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Islam and Islamism as Security Challenges

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Abstract

By the second decade of the 21ˢᵗ century, Islam itself – and Muslims who represent Islam, especially Muslim migrants – and not only radical Islamism or jihadism have gradually become a reason for securitization. Threat is mainly perceived in two fields: terrorism and social security.

According to Sayyid Qutb's "permanent jihad" theory, jihadism considers jihad, reinterpreted as a constant fight against foes, to be the duty of each individual. Since jihadism became globalized and transnational jihadist organizations were established, terrorist attacks motivated by jihadism (or related to jihadism in any other way) have also become globalized, and from the earlier, predominantly local levels they have risen to an international level spanning to the United States and Western Europe.

The primary target of al-Qaeda has always been the West, whereas the Islamic State turned against the West after having encountered difficulties in "building" a state while losing ground in Iraq and Syria; since then, is attacks have targeted Europe. The stock of second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants who failed to integrate into the European societies which accepted them have become an increasingly important source of jihadist terrorism. Many view the spread of Islamic culture in Europe along with the ever greater numbers of Muslim immigrants to be increasingly threatening the essential features of European societies, European values, and collective national identity/identities.

For reaching a long-term solution, the causes need to be addressed. Taking steps to solve the crisis in the Middle East is an essential condition. A situation has to be created which puts an end to armed conflicts and which enables the millions of refugees to return to their homelands. In Europe, too, complex measures have to be taken. Besides the must to solve the refugee crisis, promoting the integration of migrants is also an urgent task. The dividing line between Islam and the West is only secondary to the one between radical jihadists, who use terror as an instrument, and the moderate "rest". In the fight against jihadism, Christians and the moderate Muslim majority are allies. One of the main problems is mutual mistrust, which should be countered by building trust from both ways.

Keywords: securitization, jihadism, threat, apostasy, integration, Islamism, Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, refugees, migrants, societal security, terrorism

Introduction

By the first decades of the 21st century, Islam and Islamism (and its radical wing, jihadism) began to play an increasingly important role in terms of security, presenting a serious challenge – especially in two dimensions of security –, which is interpreted and experienced by politicians, experts, and a part of the society as an actual threat that affects everyday life. The two affected dimensions are *terrorism* (terror threat) and *societal security* (threat against the Western civilization, which is rooted in Christianity, and the collective European identity [identities]).

By 2016 the situation became particularly serious because in 2015 a migration crisis the likes of which had never been seen before broke out – and the European Union failed to find the right formula to respond to it –, and in Europe there was a rash of terror attacks that were linked to jihadism in some way.[1] Actors advocating the necessity of *securitization*[2] emphasized the intensification of the dual threat posed by hundreds of thousands of migrants: first, the threat to the European identity and culture, and second, the threat of terror that increases in parallel with the rise in the number of migrants.

The above threats have a deep impact on Europe, the European security situation, and the perception of security. As far as the actual threat of terror is concerned, however, the target area of terrorism – specifically, jihadist terrorism – is much broader: most of the jihadist terror attacks are launched outside Europe in the broader Middle-Eastern region.

Increasing securitization of the Islamic (Islamist/jihadist) threat

The nineties: the "Islamic threat"

The coming of the last decade of the 20th century and the dawn of a new, post-bipolar international system brought for the West a new concept of the enemy: the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the communist block was replaced by the "Islamic threat"[3], at least in the communication of certain political leaders, experts and media. In 1995, the then-Secretary General of NATO, Willy Claes, declared that since the end of the Cold War, "Islamic militancy has emerged as perhaps the single gravest threat to the NATO alliance and to Western security." (PIPES, 2002: 22.). Dan Quayle, vice president to George W. Bush, Sr., compared the threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism to Nazism and communism (ESPOSITO, 1995: 189.). Certain leading Western media outlets even talked about "the start of a new cold war".

Among experts, similar thoughts were expressed. One of the most influential orientalists, Bernard Lewis, who was an advisor on the Middle-East to US President George W. Bush, Jr., used the phrase "clash of civilizations" for the first time in his study dissecting

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[1] In July 2016 there were four such incidents within a week in Germany.

[2] This study is not meant to provide an in-depth introduction to the concept of *securitization* developed by the Copenhagen School and, first and foremost, by Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver (see, in particular: BUZAN et al., 1998; see more about the subject in Hungarian: MARTON et al., 2015; 19–46.).

[3] The situation is not so clear-cut as "radical Islam", "Islamic fundamentalism", "Islamic militancy", and other categories that were in some way related to Islam, but could not be applied (at least, not necessarily) to the entirety of Islam were also included as the source of threat.

"the roots of Muslim rage" published in September 1990 (Lewis, 1990), presenting a vision of 1400 years of confrontation between Islam and Christianity[4]. The greatest impact was produced by the "civilizational paradigm" of Samuel Huntington, an American professor of political sciences, which posited that the post-cold war international system should be analyzed using a new "civilization" based approach (Huntington, 1996). According to this paradigm, the new lines of conflict in the international system now lie between civilizations, of which the most dominant one is the *"West versus the Rest"*, and in particular, between the Western and the Islamic civilization.

Indeed, the nineties were plagued by various attacks launched by various organizations and persons who originated from Islamic civilization (and were mostly associated with the al-Qaeda network)[5], culminating in the events of 11 September 2001. All these incidents prompted Huntington to call the period spanning the first years of the 21st century as "the age of Muslim wars" (Huntington, 2001[6]) and to reassert his previous claim that Islam had "bloody borders". Huntington seems to have been vindicated – and is still being vindicated – by the terror attacks that have been cropping up ever since[7], the activation of radical Islamism (jihadism), and the emergence and conquest of the Islamic State. The word *Islam* acquired an increasingly negative connotation: people began to regard it as something which threatens the West (Europe), inherently entails (because, one might say, it can be traced back to the Quran) radicalism and violence, and which is alien to Europe and to the Western civilization and its values.

The 2000s: increased perception of threat

By the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the transnational, internationalized and globalized Islamic radicalism (jihadism) clearly became a subject of securitization. The "War on Terror" announced by US President George W. Bush focused on jihadist terrorism in the first place. Since jihadism became globalized and transnational jihadist organizations – first and foremost al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State – were established, terrorist attacks motivated by jihadism (or related to jihadism in any other way) have also shifted from the earlier, predominantly local levels to a global international level spanning the United States and Western Europe.

As for *societal security*, many people consider the spreading of Islamic culture in Europe – brought about by the rising number of Muslim immigrants – as an increasing threat to the defining features of European societies, the European values and the collective national identities embodying Europe and Europeanism, and steps are taken to securitize the

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[4] Instead of *Christianity,* Lewis uses the term *Christendom*, referring to the Christian civilization/culture and not to the Christianity as a religion.

[5] December 1992, Aden; November 1995, Riyadh; June 1996, Dhahran, Khobar towers; August 1998, US Embassy, Nairobi; August 1998, US Embassy, Dar es-Salaam, etc.

[6] "Muslim wars have replaced the cold war as the principal form of international conflict. These wars include wars of terrorism, guerrilla wars, civil wars and interstate conflicts. These instances of Muslim violence could congeal into one major clash of civilizations between Islam and the West or between Islam and the Rest."

[7] October 2002, Bali; May 2003, Riyadh; March 2004, Madrid; July 2005, London; 2008, Mumbai; January 2015, Paris (against the offices of *Charlie Hebdo*); November Paris (the Bataclan Theatre, the Stade de France stadium); March 2016, Brussels; July 2016, Nice.

defence of European civilization and culture. In literature on security it has been a widely recognized fact, which is quoted frequently these days in the context of terrorism, that the objective (real threat) and subjective (perception of threat) approach to security are often markedly different (GAZDAG–TÁLAS, 2008: 9; NAGY, 2016; SZABÓ, 2016),[8] and a significant portion of the citizens and the public perceives a threat greater than in reality. Subjective perception of security changes owing to various factors. As Péter Tálas very aptly noted, "judgment about the threat posed by a certain security policy related challenge [...] depends on how realistic and differentiated our approach to and our evaluation of the given issue after the first shock of experiencing the challenge, and to what extent we are able to get rid ourselves of the shackles of our political views and prejudices" (TÁLAS, 2009: 32.).

Shaping of the subjective perception of security and the process of securitizing the individual threats are dominated by politics and the media. This is due to the fact that a key element of securitization is speech, i.e. making an effort to focus the attention of the public on the threat that is to be securitized, using communication targeting as wide a group of the populace as possible. The above statements are particularly applicable to Islam or rather the security challenges that are in some way related to Islam. There are a lot of prejudices regarding Islam in the first place, from superficial knowledge to generalizing conclusions. Surveys have showed that the word Islam has mostly negative connotations in the programs of the Western-European media (violence, terrorism, disadvantaged status of women, etc.), amplifying the "alien" character of Islam as a religion and culture in relation to Europe. Furthermore, even the experts subscribe to contrasting views in regard to various subjects related to Islam.

As far as the actual threat to the West and to Europe is concerned, on the one hand, there are very conflicting opinions about what can be identified exactly as the origin of the threat/risk: Islam itself or Islamism or maybe its radical wing, jihadism. On the other hand, the views also differ regarding the question of how serious and how great the actual threat is. Huntington already posited the following opinion well over two decades ago, which is still shared by many people today: "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power." (HUNTINGTON, 1996: 217.).

By 2016 the generalizing conclusion that in the past decades – specifically in 2015 and 2016 – the perpetrators of the violent attacks launched in Europe represented the same "alien culture" (i.e. Islam), regardless of whether the attack was in any way related to jihadism or Islam, or whether the attacker was a second or third-generation immigrant born in Europe became widely adopted. The perception of threat intensified, the European citizens' overall sense of security diminished, and threats emerging in various areas of security (terrorism, identity, migration, etc.) seem to converge into a form of threat – often left unspoken, but latently present in the background – posed by "Islam as an alien culture", further amplifying the process of involving Islam in the discourse about security that started about two and a half decades ago.

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[8]   Determining the extent of the "actual" threat with any degree of accuracy is extremely difficult because there are hardly any objective benchmarks.

Conceptual foundations: Islam, Islamism, jihadism

The meanings of Islam

Experts studying the subject for a long time do not even agree on the proper terminology or on the exact and clear meaning of the individual terms. Also, the word *Islam* itself is used to represent different things. Islam is first and foremost a religion, one of the three great monotheistic religions in the world. Second, Islam is a civilization (or, in other words, a cultural system), and this meaning is different from the previous one. These interpretations are complemented by a third one, a meaning that many people apply to the entirety of Islam: Islam as a political system or political Islam *(al-Islam al-siyasi).* Although the past decades were indubitably characterized by the politicization of Islam, political/politicizing Islam does not represent the entirety of Islam (i.e. it is not the third meaning of the word *Islam*) rather a trend that involves the use of Islam explicitly for political goals, which is most befittingly called Islamism.

One of the characteristics of the image of Islam that formed in the past decades in the West is generalization. Islam as a religion is not monolithic (in addition to the prevailing Sunni-Shia opposition, there are several other, sometimes starkly conflicting factions in addition and within these two branches), and as a civilization it is even more differentiated. There are huge differences between the individual civilizational/cultural subsystems of the Islamic civilization (e.g. between the Saudi-Arabian and Indonesian Islam, etc.).

Different interpretations of Islam

Among experts studying Islam there are two different interpretations of Islam, which differ in essential aspects and, as a result, come to conflicting conclusions in their assessment of certain subjects relating to Islam on account of their differing starting points – both of these interpretations are often encountered in Hungary in relation to, among other things, the migrant crisis. One of them could be called traditional, orientalist/Arabist or essentialist interpretation, the other one could be called social science based or pluralist interpretation of Islam. The former is represented by experts who have a degree in orientalism/Arabism, while the latter is embraced by those who approach Islam and the Islamic world from the disciplines of social sciences. The former use Islam and the Islamic system as their starting point and the subject of their studies, while the latter focuses on the actual social, economic and political conditions, and the changes that take place in the Islamic world.

The first approach regards Islam in a holistic/totalistic way, based on essentialist-culturalist considerations, and treats it as a closed and coherent system which determines every aspect of Muslims' behaviour, explains everything that Muslims do, either in the Islamic world or in Europe. The behaviour, responses and expressions of Muslims can be understood on the basis of Islam. Islam as some sort of "Islamic continuum" is a central, definitive element of Muslim history spanning more than 1400 years. This methodology

approaches the subject from "within", from the normative dimensions of Islam[9], and uses an ideal-typical – or rather, utopian – model of Islam[10] which exists only at a theoretical level at best as the actual practices in the Islamic world never corresponded to those of this model.

According to the other, pluralist view, there is no Islam as a closed system other than in the form of a hypothesis or a utopia. Islam has never existed in itself, Islam has always been represented and embodied by various personalities, such as theologians, experts of religious laws, organizations, movements, etc., each subscribing to their own interpretations of it. The world of Islam today is characterized by competing interpretations or, paraphrasing Huntington, "the clash of interpretations". Each interpretation attempts to present itself as the representative of the true, authentic Islam. One of the most important characteristics of Islam has always been its diversity, the variety and plurality of its interpretations and the ways of expressing itself.

Throughout the history of Islam spanning nearly 1400 years the actual practice never corresponded to the essentialist and ideal-typical image of Islam. (This is the reason why Islamists have been attacking the current political system for decades as, according to their claims, they fail to follow the principles of Islam. As a result, their goal is to establish an Islamic State, which, of course, has never been clearly defined, and to Islamize the political, social and economic sphere.) Dynastic empire that was the hallmark of the history of Islam did not follow the principles of Islam. "As a political and civilizational project, the entire history of Islam was dominated by realistic political calculations" (HALLIDAY, 1995: 118.)[11] and it is still defined by political calculations, attempts at enforcing various interests and geopolitical considerations. The monolithic image of Islam is squarely contradicted by the cultural and political diversity of the Islamic world – the actual practice. Of course, it would be a serious mistake to ignore the role of Islam, we only question its exclusivity.

Islamism

Islamism is an activist movement that manifests itself in the activities of different organizations, relies on a special political ideology and uses Islamic religious and cultural symbolism to wield religion or rather, their own strangely misrepresented version of Islam fabricated

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9   "Is it possible to introduce profound reforms in a Muslim society? Probably not, because such reforms would mean breaking away from a predominantly Islamic character that provides the roots of the society and builds on a *ne varietur* Quran, prophetic tradition and Sharia", argues Róbert Simon (2014: note 12 & 13). Elsewhere he emphasizes the same: "This makes it probable that essential elements of an Islamic society cannot be reformed as the foundations of Islam are untouchable, but meaningful social reform could only be implemented through an in-depth critical reform of the latter" (Simon, 2016: 183.). "We are dealing with a closed system of thinking from which single areas cannot be separated and reformed. On the other hand, as customs and practices of Islam are sanctified by commandments originating from God, they are inherently and universally irreformable", argues Miklós Maróth (2002).

10 "Imagined" or "imaginary" Islam (ROY, 2007: 42.).

11 It is an often cited example that Ayatollah Khomeini, the top religious leader of Iran, wrote a letter in January 1999 to the incumbent president of Iran, Ali Khamenei (who is now the number one religious leader of Iran) in which he called his attention to the fact that the interests of the state should be given priority over those of Islam and Islamic law, and if necessary they override the ordinances of Islam, including the "pillars" of Islam (fasting during Ramadan, haj, etc.) (RUTHVEN, 2007: 91.).

from certain cherrypicked and misconstrued elements of it, in order to achieve political goals. Islamism is a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups or organizations to pursue political goals (Ayoob, 2008: 2.). Islamism is a very recent phenomenon which offers an adequate response to the challenges of globalization and modernity. (Many experts consider equate Islamism to political Islam.)

A collective term that has been in use for a long time but with a changing definition is Islamic fundamentalism, which was originally a religious initiative that aimed to return to the purity of the origins, although it also laid down political objectives. Today most of the experts still refuse to make the distinction between Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism (Kramer, 2009: 1.; Tibi, 2008: 120.). However, it is reasonable to draw a line between "classical" Islamic fundamentalism and "modern" Islamism by defining the latter as groups, movements and organizations which are driven predominantly by political and ideological goals underpinned by religious elements that are given a particular interpretation. Róbert Simon draws the line between Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism by claiming that the former stays between the boundaries of Islam and strives first and foremost to restore the purity of the origins while the latter mostly covers political movements seeking to find a way to address the challenges of globalization, which have barely anything to do with the original roots of Islam (Simon, 2014: 12.).

Islamism is regarded by many as a radical violent movement or organizations. Some of the experts also tend to treat Islamism as a homogeneous monolithic movement and consider every Islamist a "potential killer" (Pipes, 2012),[12] and compare Islamism to fascism or Marxism-Leninism (Pipes, 2000). The situation, however, is much more complicated. It is more appropriate to choose a sophisticated, differentiated approach as there is a moderate and a radical wing of Islamism (jihadist Islamism or jihadism). Moderate Islamist organizations foreswore violence and adapt to the "rules of the game" in order to seize power in a peaceful way (e.g. by participating in elections) (for example, Ennahda in Tunisia or the main branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). Recently it is noticeable that many Islamist organizations transformed themselves from terrorist organizations steeped in violence into political parties (for example, the Hezbollah in Lebanon).

The Islamist movement, and even its radical branch, jihadism, is extremely fragmented, divided by deep fault lines, and not united either in its goals or its methods. Rivalry, disagreements, conflicts and sometimes even armed clashes between individuals and groups are everyday occurrences within Islamism and jihadism.

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[12] "All Islamists are one. A moderate Islamist is as fantastical a notion as a moderate Nazi. Every member of this barbaric movement is a potential totalitarian thug."

Jihadism

Theoretical foundations: Sayyid Qutb and "permanent jihad"

In contrast to moderate Islamism, jihadism sees violence as the appropriate method to achieve its goals. The theoretical foundation for it was developed by the indubitably most influential theoretical-ideological founder of jihadism, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb.[13] He is credited with working out a theory of Islamic revolution, the creed of which was the "*What is to be done* of the Islamist movement" (KEPEL, 2007: 54.), the book Milestones/Signposts Along the Road *(Ma'alim fi al-Tariq)* that Qutb wrote in 1964 in prison.[14]

Sayyid Qutb applies the word *jahiliyya* that was used to describe the period of ignorance and barbarism before the advent of Islam, to the contemporary world, including countries that call themselves Muslim. "We are also surrounded by Jahiliyya today, which is of the same nature as it was during the first period of Islam, perhaps a little deeper. Everything that surrounds is […] Jahiliyya. […] Our mission is not to compromise with the practices of Jahili society, nor can we be loyal to it. […] Our aim is to first change ourselves so that we may later change the society." (KUTB, 2014: 285−286.).

This change could be the result of a "permanent jihad". The religious layman Qutb reinterprets jihad in a way that can be tagged as a heretic innovation in terms of classical Islam: as a permanent fight against internal and external enemies, and as a personal obligation. "It is a permanent state and not an occasional situation [...], which makes the liberating Jihad mandatory until the only religion is Allah's" (QUTB, 2014: 285−286.).

Waves of Jihadism

The evolution of jihadism, which spans a few decades, is characterized by three waves (Gerges, 2014: 339-343.). The *first wave* was dominated by the followers of Sayyid Qutb, the key ideologist of jihadism. Their primary target was the "near enemy"[15], which meant the local, Middle-Eastern secular political governments and those friendly to the West from Egypt to Syria. They launched a series of armed attacks in quite a few countries in the Middle-East, and attempted to overthrow the incumbent political powers. These attempts

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[13] Sayyid Qutb was the leading ideologist of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. He was executed on the order of Egyptian President Nasser, along with several other leaders of the Brotherhood in 1966.

[14] See in Hungarian: QUTB, 2014. jihadist ideologists and leaders of jihadist organizations, for example, Mohammed Yusuf, founder of Boko Haram often cite Sayyid Qutb. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second general emir of al-Qaeda and one of its key ideologists was an "admirer" of Sayyid Qutb. Sayyid Qutb's brother, Muhammad Qutb, held lectures on Islam as a university professor at King Abdulaziz University, and among other students, his lectures were attended by Osama bin Laden too.

[15] In the words of Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, ideologist of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Group "fighting the enemy that is near to us comes before that which is far." (FARADZS, 2014: 450.). "As for the Muslim lands, the enemy resides in their countries. In fact the enemy is controlling everything. The enemies are these rulers who have snatched the leadership of the Muslims. [...] the main reason behind the existence of Imperialism in the Muslim lands is these rulers. [...] to begin with destroying Imperialism is not a useful action and is a waste of time. [...] there is no doubt that the prime field of jihad is to remove these faithless leaderships and replace them with the complete Islamic system, and from here we start." 451–458.).

were all suppressed, sometimes with considerable casualties. One of their attacks that triggered maybe the greatest stir was the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981. In many countries, Islamism became the number one oppositional movement against which the political leaders took strong action. It was at that time that Ayman al-Zawahiri who was then a theorist of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and later became the second leader and, after the death of Osama bin Laden, the actual leader of al-Qaeda, began to operate.

The *second wave* was rooted in the battles fought in Afghanistan in the eighties, and al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden became its dominant organization. Essentially, by the middle of the nineties, a new, transnational form of militant Islamism gained momentum: global jihadism (global Jihadist Salafism), which chose the "far enemy" – i.e. the West, and first and foremost the United States and its allies – as its primary target. Certain experts link this development to the Osama bin Laden's fatwa about global jihad that was issued in 1996 (bin Laden, 1996). By then, Jihad was globalized and, as a religious-ideological justification, its defensive and retaliating character – responding to the crimes committed by the West against the world of Islam – was emphasized.[16] Jihadist Islamism that had been involved mostly in local conflicts until then entered the global scene.

The *third wave* still continues these day, with its leading organization, the Islamic State. The leader of the organization, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who, unlike the engineer Osama bin Laden and the doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri, has religious qualifications (graduated from the Islamic University of Baghdad) wishes to ensure the religious legitimation and exclusivity of its operations by declaring a caliphate.

Jihadist terrorism as a security challenge

Terrorism cannot be analyzed in itself because it is not an objective but a tool: certain groups and persons resort to violence in order to achieve their goals, thereby generating fear among the civilian population. The perception of terrorism is also controversial: a person who is considered a terrorist by one side is often regarded as a freedom fighter by the other side. Terror always followed humanity throughout its history, and various organizations and groups use it to further their agenda. In Europe there were periods where terror was part of everyday life, for example just a few decades ago in Northern-Ireland, the Basque country, Italy or the Federal Republic of Germany.

Watching the news from media for well over two decades, one might get the impression that all (or the majority) of terror attacks committed in Europe and in the United States are linked to Islam or Islamism. Much less publicity is given to violence and attacks committed by non-Muslims. The facts, however, show a different picture. A report created in 2015 in the United States found that "since the mass murder of 9/11, more people have been killed in the United States by non-Islamic domestic terrorists than jihadists" (SPLC, 2015: 4.). The report states that between 2009 and 2015 a "domestic terror attack" was committed every 34 days on average, and in 74% of the cases, the perpetrators were "lone wolves". Another terrorism research organization attached to the University of Maryland published a report early in 2016 stating that between 1990 and 2014 there were 62 casualties of al-Qaeda related

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[16] For a summary of motivations for Osama bin Laden, see bin Laden, 2002.

attacks, while ideologically motivated terror attacks committed by right-wing extremists left 245 people dead (START, 2016).

Only in 2013 14 thousand murders were committed in the United States, and 190 thousand between 11 September 2001 and 2013. The total death toll of Muslim terrorism was 37 in the same period. In 2013, thirty attacks were committed in the United States that killed more than four people. Of these attacks only a single one is linked to jihadists, which was the terror attack against the Boston Marathon that claimed four lives. The death toll of the other terror attacks in 2013 was 137, which is more than three time that number of victims claimed by attacks linked to jihadists after 11 September 2001 (KURZMAN, 2014: 2.).

An Europol report in 2015 found that terrorist attacks related to religious and non-religious motives were equally committed in the member states of the European Union, the majority of which was separatist terrorist attacks (Europol, 2015). The reports also calls the attention to the fact that the jihadist threat and the violent acts committed by the Islamic State seriously increase the activity of the radical far right in terms of both authorized (demonstrations) and illegal (violent) acts.

Terror as the tool of radical Islamism

Violence and terror as a tool have been used by radical Islamists (and other Middle-Eastern organizations, including secularized Palestinian groups) from the very beginning. Initially, violent acts of radical Islamism were limited to local targets, including local political authorities from Egypt to Syria that allegedly ignored the ordinances of Islam and – in the case of attacks by Palestinian organizations (such as Hamas) – Israel. The situation is made more complicated by the fact that only a smaller portion of activities carried out by radical Islamist organizations (Hamas, Hezbollah, etc.) involved violence as they mostly performed and still perform niche social-charity activities which significantly contribute to the improvement of the population's quality of life and, as a result, they have serious social support (Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in South-Lebanon). As a result, declaring them terrorist organizations *en bloc* is questionable from a certain point of view.

Globalization of jihadism entails the globalization of jihadist terrorism. In this area, al-Qaeda was the pioneer as the prototype of a globalized jihadist terrorist organization. Its operations started to get into the limelight at the end of the nineties (mostly on account of the attacks launched in 1998 against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania), and after the terror attack on 11 September 2001 it became the primary enemy. 11 September 2001 can be seen as a turning point as from that point onward international terrorism became the number one factor threatening security, US President George W. Bush declared war on terrorism, and Europe also started to regard terrorism as the most significant source of threat. In the following years, however, changes occurred, and by the end of the 2000s terrorism slipped back in the rankings of security threats in the Western societies.

This situation changed profoundly due to the events of 2015 in the first place. A survey completed in the spring of 2016 by Eurobarometer showed that migration and terrorism were now ranked as the two most significant and most worrisome sources of threat, and it was especially in the case of the latter that the survey showed the considerable increase compared to the surveys of the previous years (Eurobarometer, 2016).

Global jihadist terror organizations (al-Qaeda, Islamic State)

Today there are quite a few jihadist organizations that use violence and terror as a means to achieve their goals. (Suicide bombings have become an almost everyday occurrence, and they also became a hallmark of combat activities in, among other things, Iraq and Syria.) Most of these attacks, however, still remained localized (for example, the Syrian al-Nusra Front[17] that operated for a long time as a local branch of al-Qaeda), and two organizations entered the international scene: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The influence and effectiveness of al-Qaeda noticeably diminished in the past years, in part due to the disruption of cohesion within the organization (several leaders were killed), in part because of the emergence and spreading of new, rival organizations, first and foremost the Islamic State (NCTC, no date).

The primary target of al-Qaeda was always the West, and they prioritized attacks against the West at various locations around the world. The main reason for this approach is not religious but political-ideological, namely the "protection" of Muslim areas from the United States and its allies or, as bin Laden put it, "the Crusader-Jewish alliance". "[T]he ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it", declares a fatwa issued by the World Islamic Front (full name: World Islamic Front for Combat Against the Jews and Crusaders) with bin Laden in its ranks in February 1998 (World Islamic Front, 1998).[18]

The Islamic State shows a different picture. This organization is specifically a product of globalization, it is modern in its communication, its activities combine advanced revolutionary and ancient Islamic traditions, and its revolutionary character and the ruthless terror are reminiscent of the Jacobins, Bolsheviks or even the Red Army Faction. Borrowing and improving on a lot of things from al-Qaeda, the Islamic State "re-territorialized" the fight by focusing its operations on "state building" in Syria and Iraq while maintaining its internationalized and globalized dimensions, first and foremost in the area of communication and recruitment, and by establishing the caliphate. The difficulties encountered and the air strikes of the international coalition diverted its attention towards attacks on the West and mostly on those launched in Europe.[19] With these attacks its declared goal was to "punish" countries that actively participated in the coalition against the Islamic State.

Both al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State set up a network spanning many countries around the world, consisting of formal or informal local organizations – cells – and individuals.

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[17] Leaders of jihadist organizations often exhibit a great deal of pragmatism, which often overrides their ideological convictions. For example, the leadership of al-Qaeda explicitly forbade the al-Nusra Front operating in Syria to attack the West – either the United States or Europe (al-Golani, 2015; BBC, 2015). In July 2016, the al-Nusra Front "officially" broke away from al-Qaeda and chose a new name, indicating that it intended to play a leading role in the Syrian opposition (Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Front for the Conquest of the Levant).

[18] The fatwa identifies three main reasons: 1. The United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places. 2. [...] the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and [...] the huge number of those killed, in excess of 1 million... 3. The Americans' aim [...] is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem..

[19] On 21 September 2014 the spokesman of the Islamic State, Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, called on Muslims to kill Westerners and their allies, either soldiers or civilians, with a special emphasis on the countries partaking in the coalition against the Islamic State (al-Adnani, 2014).

Some of them were organizations, created earlier in the given country and operating in an organized way, which pledged their loyalty to the mother organization (Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, etc.). There are also individuals or scattered groups of individuals that consider themselves members of the central organization or network on the ideological basis of jihadism. There are people among them who, during their stay in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, etc., made contact with a member of the mother organization, but there are others whose only connection to the latter is the shared ideology.

In addition to the common ideology, the role of the "brand" became just as important. An important objective of terror is to create fear, and this goal is easier to achieve if strikes are launched by "dreaded" organizations that carried out a series of successful terror attacks. For this reason, even unaffiliated persons tend to call themselves members of these organizations and on the other hand, organizations are quite eager to assume responsibility for attacks launched by people outside their organizations as these acts improved their "reputation". Such attacks, some of which requires considerable preparations and organization, cannot be coordinated from a central location several thousands of kilometres away, even with advanced communication technologies. Most of them are acts on local initiatives or decisions.

Sources of jihadist terrorism

The base of jihadist terrorism consists of jihadist organizations that operate in the area of the broader Middle East (or *Greater Middle East* as the Americans call it). The root causes include local, regional and global problems that have been unresolved for decades and have a negative impact on some of the countries in the region and on certain social classes and groups. Even though these are movements that originally sprang from religious motivations and their starting point was allegedly their objection to the local political leaders' and certain social classes' failure to abide by the commandments of the religion – namely, Islam – or the "occupation of Muslim land", subjugation and exploitation of Muslims by the West, economic, political and social problems that have remained unresolved for decades also contribute to the support for these movements and organizations.

The most significant internal opposition of autocratic political regimes that are in power in most of the countries of the Middle East has been Islamism for many decades now, which the former usually radically oppress, often even in cases where Islamist organizations/movements come to power in a (quasi) democratic way, i.e. via elections (see the army's intervention in Algeria at the beginning of the nineties, or the blocking of Hamas from forming a government in the Palestinian territories or the Egyptian political leadership's crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood). "Official" ideologies represented by certain countries in the Middle East –first and foremost, the Saudi Wahhabism – are very close to jihadist ideology. For decades Saudi-Arabia made considerable efforts to spread Wahhabism even outside the Islamic world (through sizeable financial aids), and in this way they inadvertently supported the jihadist movement.

Armed conflicts and civil wars that break out, in part, due to Western intervention and, in part, because of internal reasons, and the severe weakening – or even failure – of the state create a hotbed for various jihadist organizations to build up their bases (Afghanistan,

Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, etc.). In that regard, Afghanistan and al-Qaeda as well as Syria, Iraq and the Islamic State have been playing a significant role. The explanation is that these cases signify "pan-Islamic" matters that attracted thousands of fighters from various countries of the Islamic world (and from the outside, including Europe).[20] Their return to their countries of origin raises the threat of terrorism considerably.[21]

Second and third-generation Muslims who were born and raised in European countries and are native speakers of the language of their countries proved to be an increasingly important source of jihadist terrorism in the past years. The reasons for their conversion into terrorists are extremely complicated. The most important factor is the lack or failure of integration into the hosting society and the resulting frustration and identity crisis. Certain radical imams who are present in Muslim communities and the followers who gather around them may also contribute to the process, but the role of the media and the Internet cannot be ignored either.

Targets of jihadist terrorism: The vulnerability of Europe

In the case of jihadist terrorism, we are dealing with threats, security challenges and security risk factors that manifest themselves at local, regional and global levels. Radical Islamism/jihadism and the associated terrorist activities do not only pose a serious security challenge to the West, including Europe, but also to the Islamic world where attacks claiming dozens or sometimes even hundreds of lives – most of whom are Muslims – are launched almost every day from Lebanon through Iraq to Afghanistan and Bangladesh and where there are armed clashes with extremist jihadist organization in several countries.

Trivializing the issue of terrorists threats to Europe should absolutely be avoided as we are facing a serious problem, however, it must be stressed that even though jihadist terrorism is a terrible tragedy, it does not present an existential threat to the West, including Europe. The real problem is not terrorism itself – or rather, not terrorism in the first place – but the reaction produced by acts of terrorism. Fear, sometimes exaggerated panic responses, sensationalist reporting of the events by certain media outlets, and statements made by some of the politicians and experts[22] serve the jihadists' interests in that they ascribe more power and influence to these groups that what they really possess, thereby furthering their goal of instilling fear into the public and providing them with the publicity they desire.

This is the reason why the practice of claiming responsibility for attacks they have probably nothing to do with, which was previously employed by al-Qaeda, has been adopted now by the Islamic State too. It is undeniable that Jihadism has an ideology that can be linked to a single dominant organization or network (during the "supremacy" of al-Qaeda it

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[20] Those acting in the name of the entire Islam, as a representative of Islam or in defence of Islam can expect a lot of sympathy and support. It is no wonder that a lot of leaders from Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden – including both "secular" political leaders and leaders of Islamist/jihadist organizations – used this rhetoric, often with considerable success.

[21] According to the president of the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) by the middle of 2016 about the third of 810 persons who left Germany to join the fighters of the Islamic State returned to Germany where there were about 500 suspected terrorists on record (BKA, 2016a).

[22] For example: "the West is at war with Islam", "Europe has become a battleground".

was called "al-Qaedaism"), which attracts a lot of people.[23] One of the strengths of jihadists is their political-ideological capacity to mobilize others, which is compared by some experts to that of the "Leninist revolutionary vanguard party" (TIBI, 2008: 120.). If this capacity is administered into the pool of frustration, failure of integration, identity crisis and, occasionally, additional mental disorders, many people can be seriously drawn to its allure, and it might also provide enough motivation for a few "lone wolves" to commit a terrorist act even if the person has no real connection to the Islamic State.

The majority of the victims of globalized jihadist organizations (al-Qaeda, Islamic State) operating in the international arena are Muslims. According to a report of the National Counterterrorism Center in the USA covering the period between 2005 and 2010, 82 to 97% of the victims of terrorist attacks linked in some way to religious motives or to a religion were Muslims (NCTC, 2012: 14.). In the same period, terror attacks by al-Qaeda claimed seven times as many Muslim victims as non-Muslim victims: Western casualties amounted to 15 percent of the total number of people killed (CTC, 2009: 2.). The UN report reveals that the overwhelming majority of the victims of the Islamic State in Iraq were Muslims (OHCHR, 2014). In the USA a joint government-university program studying terrorism *(Global Terrorism Database, GTD)* indicates that between 2004 and 2013 half of the terror attacks (and 60% of the casualties) were concentrated in three countries – Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan – of the Islamic world. One of the persons working on the program claimed that even though it is impossible to declare with absolute certainty that 95% percent of terrorist attack victims are Muslims, this percentage is very close to reality (MILLER, 2015).

The Religion of Peace collected data about terrorist attacks linked to Islam that were committed in 2016 (between 1 January and 16 July). In fifty countries, there were 1274 attacks (including executions by the Islamic State) with 11 774 people left dead and 14 303 injured. Of these attacks, there were five in France (86 dead, 207 injured), four in Germany (two dead, seven injured) and three in Belgium (35 dead, 223 injured) while hundreds of casualties were claimed by attacks in predominantly Muslim Asian and African countries. (Religion of Peace, 2016).

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[23] The befitting name coined by Lee Harris for the ideology of al-Qaeda – "fantasy ideology" (HARRIS, 2002) – is also applicable to the ideology of jihadism and even to Islamism as they have very little to do with reality and they do not offer true alternatives. This perception was changed to a certain extent by the "national and state building" concept of the Islamic State.

Islam and jihadism

Is jihadism Islamic?

Jihadist organizations and their theorists prefer to parade as representatives of Islam (the "true" Islam), a "vanguard", or the protectors of Islam and of the Muslims. However, their acts are in stark contrast with their posturing since, as we have already seen, most of their victims are Muslims, even if they attempt to justify it by claiming that they were either apostates, martyrs or collaborators. In fact, the overwhelming majority of Muslim religious scholars blames jihadists for distorting the teachings of Islam and declare their actions contrary to Islam. The views differ as to what extent jihadist organizations can be regarded as actual representatives of Islam. In that regard, the question arises: what is "true" Islam, what is the "authentic" Islamic position?

Interpretation has a central role in Islam. This applies to all written records that constitute the cornerstones and primary sources of the religion, such as the Quran and *Hadith*. Various statements in the Quran are subject to constant debates and interpretations.[24] Islam does not have a religious centre – similar to Vatican – and in Islam there is no so called church either. There is, however, a class of learned religious scholars and experts of religious laws (*ulama* and *fuqaha*) who, thanks to their education, are the most experienced in the theological questions of Islam. At the same time, there are respected religious institutions and religious scholars whose opinion weighs strongly when an "Islamic" position is formed. In Sunni Islam, such institution is Al-Azhar Mosque and University and other institutions attached to it, and in Shia Islam *Hawza* (Shia seminars) in Qom, Najaf and Karbala.

So how can anybody make a statement in an issue such as, e.g. whether or not al-Qaeda, the Taliban or the Islamic State is Islamic or can be considered a representative of Islam? Barack Obama stated about the Islamic State, Bill Clinton about the Taliban, and George W. Bush about al-Qaeda in connection with 9/11 that they do not represent Islam.[25] However, according to Daniel Pipes, an American expert on Islam, a non-Muslim (especially a politician) has no competence in deciding on what is Islam and what is not. Furthermore, the above organizations consider themselves authentic Islamic organizations, and they constantly emphasize this fact. "Anyone with eyes and ears realizes that the Islamic State, like the Taliban and al-Qaeda before it, is 100 percent Islamic. If somebody claims that he is a Muslim, I am ready to believe his worlds" (PIPES, 2014).

Indeed, it would be a mistake to claim that jihadism that resorts to terror and violence has nothing to do with Islam. There may be – in fact, there is – an interpretation that uses arguments based theology and religious law to justify even the most extreme forms of violence. That is what the Islamic State does. Leaders of jihadist movements are keen to quote Ibn Taymiyya who lived in the 13th and 14th century and belonged to the most rigid legal branch of orthodox Islam, the *Hanbalites*.

It is an undeniable fact that there are verses in the Quran that encourage violence (9:5, 47:4, 8:60). However these verses cannot be interpreted out of space and time as they were

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[24] As Olivier Roy so aptly put it: "the key question is not what the Quran actually says, but what Muslims say the Quran says" (Roy, 2004: 10.).

[25] "We are not at war with Islam – we are at war with people who have perverted Islam", claimed Barack Obama *(Barack Obama says US..., 2015).*

written in a given historical context, mostly before some crucial battle when Muslims were fighting a life-or-death battle with the Meccans for survival. It is also a fact that there is no world religion in the name of which inhuman acts and violent atrocities have not been committed. Retaliation that jihadist often cite, i.e. the "an eye for an eye" principle is also not exclusive to Islam. [26]

In addition to who a person thinks they are, it is just as important to know who others – in this case, learned religious scholars or the community of Muslims – think they are. The absolute majority of the religious scholars of the Islamic world do not consider the Islamic State Muslim, and regard their activities as explicitly harmful to Islam (*A collection of the words... 2015;* HASAN, 2015). From a religious point of view, the Islamic State has absolutely no support in the world of Islam, and the caliphate of al-Baghdadi is not recognized by religious scholars who declare the acts of the Islamic State contrary to Islam.

The Islamic State's exclusive interpretation of Islam

A clear understanding of the ideology of the Islamic State can be achieved by studying the publication of the organization *(Dabiq)*, the statements of its leaders, and the actual operations of the organization. The Islamic State considers Islam or rather an orthodox Sunni branch of it, as its religion, and only as it is interpreted by the Islamic State. Everybody who follows either a different religion or who is a Muslim but fails to accept Islam as interpreted by the Islamic State is considered an unbeliever or an apostate, regardless of whether they are a Shia or a Sunni.

The Islamic State and the Muslims

On 29 June 2014 the leaders of the Islamic State declared the restoration of the caliphate and proclaimed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi caliph.[27] With this symbolic act the Islamic State intended to extend its jurisdiction to all Muslims around the world. Five days later "Caliph Ibrahim" aka Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi delivered a speech in which, as a symbolic act, he quoted from the speech of Abu Bakr (the first caliph of Islam after Muhammad's death). By establishing the caliphate, al-Baghdadi has become (theoretically) the caliph of all Muslims, which means that, by elevating itself above other jihadist organizations, the Islamic State declared itself the religious leader of the Islamic world as well as the leader of jihadist organizations. This put a chink in the legitimacy of al-Qaeda (they were called on to disband and join the Islamic State), the authority over all jihadist group was handed over to the Islamic

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[26] "Whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land – it is as if he had slain mankind entirely." (Quran, 5:32). While: "And he that smiteth any man mortally shall surely be put to death." (Bible, The Third Book of Moses, 24:17).

[27] The institution of caliphate was created after the death of the prophet Muhammad in 632 CE *(Khalifat Allah =* "steward of God") and endured almost 13 centuries until 1924 when it was abolished by the national assembly of Turkey under the presidency of Kemal Atatürk. The caliph was considered the spiritual leader of the entire Islamic world.

State, and Baghdadi stated that emigration *(hijra)* to the territory of the Islamic State is an obligation of all Muslims.

"In reality, there are only two religions. There is the religion of Allah, which is Islam, and then the *religion of anything else,* which is *kufr (unbelief).* […] So whatever is not Islam is not the religion according to Allah and it will never be accepted. […] Therefore, anyone who falls into kufr has left Islam, even if he claims to be a Muslim." (Dabiq, 2016a). Apostasy *(ridda)* is an important category used by the Islamic State, which does not just mean a Muslim who became a Jew, a Christian, a Hindu or a Buddhist or a follower of any other religion but also anybody else who became an apostate Muslim because they refused to subscribe to the Islamic State's interpretation of Islam.[28]

The immediate target for the Islamic State is the "apostate" organizations and persons of the Islamic world against which/whom the organization openly declared war. Such organizations and "target persons" include representatives of the broadest religious and ideological sphere, with a great number of Sunni in addition to the Shiite! Such a target is the Kurdish *"communist murtaddin"* PKK/YPG (Dabiq, 2014a), the "party of extreme apostasy, [...] the Muslim Brotherhood, a devastating cancer spreading and attempting to drown the entire Ummah in apostasy, including its factions, branches and "Islamic' centres" (Dabiq, 2016b). The photos illustrating the lengthy essay about the Brotherhood tag quite a few Muslim personalities as *"taghut"*[29], the synonym of evil (Ali Khamenei, the top religious leader of Iran; Turkish president Erdogan; Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas; former Egyptian president Mubarak, etc.) and the leader of al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri, is nothing more than a "soldier of the Pakistani puppet Akhtar Mansur"[30]. The Islamic State treats "apostate" tribes as a homogeneous unit and employs collective punishment against them (Dabiq, 2014b). Issue#14 of *Dabiq* released in April 2016 called upon the Muslims to "kill the imams of Kufr in the West" (Dabiq, 2016a). The list of targets include mostly Sunni religious leaders living in the West who strongly criticized the activities of the Islamic State.

The Islamic State does not accept al-Azhar in Cairo, which is globally recognized as the most influential institution of the Sunni branch of Islam, as an authentic representative of Islam because, since the caliphate was "re-established" in 2014 with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its head, only the latter can represent Islam. It talks about the religious leaders of Sunni Islam as "apostate scholars of al-Azhar and Medina, who, instead of staunchly opposing "shirk"[31], lead religion into a "satanic" direction (Dabiq, 2016c). The Islamic State declares Sheik Ahmed el-Tayeb, the Imam leading al-Azhar an apostate, and in their publication the following caption was added to a photo depicting a meeting of Pope Francis and Sheik Ahmed el-Tayeb: "The Crusader Pope Francis and the apostate Ahmed el-Tayeb."

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[28] Declaring someone an apostate is one of the most severe sanctions *(takfír)* of Islam.

[29] Originally it was the name of an idol in the pre-Islamic period, which later became a synonym of satan or devil.

[30] After the death of Mullah Omar, Akhtar Mansur became the religious leader of the Taliban and it is to him that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, pledged his fealty. (On 21 May 2016, Mansur was killed in a US drone attack and was succeeded by Hibatullah Akhundzada as the Emir of the Taliban.)

[31] Association, i.e. polytheism, one of the most negative categories in Islam.

The Islamic State and Christians

Many believe that there is a religious war in Europe, which is, in fact, a war waged by jihadism against Christianity. Some of those who adopted this view went even further and talked about a war between Christianity and Islam. There is no denying that the Islamic State committed a series of brutal acts against Christians living in Syria and Iraq, however, the same brutality was brought to bear against Muslims that did not share their interpretation of Islam.

The publication of the organization berates Christianity and Judaism in a series of lengthy theological commentaries. The scriptures that Moses and Jesus received (the Torah and the Gospel, respectively) were not preserved in their original form, but they were lost and replaced by forgeries. Instead of the "Gospel of Jesus", there is a version attributed to Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, which sometimes contradict each other. The Trinity is "one of the pillars of the pagan Christian theology" as all three persons are Gods themselves (Dabiq, 2016d).

Similar to al-Qaeda, a generalized image of the West shares the focus of the Islamic State's hatred, in part, due to religious and, in part, due to other reasons. The publication of the organization described in several points why they hate the West. "We hate you, first and foremost, because a) you are disbelievers; you reject the oneness of Allah; b) We hate you because your secular, liberal societies permit the very things that Allah has prohibited while banning many of the things He has permitted; c) you disbelieve in the existence of your Lord and Creator, and you refer to physical laws that govern the Universe; d) you commit crimes against Islam and we wage war against you to punish you for your transgressions against our religion; e) you commit crimes against the Muslims; your drones and fighter jets bomb, kill, and maim our people around the world, and as such, we fight you to stop you from killing our men, women, and children; f) you invade our lands and we fight you to repel you and drive you out. As long as there is an inch of territory left for us to reclaim, jihad will continue to be a personal obligation on every single Muslim." (Dabiq, 2016e).[32]

Fault lines in jihadism

Since its inception, jihadism fought a war on two fronts: on the one hand, against the political leaderships of the countries of the Islamic world that disregarded Islam and, on the other hand, against the representatives and religious leaders of the so called institutionalized Islam that consort with political leaderships. There are, however, deep dividing lines not only between jihadism and the religious leaders and leading religious scholars of Islam but also between the individual jihadist groups and organizations. Even Sayyid Qutb who laid down the foundation of the ideology was harshly criticized by conservative religious scholars – by Saudi Wahhabis in the first place – for being a "reformer" who treats the holy scriptures with too much liberty and whose interpretations include unacceptable inventions.

As there is no religious centre in Islam, Islamism and its radical wing, jihadism, has no centre, central body or any other institution either that would represent a uniform position. "There has been no Islamist or jihadist "Comintern" or "Islamintern" similar to that

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[32] The publication discusses these points in more detail, but we chose to stick to the most essential parts.

of international Communism that was set up after World War I in 1919. (GERGES, 2005: 117.). Neither Islamists nor jihadists were able to move beyond their differences and unite in a "common front", and they could not even agree on a common leadership. "Religious nationalists" were fragmented from the start, and they fought for local goals in local territories, and even though transnational jihadists escalated their operations to the global stage, their movement has not become any more cohesive. They are still dominated by the views of autocratic leaders and actual persons, with a great emphasis on personality and charisma.

Within Islamism and jihadism the global jihadist strategy and specific actions of al-Qaeda were subject to strong criticism. For example, Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the founding spiritual leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon, criticized al-Qaeda on a few occasions, rejecting, among other things, the claim that suicide attacks committed by the organization were "martyr attacks" and for this reason they are legitimate (Gerges: 2005 237-238.). According to Fadlallah, these were terrorist attacks because while similar attacks launched by Hezbollah in the early eighties could be regarded as legitimate from a religious perspective as they combatted Israeli occupation, al-Qaeda attacks against Americans are not legitimate as the USA does not occupy Muslim territories and does not oppress or kill Muslims. Gerges cites a long list of Islamist and even jihadist organizations and their leaders which/who harshly condemned the internationalization of jihad and the attacks of al-Qaeda, in particular 11 September 2001, and even declared them contrary to the fundamental principles of Islam (GERGES, 2007: 214–221.).[33]

The caliphate could have provided serious legitimation to the Islamic State on religious foundations, ensuring its primacy in the Islamic world. But that is not how it happened. The majority of the Islamic world rejected the caliphate of al-Baghdadi. From the start al-Qaeda refused to accept the Islamic State as a caliphate, and treated it the same way as any other local jihadist groups. They did not consider al-Baghdadi a leader who had the qualities of a caliph. On 2 February 2014 al-Qaeda officially distanced itself from the Islamic State and went even further: they appointed a "anticaliph" in the person of Mullah Muhammad Omar.

The calculations of the chiefs of the Islamic State that with the symbolic move of proclaiming the caliphate they would rally the Muslims to their cause failed. The twisted interpretation of Islam, the brutality of the organization turned the leading religious scholars against it, who declared the Islamic State a terrorist organization and its actions contrary to the tenets of Islam *(Muslim Voices Against…, 2014; A collection of the words…, 2015).* Ahmed el-Tayeb, the Grand Imam of the al-Azhar, the most reputable institution of Sunni Islam, called the ideology of the Islamic State unreconcilable with Islam and the organization barbarian (Al-Azhar, 2014). Even Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, an otherwise radical Islamist organization, turned against the Islamic State, claiming that it posed an existential threat to the entire region and for this reason it must be countered and fought (Nasrallah, 2015).

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[33] Karam Zuhdi and Nageh Ibrahim, the leaders of one of the largest jihadist organizations, the Egyptian al-Jama'a al-Islamiya, who were imprisoned for the role in the assassination of President Sadat and for other attacks, condemned al-Qaeda in general, and bin Laden in particular, stating that Islam forbids the killing of civilians and teaches "peaceful coexistence" of religions, particularly when Muslims migrate to foreign lands and are welcomed by inhabitants, which means that al-Qaeda's actions are nothing more than the betrayal of a fundamental spiritual obligation. (GERGES, 2007: 214–221.).

The Middle-Eastern region: a source of security threats

Parallel crises

The region of Middle East is characterized by a crisis situation that has been dragging on for decades. The symbolic defeat of the Arabs by Israel in 1967 drove home the message about the modernization crises that affected a lot of areas and the symptoms of which are still observable in most of the countries in the region. Social, economic and political issues have been unresolved for many decades and are becoming even more serious. The crisis also exposed the failure of secularized ideologies and of the development models based on them, opening the door to re-Islamization that have been an ongoing process ever since.

This was exacerbated in the recent years by the crisis of the state. With a few exceptions, the countries of the Middle East are artificial entities that were not created through a process of organic development but as a result of agreements between the Western powers, with artificially laid out borders. The best example is the Sykes-Picot Agreement which divided the region into British and French spheres of influence and "celebrated" its centenary in 2016. The states of the Middle East lack historical-cultural foundations and the artificially created borders separated culturally cohesive areas, ethnic groups and tribes or turned their members into citizens of several countries. Events in the past years clearly exposed the crisis of the state.

Identity crisis can be seen as the third factor. As a result of a social structure in the Middle East that differs from the European at key points, we can encounter inherently complicated and complex "multiple" identities (ethnic, tribal, national, large family, pan-Islam, pan-Arab, etc.) and the hierarchy of identities might change or be reshuffled occasionally. This is what we experienced in the past period when the emphasis between competing identities shifted considerably, specifically towards identities associated with smaller, more fragmented social units.

Consequences of the "Arab spring": instability, fragmentation, armed conflicts

Of the three parallel but thoroughly intertwined crises, it was the issues ensuing from the modernization crises in the first place (high population growth, unemployment, lack of perspectives for the youth, etc.) that contributed significantly to the outbreak of the series of demonstrations of the so called "Arab spring". In contrast with certain initial expectations, however, the "Arab spring" failed. Not only did it fail to produce any progress in finding a meaningful resolution to the problems but it led to the emergence of new ones. High degree of instability and insecurity overcame the region, the state was shaken – some of the countries were even close to becoming a failed state (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen) – and widespread fragmentation was prevalent as the positions of various non-state actors grew stronger and the fault lines between ethnic groups, tribes, religions and sects deepened.

The conflict between the safety of stability assured by autocratic political powers and the uncertainty of "democratization" was amplified, which posed a serious dilemma for the West too. It was revealed that a "bad leader" could be replaced with an even worse one, and even an anarchic situation that threatens with civil war may arise. Sectarian (Sunni-

Shia) antagonism deepened and so did the political conflicts and the conflicts of interest between the Sunni block led by Saudi-Arabia and the Shiite block led by Iran. Leading Sunni countries feared the threat of a "Shia crescent" and certain experts even started to talk about an imminent "new cold war in the Middle East". In several countries armed conflicts and "proxy wars" broke out, sometimes leading to a civil war and producing extremely complicated and entangled constellation of interests and – in accordance with those interests – alliances. Besides "new" trouble spots, "old ones" have not been resolved either (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestinian-Israeli relations), and were even given a new impetus in several locations (rise of the Taliban).

In regard to this unfavourable turn of events it is unavoidable to emphasize the role of the West. The roots of this role go back to the era of colonization and to the aforesaid artificial division of the region. The flawed American (and, on a broader scale, Western) Middle East policy of the 2000s, the responses to 11 September 2001, the war in Afghanistan followed by the declared war on terror, the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 by the United States, the intent to "export democracy" and follow through with a grandiose reformation and democratization of the Middle East, the flouting of local conditions and characteristics that differed greatly from those of the West all contributed directly to the worsening of the situation in the Middle East and to the outbreak of a series of latent conflicts.

Of the consequences, it is worth highlighting at least two: one of them is the rise of radical Islamism (jihadism) which manifested itself in the unprecedented expansion of the Islamic State in the first place, and the second is the wave of refugees. An additional negative consequence of the rise of jihadism is that Islamist discourse was almost exclusively taken over by radical jihadists who enjoyed extensive media publicity: this includes the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the first place, and their "branch organizations". Moderate Islamist organizations that shunned violence were entirely marginalized, the room for their political manoeuvring became extremely restricted, in part, due to pressures from the political powers and, in part, on account of jihadist attacks. The pervasive activities of the Islamic State, conducted in the name of Islam, did not only discredit Islamism but in the eyes of many it made Islam look intrinsically bad.

Europe: Islam/Islamism and societal security[34]

Societal security itself is a complex multidimensional concept, which first and foremost has social and cultural as well as economic and political aspects. According to the well-known definition of the School of Copenhagen, societal security is "the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats" (Buzan et al., 1993: 23.). Thus, on the one hand, societal security means social stability and the coexistence of the members of the society in a state that is relatively free of serious conflicts and, on the other hand, preservation of the society's existing or often just imagined collective identity. For many people not only radical and extremists Islamism but Islam itself – and the

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[34] At this time we will only examine the aspects of the complex topic of societal security that are affected by jihadism and Islam.

significant population of hosted Muslim minorities – appear as a factor threatening societal security in the European societies.

Intrusion of Islam and its European presence

Basically Islam has been present in Europe since 711. That was when Muslim troops entered the Iberian peninsula at Gibraltar. It was followed by three other great waves: the Mongols conquered the Volga basin and the Caucasus in the 13th century and from the 15 century the Ottoman Empire subjugated the Balkan and the greatest part of Central-Europe, and lastly after World War II the influx of Muslim labour (along with non-Muslim workforce) into the Western-European countries was given a boost. The massive presence of Muslims in Europe became noticeable at the time, and once a distance religion and culture Islam became the part of everyday life. This poses a serious challenge to European national/nation-state identities.

Over the centuries Islam has a dual effect on Europe. On the one hand it posed a challenge and a threat which was countered by appropriate European responses, and on the other hand, acting as a source of spiritual inspiration it had a serious impact on European civilization by handing down and further developing the Hellenic heritage and through its serious contributions to sciences (philosophy, medicine, astronomy, mathematics, chemistry, botany, etc.).

The attitude of modern Europe towards Islam was not unambiguous. The "discovery of the East" took place in Europe in the 18th century, and many people adopted the view that treated Islam as a culture that was equal or even superior to the European. Romanticism was characterized explicitly by the admiration – or at least a positive view – of Islam.[35] This situation changed in a couple of decades. Modernity rearranged Europe's past into a contiguous European history, a "great narrative". The "Europeanization" of Europe or, in other words, the redefinition of Europe's historical past was complete, including the removal of elements from outside Europe even though they played a major role in the culture of premodern Europe.

Visibility of Muslims and the "demographic bomb"

The presence of Islam in Europe is an undeniable fact. In Western-Europe in the member states of the European Union about 20 to 25 million Muslims live,[36] in the Balkans (in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) there are about 9 to 10 million "indigenous" (non-immigrant) Muslims and more than 80 million in Turkey whose geographical and civilizational-cultural association and status are debatable (Europa, Asia or the Middle East).

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[35] The first translation of *Arabian Nights* was completed at the beginning of the 18th century but we could also mention Goethe's *West-Eastern Diwan* or Lessing's *Nathan the Wise*.

[36] The population of hosted Muslim minorities is estimated at 6 million in France, 5 to 5.5 in Germany, 3 in Great-Britain, 1.5 in Italy, 1 in both Spain and the Netherlands, while several hundreds of thousands in other countries.

The proportion of Muslims within the European population was about 5.9% in 2010 according to the data of Pew, which will grow to 8.4% by 2050 without immigration or 10.2% with immigration (Pew, 2015). These percentages did not come to be momentarily but in the course of several decades, and the "migrant crisis" in 2015 essentially caused significant changes in a single country, Germany, increasing the number of Muslims living there by 1 million.

Demographic forecasts and expectations are very different (some people even talk about a "demographic time-bomb") and accordingly issues of greater and lesser concern are raised. Among the Muslim minorities, the rate of birth is higher than among the indigenous population (according to the above referenced Pew study, between 2010 and 2015 the rate of population growth was 2.1% among the Muslims and 1.6% among the Christian population [Pew, 2015]), which, considering the reduction in "indigenous" populace that has already occurred in a number of countries, suggests a further increase in the proportion of Muslims, even without further immigration. The difference, however, is not so significant, according to authoritative sources.

Compared to other minorities, the "visibility" of Muslims is significantly greater as their customs, clothes, behaviour, and some of their buildings show particular difference compared to what is customary in Europe, and are easily recognizable by everybody. It is not a coincidence that in several European countries the use of Muslim signs, symbols and visible signs of their presence are subject to restrictions (prohibition of minarets, burqa and/or niqab). The rootlessness and hopelessness of the second and third-generation youth and the lack of a positive vision of the future pose an actual threat to social stability.

It is especially at theoretical level that concerns are expressed in connection with the threat that Islam – as an alien culture – poses to the ancient collective identities of the European societies and to Europeanism and the European (Christian) culture and values, and with the Islamization of Europe.

Failure to integrate

One of the greatest problems is caused by the failure of integration. This can be stated in general along with the fact that a small part of the Muslim minorities – certainly the smaller part – have been successfully integrated and many of them have even been assimilated.[37] The majority of Muslim communities, however, were pushed to the peripheries and marginalized, living in "ghettos" and parallel societies in the suburbs and the outskirts of large cities. Social indicators are measurably worse among them compared to the *"indigenous" population*. The "hosting" society failed to host them.

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[37] Providing a detailed interpretation of the various concepts falls outside the scope of this paper. In the professional literature there are significant differences in terminology, and concepts such as assimilation, integration, segregation and multiculturalism are used by many in a simplified way and with a meaning different from their original interpretation. Societies comprising various cultural communities may pursue the above mentioned four policies in regard to immigrant and other minorities (Rostoványi, 2010: 57-64.). Jürgen Habermas differentiates between political integration that affects every citizen and ethical-cultural integration of groups that have their own collective identities. In his opinion immigrants should only be expected to accept the political culture of their new home country without giving up the culture of their country of birth (Habermas, 1997). In Germany the debate about the "guiding culture" *(Leitkultur)* has been going on for many long years.

Young Muslims who were born in Europe and belong to the second or third-generation suffer from a certain kind of identity crisis. They have already lost contact with the original country of origin of their parents/grandparents and its culture, which is no longer part of their identity as they were born and raised in Europe, and they speak the local language as their native language. At the same time they were unable to integrate into the society of the majority, which had serious reservations about them from the start (this may be due to their own fault or the fault of the hosting society, but the most likely answer is that both are true). They became rootless and frustrated, which is further intensified by the economic and social issues of living in the suburbs. They seek something to hang on to, foundations on which they could build their own self-image. It is almost natural that these young people who seek to establish their identities and believe that they have found it in Islam become servants of radical Islamism.

When looking for the causes of the failure of integration, the often cited theory that Muslims, with a few exceptions, "are not too keen on integration" and do not wish to adapt to the local way of life and habits, choosing isolation instead, is a simplification. This view was not supported by reports and surveys created in the recent years (ROSTOVÁNYI, 2010: 50–53.; BERTELSMANN, 2015). Indubitably there are a lot of such persons among the Muslims but there are also a lot of them who are keen to integrate into the society. However, the process has two sides: openness to integration and willingness to be part of the society are futile if the same is missing from the hosting society. Integration is a two-sided process. If the host society treats them as "aliens" from the outset – or even as potential enemies or as serious security threats –, it will hardly facilitate their integration.

From anti-immigration to "anti-Muslimism"

Rejection of immigration has been present in Europe for many decades, and it is a definitive topic in the program of many right-wing radical parties (Borbély, w/o date). After "Islamic threat" began to dominate the discourse about Islam in the West in the first half of the nineties, the focus of anti-immigration groups shifted towards Muslims and anti-migration sentiment turned into anti-Muslimism in many places (HALLIDAY, 1995: 160.). Anti-Muslimism seems to be an adequate term as in this case it is not necessarily Islam as a religion that is being targeted but – with some simplification – ethnicized Muslims. Islam is considered to be predominantly a culture which – in the essentialist and "culturalist" interpretation of culture – determines the behaviour of a certain group of people – in this case, Muslims –, lending it a specific character that sets it markedly apart from other groups of people.

Ethnicization of Muslims became widespread or – one might say – even universal (Roy, 2004: 126.), which means using the word *Muslim* in its "neo-ethnic" sense in order to treat Muslims as a homogeneous ethnic-cultural group. According to this interpretation, Muslims are part of a common Muslim culture regardless of the significant differences between them, and the nature and the extent of their religious beliefs, and this culture clearly sets the Muslims apart, not as a religious community in the first place but as a pseudo-ethnic group, (Roy, 2004: 126.) from "others" or from "the rest". The actual situation is somewhat more complicated. European Muslims cannot be regarded as a homogeneous group, they do not form a monolithic block. On the contrary, they are very differentiated. Even though

Islam is an increasingly important part of their identity, their ethnic, place of origin-based, sectarian, generational and socio-cultural differences create deep fault lines between them, not to mention their attitude towards the host society or even religion.

Most of the Muslim population in Germany that was born abroad came from Turkey (Turks and Kurds), but a lot of them originate from Kosovo, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Morocco too. In France, the former colonies – Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco – are the dominant countries of origin. In Great Britain, the majority of Muslims who were born abroad came from the Asian countries of the former Commonwealth (Pew, 2015b). Anti-Muslimism often turns into Islamophobia. One of the most characteristic examples is the Dutch Freedom Party: its leader, Geert Wilders, whose Islamophobic declarations are regularly given wide publicity in the press, calls Quran a "fascist book" that promotes violence, being similar to Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and, for this reason, has no place in European societies.[38]

The perception of Muslims – and Islam – deteriorated noticeably in the first decade of the 2000s among the indigenous European population. According to a report of Bertelsmann Stiftung created at the beginning of 2015 – the population of Muslim minorities living in Germany was about 4 million at the time –, 57% of the Germans consider Islam a serious threat (in 2012, this figure was only 53%), 61% believe that Islam is irreconcilable with Western culture (only 52% in 2012), 40% feel "alienated in their own country" due to the presence of Muslims, and every fourth of the interviewed persons would ban Muslim immigration into Germany (BERTELSMANN, 2015).[39]

This extremely negative image of Islam, which is marred by jihadism, presents a serious barrier for the Muslim minority in Germany, contributing to their isolation and marginalization, even though the majority of them have the intention to integrate into the society. 90% of them seek the company of non-Muslims in their free time, 50% of them maintain contact with at least as many people outside their religious communities as Muslims. It is only 8% that only mingle with Muslims. According to this report, parallel societies do not exist. The summary of the report starts with the following statement: "In both their attitudes and ways of life, Muslims living in our country adhere strongly to the values of the Federal Republic of Germany. However, the majority of the population barely perceive this fact. They increasingly reject Islam. As a result, Muslims living in the country face isolation and serious stress."

The study found that even though the great majority – 85% – of the Germans consider themselves extremely tolerant towards other religions, Islam is an exception, and Islamophobia began to acquire a "socially acceptable" status. These findings seem to be backed by the rising support for the Alternative for Germany party that was founded in 2013 and included in its program a declaration that Islam does not belong in Germany and it should be expelled (AfD, 2016). According a survey published by Pew in July 2016, the negative

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[38] A brief abstract from an essay dated 7 July 2016, posted on Geert Wilder's homepage, which described Islam as a "serious threat": "The wisdom of the people commands us to do something about the threat of Islam. [...] Islam does not belong in Europe. We must stop all immigration from Islamic countries and start de-Islamising. [...] We must treat Islam the same way we treat other totalitarian ideologies, such as Communism and Nazism. Perhaps we should even consider outlawing Islam. [...] Islam is an existential threat to Western civilization." (WILDERS, 2016).

[39] Spiegel Online published an article about the report under the title *Muslims are integrated, Germans are segregated* (Spiegel, 2015).

image of Muslims deteriorated significantly in a single year: by 12% in Greece, 9% in the United Kingdom, 8% in Spain and Italy, 5% in France and Germany (Pew, 2016).[40]

Mutual threats, bilateral radicalization

One of the characteristics of the Western societies is the perception of mutual threats to identities. Majority societies perceive the "alien" Islamic culture and Muslim minorities as a threat to their national identities while Muslim communities feel that their own religious identities are being threatened. At the same time we are witnessing the process of radicalization on both sides: first, radicalization among the second and third-generation Muslims and second, the rising xenophobia and Islamophobia (Muslimophobia) among the indigenous population. The two processes amplify each other.

Anti-Muslimism often manifests itself in atrocities committed against Muslim minorities living in Europe. Statistics from the Scotland Yard show that the number of hate crimes against Muslims doubled in the period between June 2014 and June 2015 in the British capital alone (rising to 800 from 406) (Ramgobin, 2015). Following the terror attack against the offices of Charlie Hebdo in France, in a single month there were 153 Islamophobic attacks, which represents a 70% increase compared to the same period in the previous year *(Les actes islamophobes...)*.[41] According to an analysis completed by the German Federal Criminal Police Office *(Bundeskriminalamt, BKA)* refugees do not commit more crimes than Germans or other groups of the society (BKA, 2016b). A report published by BKA in August 2016, 655 acts of crime were committed against institutions that attend to refugees in Germany in the first 7 months of 2016, of which 118 is categorized as violent crime (bombing, arson). 613 of the 655 incidents were committed by "right leaning perpetrators" (BKA, 2016c).[42]

Security dimensions of the refugee issue

In the Middle Eastern region, migration always played an important role, which was related, in part, to social-economic problems and, in part, to armed conflicts. There were periods when millions of migrant workers arriving from various Arab countries toiled in the oil monarchies of the Gulf, and wars (e.g. the Iran-Iraq War) caused millions to seek refuge in the neighbouring countries. The largest group is made up of Palestinian refugees: hundreds of thousands of them have been living for decades in various Arab countries, mostly close to the Palestinian territories.

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[40] According to the survey of Pew, the negative image of Muslims is the worst in Hungary: 72% of the population see Islam in a negative light.

[41] The organization of Muslims living in France, Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM), reported a total of 764 "Islamophobic" incidents in 2014, of which 22 involved physical violence, 586 discrimination and 25 attacks against Muslim institutions, mostly mosques.

[42] In an interview in June 2016, President of BKA, Holger Münch, drew the attention to the rise of "right-wing violence" as the focus shifted towards the subject of refugees, which may lead to radicalization and the establishment of terrorist structures (BKA, 2016a).

Wars, especially those that are dragging on for a long time, always lead to an increase in the number of refugees, regardless of whether they are from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq or Syria. The Syrian civil war that broke out in 2011 triggered a new wave of refugees. The number of people leaving Syria grew from year to year: the figure rose to 2.5 million in February 2014, 3.2 million by December 2014, 4 million by the end of 2015, and 4.8 million in the summer of 2016, while the number of so called *internally displaced persons* amounted to 7.6 million. Most of the refugees were accommodated in refugee camps in neighbouring countries around Syria (2.7 million in Turkey, 1.2 million in Lebanon, 700 thousand in Jordan, 250 thousand in Iraq, 150 thousand in Egypt) where they waited for the settlement of the Syrian situation so they may return to their former place of residence as soon as possible (UNHCR, 2016). The prolonged war, the almost intolerable conditions experienced in many refugee camps, and the hope of a better life caused many of the refugees to migrate towards the European Union.

Existential threats created by the war is just one of the root causes of migration. More and more experts point to other root causes that are expected to be even more persistent and may prove to be even more difficult to address than the previously mentioned issues: deteriorating economic problems, climate change, drought and desertification. One of the root causes that led to the internal migration which triggered the Syrian events was the drought caused by climate change. As shown by a number of studies, Syria and the Fertile Crescent were hit in 2006 and 2007 by the most severe drought of all times. As a result, about one and a half million Syrians abandoned their original home in the country and migrated to the suburbs of cities. This led to huge social tensions, which played a key role in the outbreak of the protests in 2011, and later in the civil war that lasted for many years (Kelley et al., 2015).

Scientific studies are being prepared regarding the correlation between climate change and the outbreak of armed conflicts, and some experts seem to find direct correlation between the drastic rise in temperature, the drought and the armed conflicts (Burke et al., 2009; O'Loughlin et al., 2014). Forecasts claim that the negative impact of climate change will force tens of millions in the coming years and decades to leave their homelands and migrate mostly from Africa to Europe.

Although the refugees do not present an existential threat to the European countries and many even consider them as an alternative solution to the increasing labour shortage and population decline, the issue of refugees has become a subject of securitization in several European countries, along with terrorism and the growing threat to the European, Christian culture and identity.

It is an undeniable fact that hundreds of thousands of migrants entering Europe represents an increasing security risk as, merely according to the law of large numbers, they may include a greater number of extremists and other persons who are willing to commit acts of terrorism. So far, however, most of the terror attacks were committed not by migrants but people who were born in Europe, spoke the given language as native speakers but failed to integrate into the society and remained rootless.

Possible solutions

Halfway through 2016 it can be stated that Europe will have to live with jihadist terrorism, at least for the time being. It is absolutely necessary to take action against terrorism and to curb migration,[43] however, these measures will not remedy the above outlined problems as a long-term solution requires addressing the root causes. This involves a complex, multi-pronged and prolonged process. First of all, taking steps to solve the crisis in the Middle East is an essential condition. Syria and Iraq should be given priority, but Afghanistan and the neighbouring countries should not be ignored either. A situation has to be created which puts an end to armed conflicts and which enables the millions of refugees to return to their homelands.

This, of course, entails immense inherent difficulties considering the fragmented character of these countries, the large number of local players involved and the disagreements as well as sectarian and other conflicts between them, and the different interests of the great powers and regional middle powers, and list could go on and on. There is a broad consensus, however, that one of the most important measures to be taken is the further containment and, eventually, the complete disbanding of the Islamic State.[44]

If it succeeds, presumably the same phenomenon will occur that we have already experienced in Afghanistan. Thousands of warriors joined the Islamic State in the past years. A report by The Soufan Group at the end of 2015 showed that many of the 27 to 31 thousand combatants arriving from 86 countries came from European countries (France: 1700, Germany: 760, Denmark: 125, The Netherlands: 220, Russia: 2400, Spain: 133, Sweden: 300, Great Britain: 760) (The Soufan Group, 2015). Many of these fighters originating from Europe have already returned to their home countries, and if the Islamic State is dismantled, even more of them would follow their example, leading to a significant increase in terrorist threats across Europe.

In Europe, too, complex measures have to be taken. Such measures include establishing a common position in regard to the settlement of the refugee issue. Laying the groundwork for facilitating the integration of immigrants, which is in part a cultural and in part an economic-social (and obviously political) issue, is an urgent task. In certain Western European countries different measures and solutions will be needed owing to their different situations (the three countries with the largest Muslim minorities, France, Germany and Great Britain, have already tried different models). The severity of the situation is clearly indicated by the fact that it is not a recent problem: although the countries involved have been aware of its significance for many decades, there are debates that have been going on for years in many countries, both among the politicians and the populace, concerning the options to move forward, and extensive expert material to analyze the situation and make proposals as to the actions to be taken have been prepared, there is no meaningful progress towards a resolution and there are even clear signs of failure.

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[43] In the summer of 2016, two Western European country that suffered the brunt of terror attacks, France and Germany, decided to take serious measure to boost the strength of their armed forces. As a result, in France there are calls to revive the national guard that was abolished 150 years ago, and in Germany, for this first time after the end of World War II, they are contemplating the deployment of the army within the country.

[44] A survey taken in the middle of 2016 inspires optimism as it shows that the Islamic State is strongly rejected by the youth of the Arab world (Arab Youth Survey, 2016).

Presenting the issue as a "war between religions" or "clash of cultures" or, in other words, depicting it as the main source of conflict between Islam and the Western civilization or Islam and Christianity is unfortunate. This is exactly what extremist jihadists try to achieve as the deepening of this fault line will cause the "indigenous" population to see the Muslims in an even more negative light, entail an increase in the number of atrocities against Muslims, and the intensification of Islamophobia, which in turn may radicalize more of the otherwise moderate Muslims who may then look to the Islamic State and the extremist jihadist ideology. The goal of the extremists is to generate hate.

The main fault line is not between Islam and the West, no between Islam and the Western civilization – without denying, of course, the differences in the values of the two civilizations –, but between radical jihadist wielding violence and terror as a weapon and the moderate "others", which also includes Muslims and non-Muslims. In the fight against jihadism, Christians and Muslims are allies. One of the main problems is mutual mistrust, which should be overcome by building trust on both sides.

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