of the new lawful monitoring capabilities of a technical nature continued, in line with the needs of the customers, as the “services” provided were continually forced by the changes in the external technical environment to evolve. Certain areas of technical information gathering, which had previously dominated, were often pushed into the background or were dismantled due to technological changes and the disappearance of information sources, and new information gathering needs and opportunities came to the forefront as info communication gained ground.

The SSNS, with its set of tasks as a national service provider – Paras (a) and (b) of Subsection (1) of Section (8) of Act CXXV of 1995 –, has been a key player for more than twenty years in the area of performing tasks of a technical nature of the domestic covert information gathering activities. It is a key player, because its capabilities in certain areas are exclusive in the (national) security structure, but in other service areas its performance of tasks cannot be considered exclusive, as those tasks can also be carried out by separate organizations, depending on their capabilities. Given the organization’s set of tasks, the customer agencies “do not have to operate the special expertise, the personal, technical and infrastructural backgrounds separately” (Boda, 2012: 124). With the exception of CTICAC, which is not authorized to conduct covert information gathering, as a service provider organization, it supports the national security services, the police, the National Protection Service, the Counter Terrorism Center, the National Tax and Customs Authority and the

---

49 The proposal for the organizational structure of the operational technical support of the national security services established in 1990 and of the criminal investigative units of the police was expected to be made by the a committee set up by the Council of Ministers. Source: CoM Decision No 3039/1990 on the establishment and conditions of operation of national security services, Paragraph 2.

Public Prosecutor’s Office. All this indicates that in the domestic (national) security system, the organization is a key actor, offering its services to its customers on an equal footing.

To this day, the service also monitors the changes in the external environment, seeks solutions to technical challenges, and increases efficiency of service. The introduction of an electronic service request system aimed at secure, electronic transmission of requests for covert information gathering, quick service provided to the requesting organizations, and preparing the request-related files in an electronic format.\(^{51}\) In recent years, the service has also been active in other areas to actively respond to changes affecting the efficiency of the whole law enforcement sector and the challenges of the external security and technical environment. This includes the creation of a facial image analysis registration database\(^{52}\) that is a step forward in the administrative protection of document security, crime prevention and the identification of unknown perpetrators.\(^{53}\) The amendment of the NSA in 2016\(^{54}\) may substantiate further “capacity development,” behind which there is a change in the explosively evolving external technical environment and the presence of information on the one hand, and the need to provide legal control options on the part of the state and the increase of effectiveness of the “system,” on the other. The amendment to the law shows that in many cases this necessarily can only be ensured through an obligation to cooperate with an external party\(^{55}\), a solution that cannot be regarded as new or as a domestic idiosyncrasy.

As is apparent from the set of tasks of the organization, in addition to the technical aspects of covert information gathering, mentioned earlier in this chapter, the areas of development and expert work as well as cyber security are also present. The latter is an example of a new organizational element of the NSSS’s organizational system, the GovCERT-Hungary, which was integrated in 2013. It provides its services to governmental organizations and local governments, with “the management and resolution of incidents that are used as a channel of attack against the Hungarian and international network security and critical information infrastructure organizations [...]”\(^{56}\). In October 2015, as a significant turning point for state-level cyber security, by focusing on the relevant tasks and areas of expertise, the National Cyber Security Center\(^{57}\) was established. In the field of cyber security, which

\(^{51}\) As a result of the development work that began in 2007 and lasted for several years, the lead time of the receipt of documents required for placing a request and the number of printed documents significantly decreased (Kovács Z., 2013: 171–183.).

\(^{52}\) A registration system of facial image profiles is going to be created (2015) and Bill No. T/6623 on the registration of facial image analysis and the facial image analysis system.

\(^{53}\) Act CLXXXVIII of 2015 (27.11.2015), on Facial image analysis registration and facial image analysis system; MOI Decree 78/2015 (XII. 23.) on the Detailed rules for operating the facial image analysis system and Bill No. T / 6623 (20.10.2015) on Facial image analysis registration and the facial image analysis system.

\(^{54}\) Act LXIX of 2016 on the Amendment of certain laws related to countering terrorism

\(^{55}\) Act CVIII of 2001 on Electronic commercial services and on certain aspects of services related to the information society (Sections 3/B and 13/B) and Government Decree No. 185/2016 (VII.13.) On the order of cooperation between the service providers providing applications with encrypted communication and the organizations authorized to conduct covert information gathering.

\(^{56}\) The website of the National Cyber Security Centre is at: www.cert-hungary.hu/node/1.

\(^{57}\) The Institute was established on October 1, 2015 as the organization of the Government Event Management Centre, the National Electronic Information Security Authority and the CDMA (Cyber Defence Management Authority) activity. Source: Ministry of the Interior Communiqué (1) – 1 October 2015, National Press Service.
is relatively new\textsuperscript{58} in Hungary, the Institute can carry out complex tasks (e.g. Bencsik, 2015) within the system of the central government, local government and vital systems within an organization system, to the security of electronic information systems. The compartmentalization of activities previously carried out by several organizations (official tasks: National Electronic Information Security Authority, vulnerability analysis: National Security Authority, IT security event management: SSNS GovCERT) has ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{59}

In summary, it can be stated that technological progress in the future will be unstoppable, and this will force the technical areas of national security services to be constantly renewed and improved. New and emerging technologies as well as new means based on them are emerging in our information society, which shape the necessity of developing legitimate control solutions as well as the creation of other capabilities. Regarding the elements of data acquisition necessary for the efficient and effective performance of national security tasks, in addition to the “secret” elements, the possibilities of accessing available data outside the closed national security system, or even open-source but technically related elements, are becoming increasingly important. Requiring special expertise and knowledge, the value of the areas related to experts, analysts and cyberspace is constantly increasing.

In today’s security events, society can also expect the services concerned to possess the cutting-edge technologies that contribute to increasing the security of communities. With a foreign perspective, due to the complex system of national security, the relevant development directions include the development of cyber defence, national security and criminal technical capabilities, data protection and new security solutions, including border protection, counter-terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the pronounced need for sharing security related information.

The problem of human resources, generational change and training

The efficiency of national security services is largely due to the continued availability of qualified personnel. Behind this statement, there is a wide range of human resource management and training activities, since over the last 25 years the Hungarian national security services could not avoid any changes in the external environment. Nowadays, our information society, as well as the changing security environment, are constantly forcing the services to evolve, let us just remember the life career model\textsuperscript{60} introduced in 2015 or the evolving system of training courses, but also the issue of generational change.

\textsuperscript{58} The National Cyber Security Strategy of Hungary was published in 2013 [in Government Decision No. 1139/2013. (III.21.)]; Act L (IV.15.) of 2013 on electronic information security of state and municipal bodies; Government Decree No. 233/2013 (VI.30) on the Duties and powers of the government event management centre, sector event management centres of electronic information systems and critical systems, further on the duties and powers of the event handling centre of critical facilities.

\textsuperscript{59} By the amendment in 2016 of the NSA this task was included in the basic mission of the NSSS at the statutory level. Paragraph i) of Subsection (1) of Section 8 of the NSA reads: The NSSS “performs information security tasks related to the electronic information security of public and municipal bodies according to the provisions of the law.”

\textsuperscript{60} The National Assembly adopted Act XLII of 2015 on the service relations of the active-duty personnel of the government agencies performing law enforcement functions, including the active duty personnel of the civilian security services, on April 14, 2015
Nowadays, civilian security services are staffed on the basis of the relevant legislation [Subsection (1), Section 20 of Act CXXV of 1995 on the National security services], the personnel consisting of government officials, active duty members and public-sector employees. In terms of the staffing of civilian security services under the Ministry of Interior, the strength of the Constitution Protection Office foreseen for 2016 is 1226 (1155 in 2015), while the strength of the Special Service for National Security for 2016 is 2189 (2184 in 2015).61 The foreseen strength of CTCAC in 2017 is 130.62

The most decisive of the legal relationships is the active duty service relationship, which, as a special service relationship, clearly indicates that the “active duty service is a profession pursued in a chain of command, amidst increased risk” [Subsection (1), Section 21, Act CXXV of 1995]. All of this, by definition, defines the human resource management activities of the services, so in accordance with the relevant legal requirements, specific recruitment and training systems are in place. Fitness for active duty service, willingness to be subjected to national security vetting, meeting the qualification and special qualification requirements for the service post, followed by continuous professional compliance with the given service post and development, fitting into the organizational culture and embracing it, and the commitment to the profession are all factors that have a continuous impact on the functioning of the entire system.

As mentioned earlier, from a historical perspective, more than 25 years ago, during the dismantling of the state security structure, the question arose whether the establishment of the national security system should be started from completely new grounds and personnel or should the organizational legacy of the former services be built upon by restructuring it.63 Political decision-makers at that time, with a reference to the aforementioned, chose the latter solution, thus retaining part of the special professional culture and personnel within the system. Restructuring based on CoM Decision 3039/199064 on the establishment and operation of national security services had to be carried out by transferring personnel from the MOI in such a way as to”have a core personnel of the national security services with a with lower staffing levels and better professional skills than the personnel of the former state security services in the Ministry of the Interior”65.

All this ensured continuity and the professional knowledge required for work, but also anticipated the need for professional preparation, as the original personnel left the service simultaneously with the emergence of new generations. Nowadays, the backbone of the services with strong organizational culture and regulated work environment is already

---


63 A publication in Home Affairs Review “Interview with Dr. Péter Boross” gives an insight into the the background of the government’s concepts related to the selection of the personnel of the civilian national security services established in 1990.

64 The CoM Decision dated 2 February 1990, and declassified in 2008, defines the stages of the creation of “national security services”, such as complementing the personnel, providing the necessary special buildings, material, technical conditions, resources etc.), see: www.parallelarchive.org/document/1833

65 CoM Decision No. 3039/1990, Paragraph 4
made up of members of generation X and generation Y\textsuperscript{66} who have different “labour market” characteristics in many respects. A study on this topic (Zalai, 2016: 36.) found that as long as generation X is “characterized by reliability, being under control, being motivated and career-driven,” then members of generation Y “experience their relationships virtually and in reality.” As the study also explains, each generation has different attributes that can be beneficial for organizations, so efficiency can be promoted when several generations are present together in an organization.

This is also true of the national security services that search for their “new recruits” along their complex system of tasks. Persons with various professional backgrounds and qualifications are introduced into the system, but there is a need for organizations to fill jobs that require different basic skills. In the light of the above, training is one of the areas that by imparting a common professional basic and specialized knowledge, further by providing guidance in organizational values can contribute to the creation in the long run of a stable personnel, dedicated to the services and their values.

Outlining the topic of training: before the regime change, the Department of State Security of the Police Officer Training College provided the preparation of the personnel, but this higher educational-professional training opportunity ceased to exist in 1990. Subsequently, in order to provide the necessary human resources, civilian national security services “recruited their personnel directly from universities and colleges, and in-service training courses were organized for the new recruits” (Boda, 2016b: 146). On the one hand, the introduction of newer generations to the further development of the services in the civil environment with freshly acquired knowledge (for example, technical, IT or legal knowledge); on the other hand, it necessarily raised the high priority task of training and professional preparation. Without any pretention to completeness, it can be stated that the training needs and their internal content have changed along with the development of the external technical environment, changes in security policy, intensification of international cooperation or even changes in the legal environment.

With regard to the human resource management of the national security services, several studies and academic research results have appeared in recent years, examining, inter alia, the education and training of the personnel of the services. The topic of training was discussed at open academic conferences (NUPS, 2012, 2014). The question arose whether the admission of people with civil qualifications and foreign language skills was more beneficial, as they “only” needed in-service professional training than if the organization provided the necessary professional knowledge in a training framework of a closed form of higher education. In this regard, “not even the Hungarian national security services see eye to eye.” (Kis-Benedek, 2014: 25.)

There are understandable reasons for this because, due to the complex nature of the national security activities, some of the necessary competences are available in the courses of the specialized civilian HEIs (IT, language, law, etc.), and to acquire the competences required to meet the special needs of national security activities however, there is no possibility in the civil higher educational environment. The acquisition of these can be done on

the one hand at the in-service training courses and, on the other hand, in certain elements of the closed national higher education framework, which allows for the purposeful acquisition of the professional knowledge.

Different practices have emerged, in which, however, a common element is that professional training is preceded by admission to the ranks. This is true both for attendance of in-service professional courses within the organizations and for the higher education national security training programmes to be described later. Among the reasons for this, we can mention the existence of specialized knowledge in the system and the existence of professional and practical conditions for acquiring knowledge. Another common element for civilian national security services is that students admitted have to attend internal professional training courses lasting for several months, which are “tailored to the needs of the given organization, and the reason for the differences in the subject and the duration of the training is to be found in the training needs arising from the different sets of tasks”. (Zalai, 2012: 123.)

Although the former state security training was abolished during the regime change, the idea of developing training courses for the national security services newly established did not disappear. The Police Officer Training College wanted to expand its education framework in the mid-1990s with civilian national security training, but it did not materialize then. Progress was made towards the end of the decade, when national security re-emerged in higher education, when bachelor and master courses in national security were accredited as a result of the ideas and preparatory work along the lines of military national security training needs.

In several stages, the training documents, curricula were developed for the bachelor and master’s degree national security courses built on one another, and the education programme could start: The Department of National Security ensured the coordination of the degree programs. Later, among the civilian national security services, the then National Security Office and the Special Service for National Security also indicated their needs to take part in the training (HÉJJA, 2014: 13.), so some members of the personnel of the relevant civilian national security services appeared among the day-time students. The establishment of the National University of Public Service brought about change in this educational and operational structure, and from then onwards the national security higher education was already given its separate place among the various courses, identifying the supervisory ministers as well.

Regarding the organizational framework of the training, and in the area of training related to the organizations authorized to conduct covert information gathering, the National Security Institute of the University was set up as a standalone institute, not affiliated with

---

68 The minister in charge of law enforcement, in addition to the law enforcement higher education, prepares the enrollment plans for the portfolio in the civilian area of national security higher education, and the minister of defence, prepares the enrollment plans of the portfolio, in addition to military higher education, in the military area of national security higher education. See: Section 2, MPSJ (Ministry of Public Service and Justice) Decree 1/2013. (I.8.)
69 The National Security Institute is considered unique on the national level in terms of national security services, and its creation made up decades-long arrears. As for to its internal structure, it has a Civilian and a Military National Security Department and, since 2015, has a Counter-Terrorism Department. See: http://nbi.uni-nke.hu/intezetunkrol/az-intezet-rendeltetes}
any faculty. After the preparatory work of the Department of Civilian National Security, the “civilian” national security training started in 2013 as the civil specialization of the national security bachelor and master’s degree. As a further step, as it were, efforts are currently underway, aimed at developing specialization to be launched at the Police Science Faculty, which is more closely aligned with the needs of the internal affairs sector, where both the bachelor and the master’s courses have been formulated for human intelligence, technical intelligence and counter-terrorism specializations.70

The new higher education training programs have also led to opening up, since these training programs need to provide students with a comparable qualification at international level, in line with the Bologna process and the higher education frameworks. It is important to continuously improve the training, as we are talking about a training scene where students from national security organizations and other organizations authorized to conduct covert information gathering need to acquire qualifications that are equal to those of the civilian sphere but are purposeful and meet the needs of the organization delegating the student to the university. The established Hungarian structure can be viewed as forward-looking even in the international arena, encompassing both the basic and the master’s degree and the possibility of continuing PhD studies. As a result of the training courses, specialists looking at security in a comprehensive way with an expert eye, capable of understanding security and willing to work together in a team can assist the work of the services.

The national security subjects built into the requirements of the law enforcement specialized exam organized by MOI PSPGDGD71 can contribute to the efficiency of the cooperation between the organizations and the overall security approach, whereby students from the given services can make choices in order to acquire knowledge that is closer to their tasks. The issues of the sphere appear in the mandatory subjects of the exams, among the elements of the subject of public administration and integrated law enforcement leadership, and in an optional manner, the national security administration exam72 subjects whose main purpose is to “provide general knowledge of issues related to the national security system.” The subject, as well as its students and instructors, goes beyond the civilian national security structure defined in the NSA, providing new knowledge about the operation of other organizations in the law enforcement sector. The significant progress in the training areas over the past period generally indicates that national security requires ever-wider interpretation and systemic thinking.

---

70 As a result of the wide-ranging specialization work, the training and output requirements of the Civilian National Security Course were introduced in 2016, thus defining the framework of new higher education programs in the system of higher education in Hungary. See Minister in charge of the PMO’s Decree 7/2016. (II. 15.)

71 Centre for Law Enforcement Basic and Specialized Exams of the Public Service and Personnel Development General Directorate (PSPDGD)

72 The subject of the exam consists of knowledge related to the activities of the CTC, CPO, NSSS, NPS and CTICAC. See Government Decree No. 274/2012. (IX.28.) On the law enforcement basic and specialized exam, on the Law Enforcement Basic and Specialized Examination Board, and on the list of examiners at the law enforcement basic exam and the list of the Board of Examiners at the law enforcement specialized exam, Annex 2 II/20, further http://bmkszf.hu/dokumentum/231/kvetelmnyrendszer_2742012.pdf.
Addenda for a vision

After a historical review of the paradigm shifts of the past quarter century and the summing up of the experience, it is justified that the study should attempt to give an insight into the major issues of the next years or even decades concerning the national security organization system. Of course, all this is closely related to the security challenges that Hungary is going to face. If we accept the common approach that the tasks of secret services include the protection of interests of national security in the traditional sense (sovereignty and constitutional order), in addition to enforcing the political and economic aspirations of that state, today they also include the prediction of processes that endanger the European value-based social welfare model, the potential risk factors will be significantly expanded. In preventive thinking, security strategies have a pivotal role to play, which can only have a real impact together with the appropriate practical measures.

In terms of a broad understanding security, a number of international forecasts address future challenges, short- and long-term security strategies, which implicitly influence the activities of the national security services working to safeguard security. In Hungary, the national security strategy emphasizes the area of national security at a specific point, saying that “intelligence and counterintelligence are an important element in the implementation of the security strategy, the protection of the sovereignty of our country, the protection of its constitutional order, the security policy objectives and the promotion of its national interests.”

All this requires “strong intelligence and counterintelligence” capabilities thus, in the case of the national security sector they have responded to performing tasks more efficiently and to changes in the security environment by modifying the operating framework, improving resources, increasing cooperation and adjusting co-ordination. This includes, but is not limited to, legislative changes, increased resources, or even cyberspace and the ongoing development of covert/overt human/technical information gathering capabilities. We do not intend to go into details of the changes in the security policy environment, but we want to highlight some of the effects on these Hungarian security systems:

- **Geographically,** the tasks of national security services have widened, as a significant part of the threats to security come from outside the country, and often their sources can be searched in processes and events in remote geographic areas. The transnational nature of impacts is further strengthened by the rapid change of our info communication environment, as a factor for the development of human and technical information gathering areas beyond national borders. Recent European terrorist acts and migration processes have demonstrated the cross-border nature of the challenges, the complexity of security-threatening factors, the presence of political,

---

73 One of the best-known global forecasts is the Global Trends series of the United States National Intelligence Council (NIC). These are issued four times a year, five forecasts have been issued so far, and this is the case for a 2030 forecast published at the end of 2012 (Global Trends 2030).

74 For example: European Commission, 2015.

75 For Hungary, Government Decision No.1035/2012 (II.21.) on National security strategy, Annex 1, Paragraph 48 is the determining document.

76 All this is demonstrated by international scandals around technical intelligence gathering. See GREENWALD, 2014.
economic and humanitarian elements. Their impacts may be at the national level beyond the organizations, the creation of the necessary organizational skills and cooperation.

- As for primary challenges in Hungary in the medium term, migration and associated “accompanying phenomena” (terrorist risk, organized crime) need to be addressed. A permanent, complex challenge is the sustainability of the performance of the Hungarian economy exposed to the European and global environments. These challenges, however, cannot be interpreted in themselves, without the examination and analysis of the appropriate contexts. National security services should therefore increasingly focus on the background of the processes.

  - In a counterintelligence approach, for example, the most recent European attacks have highlighted that terrorism and organized crime are much more closely interconnected to each other than previously assumed, as the logistic background needed for the attacks (firearms, smuggling, etc.) was provided by criminal organizations. Accordingly, more emphasis should be placed on not only the prevention of a specific terrorist act, but also the identification of elements that are indirectly involved in it.

  - Intelligence-driven thinking also needs to broaden the angle of view as – dwelling on migration – the stability and attitude of the source and intermediate countries play a key role in its evolution. It is a professional commonplace that globalization speeds up the spread of regional risks, so it is important for intelligence organizations to analyze processes around the world with appropriate sensitivity and optimal forecasting capabilities. (Some secret service theories call it the export of risks.)

- As regards technological advancement, the importance of global cyberspace has to be highlighted as a key element. This, besides its peaceful use, also presents significant threats for the state and society concerned. With the exception of military applications, efforts against adverse intelligence in cyberspace, cyber terrorism or even cybercrime, will be crucial for both national security organizations and other organizations responsible for security.

- It is worth pointing out that while the most up-to-date devices and solutions appear in the short term along illegal activities, organizations working for the security of the nation need to consciously prepare for the creation of legitimate control capabilities, with a long-term perspective. Today, countries in the developed world are continually improving their cyber capabilities by utilizing the work of the external IT development sector. The time between new developments and the use of results has been shortened. The range of services is expanding, while costs are reduced.77 The technological superiority of developed countries is already visible, highlighting the fact that “security, defense, intelligence and offensive capabilities in cyberspace will also have an impact” (DOBÁK–SZÜCS, 2015: 87.) on the national security systems of the states.

- The national security organizations are exposed to significant, vast volumes of information that change in form. “The services concerned must select, evaluate

77 NIC (2000)
and analyze the information necessary for the performance of their duties from this mass of information, in accordance with strict legal regulations. The form of all this is and has been going through significant changes” (Dobák-Szűcs, 2015: 87.), because of the Internet and info communication solutions, applications have become an indispensable part of our daily lives. Elements of open information gathering are appreciated which can with ever greater subtlety serve purposes of the collection, analysis and evaluation of valuable information supporting decisions.

- In order to respond quickly to the challenges and the threats, to avoid duplication and to support higher-level, comprehensive decisions, the so-called fusion (information fusion and information sharing) centres are coming to the forefront of national security activities. Regarding the use of structures that focus on information and expertise that increase the effectiveness of the use of existing capabilities at national level, professionals now have extensive experience.

- National security activities today can no longer be conceived without the broader cooperation areas of the organizations and without the exchange of information. Here we must mention international co-operation, professional relations between EU Member States and their national authorities, but it is important to emphasize the communication and info communication service providers involved in the development of the info communication environment and the intensification of the dialogue with the IT sector. The EU’s relevant security strategy states: “In 2015, the Commission will launch an EU-wide forum for mainstream IT companies to curb terrorist propaganda on the Internet and social media and to find ways to address the concerns of law enforcement authorities in relation to new encryption technologies.”

Based on the above-sketched summary of the risks, the most important requirement for modern secret services in the next period is to continuously be able to adapt to their environment – finding the right balance between the obligations of tradition and the need for adaptation. This will necessarily accelerate the modernization of the security institutional system, and beyond the organizational responses, it will further expand the toolkit and will further enhance the national security activity. The most dynamically developing area is cyber defence and cyber security, whose independent organizational and professional frameworks are currently being formed. (Think of the road to the creation of the already mentioned National Cyber Security Center)

With regards to the evolution of the Hungarian national security organization system, one of the most important experiences of recent decades is that the reforms should not be confined to symptomatic levels and sub-areas, and not to the formal approach of “less deadwood, larger budgets, better equipment, and information systems” (Hetesy, 2011: 20.) but rather the actual and comprehensive operation of the system should be focussed on. As demonstrated above, Hungarian reform experiments started with a broad-spectrum vision, with the need to transform the entire national security system, but ultimately it was limited to the level of an organization. The public could perceive that within the given political

force there was no agreement to act. It should be added, however, that the understanding of
the profession, at least in terms of the main directions, and the crossing of the institutional
lines laid down in 1990, are essential for a change resulting in substantial, effective adjust-
ment and efficiency gains.

It is necessary to point out that these dilemmas (modernization vs. traditionalism,
traditional vs. modern means and methods, etc.) are not only characteristic of domestic but
also of foreign national security systems. If we compared the Hungarian national security
structure of 2010–2012 to the British model solutions, it is worth mentioning that issues
related to the intelligence organization system are constantly present in the famous island
of tradition. So much so that this topic has already been found in pop culture, as the latest
James Bond film (Spectre, 2015) focuses on the problem of merging and the MI5 and MI6
in one shared office building, with an information system in the background, linking the
databases of the world’s largest intelligence services.

A brilliant description of the British perception of secret services is given in the film
in that the politician in it who, though risking the effectiveness of the system, took the lead
in the reform efforts was portrayed as a negative figure. While in Hungary it is against the
unwritten law merely a quarter of a century old to speak about the centralization of na-
tional intelligence capabilities, – in international specialist terminology this is also called
globalization of intelligence services (Svendsen, 2012) – centuries-old traditions would
have to be overcome in Britain.

Although the Counter-Terrorism Information and Crime Analysis Centre is not a clear
example in international practice, it definitely recalls the Anglo-Saxon models that it seeks
to counterbalance a wide-ranging national security system by coordinating and governmen-
tal decision-making activities by aggregating information from the services. There is
some discrepancy in the fact that the coordination tasks related to operational management
are separated from decision support by separate organizations such as the Joint Terrorism
Analysis Centre (JTAC) within the British MI5 and the National Counter-Terrorism Centre
(NCTC), while these functions are present together in CTICAC.

With regard to future operations, it is advisable to pay attention to the experience of
the Anglo-Saxon centres that they have been faced with major arousal against “traditional”
services. This is perceived in the following opinion of a senior official of the FBI – pub-
lished in the Hungarian press – as follows: “[...] and then we did not even talk about the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) that was often underfoot, while the
FBI hardly benefited from its activity at all.” (Kessler, 2012: 7). It is therefore important
that the Centre carries out its activities based on professional agreement and the principle
of reciprocity. If this happens, it ideally functions as a kind of “information cloud”, going

79 *Military Intelligence, Section 5, Section 6.*

80 In the United Kingdom, it is the Joint Intelligence Organization of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, while in the
United States it is the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) that is in charge of controlling the
7-member national security community in United Kingdom and the 17-member national security community
United States and of the implementation of uniform government information tasks based on intelligence infor-
mation. ODNI’s legal authorities have been expanded so far in the past decade that, evaluating the performance
of the services, they can make proposals for the budgets of those organizations.

beyond the paradigm of the information cycle, because instead of intermittent/cyclical
co-ordination of intelligence needs, it can be a continuous mediator, buffer between the
professional organizations and politics.

On the other hand, the “cycle” of information acquisition (intelligence cycle) also
needs to be re-interpreted as the “path” between data acquisition and use (decision), again
underlining the condition of the ideal operation of the system, is significantly shortened. In
tandem with that, fusion centres also generate new challenges, as the approach of national
cyber security based on the principle of global cyberspace requires greater protection of
the IT tools used, emphasizing that states have a greater influence on the (re) distribution
of IT knowledge.

The evolution of the information society has left behind the phase in which much of
the information obtained through the use of covert means has now become accessible via
the Internet. It has entered into a phase which is – especially through social media applica-
tions – marked by large data sets having been created (see the theory of big data) whose
analysis and application of information also takes place in the open information space. In
this medium, on the one hand, a more sophisticated approach is required for the identifica-
tion of the data that can actually be obtained only by using covert means and methods. This
inevitably entails an increase in the cost of using the secret service means. On the other
hand, it may pose a risk to the national security service if it voluntarily renounces the use
of (traditional) intelligence means and relies heavily (or even exclusively) on using open
information. By doing so, the secret service may lose its “competitive edge” and be forced to
compete with organizations (think-tanks, the press, public opinion research institutes, etc.),
which at a number of points (e.g. through information channels not tied to the hierarchy or
the looser forms of financing) are in a stronger position.

As mentioned above, the impact of the globalization of the secret services is partly due
to the fact that, typically after the end of the bipolar world order, typology is increasingly
complex. Services that can be listed under the so-called traditional category, additional
types of security services have emerged in the security environment. Accordingly, we can
distinguish (at least) seven types (BÖRCSÖK–VIDA, 2014: 68) functionally, not counting the
mixed solutions. It shows the complexity of the present Hungarian structure that virtually
all of them exist in the (national) security system in the broad sense.81

- intelligence service (IO),
- counterintelligence agency (CPO),
- service in charge of technical data acquisition (SSNS),
- coordinating-controlling (fusion) centre (CTICAC),
- service with official investigative powers (NBI),
- data protection organization (National Security Authority), and
- integrated (intelligence-counterintelligence) secret service (MNSS).

---

81 Here we have in mind a total security structure that goes beyond the Hungarian national security institutional
structure defined by Act CXXV of 1995 on the National security services (National Bureau of Investigation,
Counter Terrorism Centre, National Protection Service). In the context of this study, we do not wish to address
the institutional differences resulting from the different uses of covert information gathering and its use for
different purposes.
Jurisdiction plays a dominant role in almost all national structures. However, the importance of frontiers has lost its traditional perception, and this is managed by these systems based on jurisdictions with difficulty and/or through complicated coordination mechanisms. Because there is information coming from across the borders that is valuable from the point of view of counterintelligence, and vice versa, it is possible to gain knowledge of a foreign country within the boundaries of a third country and it is significant in terms of intelligence. Although the problem can be solved by appropriate coordination, by coordinating the work of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services, some centralization ideas still point in the direction of building national systems based on an activity profile such as human, technical data acquisition and information analysis services (Swendsen 2012: 112.)

We do not wish to make recommendations within the framework of this study on the structure and operation of the Hungarian national security system, since the structure is basically built as a result of political decision, and it is the task of the profession to operate it. The focus is mainly on the latter, since, using a commonplace of theory of organization, a formally well-structured transparent system can be operated poorly, and a bad system can work well if responsibilities are clearly laid down, appropriate professionals are available, and the interaction of the organizational elements is ensured.

The purpose of the study is essentially to outline the processes and events of the past quarter century that played a part in the development of the Hungarian national security community. We have deliberately highlighted the cornerstones that we think may occur in the next years or decades, in different forms, and with alternating emphasis, once again as challenges. We trust that this study can provide support for the interpretation of all these.

References


Legal regulations, decrees, orders, reports

1990. évi X. törvény a különleges titkosszolgálati eszközök és módszerek engedélyezésének átmeneti szabályozásáról
1995. évi CXXV. törvény a nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatokról
2001. évi CVIII. törvény az elektronikus kereskedelmi szolgáltatások, valamint az információs társadalommal összefüggő szolgáltatások egyes kérdéseiről
2006. évi CXXVII. törvény a Magyar Köztársaság 2007. évi költségvetéséről
2007. évi CLXIX. törvény a Magyar Köztársaság 2008. évi költségvetéséről
2008. évi CII. törvény a Magyar Köztársaság 2009. évi költségvetéséről
2012. évi XCVI. törvény az egyes törvényeknek a polgári hírszerzési tevékenység irányításával kapcsolatos módosításáról
2013. évi L. törvény, az állami és önkormányzati szervek elektronikus információ-biztonságáról
2015. évi XLII. törvény, a rendészeti feladatokat ellátó szervek hivatásos állományának szolgálati jogviszonyáról
2015. évi CLXXXVIII. törvény az arcképelemzési nyilvántartásról és az arcképelemző rendszerről
2016. évi LXIX. törvény a terroristum elleni fellépéssel összefüggő egyes törvények módosításáról
274/2012. (IX. 28.) Korm. rendelet a rendészeti alapvizsgáról és a rendészeti szakvizsgáról, a Rendszerti Alap- és Szakvizsga Bizottságról, valamint a rendészeti alapvizsga vizsgabiztosító és a rendészeti szakvizsga vizsgabizottsági névjegyzekről
1139/2013. (III. 21.) Korm. határozat Magyarország Nemzeti Kiberbiztonsági Stratégiájáról
152/2014. (VI. 6.) Korm. rendelet a Kormány tagjainak feladat- és hatásköréről
1988/2015. (XII. 28.) Korm. határozat az egyes jogszabályoknak az új típusú kihívásokkal összefüggő felülvizsgálatáról és a lehetséges fejlesztési irányairól
185/2016. (VII. 13.) Korm. rendelet a titkosított kommunikációt biztosító alkalmazásszolgáltatók és a titkos információgyűjtésre feljogosított szervezetek együttműködésének rendjéről
1/2013. (I. 8.) KIM rendelet a közigazgatási, rendészeti, katonai és nemzetbiztonsági felsőoktatás vonatkozásában az évenként felvethető hallgatói létszámt megállapításával és elosztásával kapcsolatos eljárás részletes szabályairól, a Nemzeti Köszolgálati Egyetemre történő felvétel különös feltételeiről, valamint a külföldi hallgatók Nemzeti Köszolgálati Egyetemre történő felvételének, jogállásának és tanulmányainak részletes szabályairól
7/2015. (V. 15.) BM utasítás a minisztéri biztos kinevezéséről
78/2015. (XII. 23.) BM rendelet az arcképelemző rendszer működtetésének részletes szabályairól
7/2016. (II. 15.) MvM rendelet az államtudományi képzési terület alap- és mesterképzési szakjainak meghatározásáról és azok képzési és kimeneti követelményeiről
3039/1990. számú MT határozat a nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatok létrehozásáról és működési feltételeiről
0739. sz. jelentés a polgári nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatok pénzügyi-gazdasági ellenőrzéséről (2007. október)
A Magyar Népköztársaság belügyminiszterének 0017. számú (1971) parancsa
A Magyar Népköztársaság belügyminiszterének 0018. számú (1972) parancsa
A Magyar Népköztársaság belügyminiszterének 35/1982. (XII. 23.) sz. parancsa
A Minisztertanács 6000/1975. sz. határozata az állambiztonsági feladatokról
A Minisztertanács elnökhelyettesének 1/1975. sz. utasítása az állam biztonságának védelmében alkalmazható eszközökről és módszerekről
Az Elnöki Tanács 1974. évi 17. törvényerejű rendelete az állam- és közbiztonságról
T/5004. számú törvényjavaslat egyes rendvédelmi tárgyú törvények módosításáról, valamint az azzal összefüggő további törvénymódosításokról
T/10307. számú törvényjavaslat a terrorizmus elleni fellépéssel összefüggő egyes törvények módosításáról

Internet sources

http://pilac.law.harvard.edu/europe-region-efforts//counter-terrorist-group-ctg (2016. 08. 13.)
http://hvg.hu/itthon.parlament/20111230_Pinter_NIBEK_Demeter_modosito (2016. 08. 20.)
http://docplayer.hu/9553751-11-cim-polgari-nemzetbiztonsagi-szolgalatok.html (2016. 07. 05.)
http://nbi.uni-nke.hu/intezetunkrol/az-intezet-rendeltetese (2016. 07. 10.)
www.parlament.hu/irom39/05004/05004-0024.pdf (2016. 08. 02.)
www.parlament.hu/irom39/05004/05004-0004.pdf (2016. 08. 02.)
www.cert-hungary.hu/node/1 (2016. 06. 20.)
www.parallelarchive.org/document/1833 (2016. 07. 02.)
www.rtf.hu/kuldetes.html (2012. 06. 20.)
www.dni.gov/index.php (2016. 09. 02.)