Military Security Today. New Threats, New Wars, New Theories

Zoltán Szenes PhD, Professor of the National University of Public Service

Abstract

This study examines theoretical and practical issues of military security from the perspective of new threats, new wars and new theories. The defence of a country is determined by the type of defence strategy it chooses to protect its sovereignty and values, to prepare the armed forces and to manage the military and security risks. Today's modern, post-modern and pre-modern wars and conflicts are different from the ones fought in the 1990s; paradigmatic changes occurred in 2001 and 2014, reflected in fourth-generation warfare and hybrid wars. New theories have been created and developed to understand and explain almost all the dimensions of armed conflicts and violence. The study argues that the changing security environment, the new role of military forces and the complexity of hybrid wars require multidisciplinary research.

Keywords: military security, war theory, hybrid war, asymmetric warfare, fourth generation warfare, military technology

Introduction

After the terrorist attack on the United States, the US Intelligence Community (NIC 2020 Project) outlined four scenarios for world development by 2020: Davos world, Pax Americana, a New Caliphate and Cycle of Fear (NIC, 2004). The first scenario focused on economic development, the second on preserving the dominance of the US, the third scenario focused on the role of radical religious political movements affecting the global system, and the fourth scenario projected the coming of a new Orwellian world due to the proliferation of violence. All the scenarios were permeated by *the importance of security in the future*, although political, economic, social, environmental and *military security issues* appeared to vary in importance in each of the scenarios. American futurologists have emphasized that the trends that determine the future world will not be clear but mixed, and will contain many insecurities, unpredictability and surprises.

The past ten years seem to have proved this forecast, and perhaps even the authors did not expect the vision outlined in 2004 by the researchers to be completely fulfilled. The global financial and economic crisis in 2008 dispersed the "Davos ideas" of the worl's steady economic development. The United States has grown tired of the global war on terrorism, wanting to preserve its economic, military and technological superiority as a "the frugal superpower" (MANDELBAUM, 2011: 9–33.). The role of political Islam in the world has gained strength, but the spread of jihadist terrorism (the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations) is threatening not only the developed West, especially Europe, but also the peace and development of the Islamic world. The world of armed conflicts and wars, terrorism and insecurity are increasingly centred on the *geographical axis of Central Asia, the Middle-East and Africa.* Assessment of world order and the operation of the international system have become increasingly pessimistic: the era of "big solutions" has been replaced by the era of "mess" followed by the period of "crises of unprecedented proportions". Today's international literature speaks of a "competing", "disintegrating" and "chaotic" world.

Although the assessment of the international order is often subject to debate, since there are optimistic and pessimistic evaluations, even conspiracy theories, but it is undoubtedly the events of recent years that embody *a combination of the four scenarios.* Today, the events of the world and the state of international order are changing rapidly and unexpectedly, situations are intertwined, separated, interconnected, and emerging in a new way and new capacity. The trends of the 1990s, the drawdown of forces, the reduction of military budgets, and the beneficial effects of peace dividends on economic and social development are far from prevalent. The United States has changed its strategy following the intervention war since 11 September 2001: it has tried to solve the crises with the air warfare after the withdrawal from Iraq and then Afghanistan, with the lowest possible land force *("no boots on the ground").* However, the "targeted" strikes with unmanned aerial vehicles and the air operations of the global coalition against the Islamic State cannot force the terrorists on their knees. *In the absence of political solutions, limited warfare has not led to sufficient results:* Afghanistan is held by the international community on a "respirator", Iraq defeated the ISIS but the disintegration processes have intensified. A paradoxical situation has come about: as a consequence of the war on terrorism, even more dangerous terrorist organizations grew out of the partially destroyed and disorganized Al-Qaeda (which was also predicted in the NIC report), and new, lasting forms of asymmetric warfare have emerged. The international community could not cope with the events of the Arab Spring, as a result of which new flashpoints emerged in the MENA region: there is a proxy war in Syria, Libya has fallen into chaos, and heavy fighting in Yemen is under way. Although there are no major military conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region, North Korea's "sabre-rattling", the disputes around the islands in the South China Sea and the struggle for power result in increasing military expenditure and the modernization of the armed forces, which creates new tensions. Asymmetric warfare represents *a multifaceted image of the war,* where modern warfare comes into conflict with traditional warfare, modern weapons are proliferating, a big number of non-state actors involved in the conflict is increasing, the security environment is fragmented regionally and locally, and the presence of foreign (European) fighters in the army of the Islamic State changes the civilizational and cultural image of the war.

The Westphalian state system is increasingly exposed to challenges presented by sub-state and trans-state adversary forces. Modern, high-tech Western armies have been confronted with well-organized terrorist armies, ethnic paramilitary forces, separatist groups, globalized networks of organized crime, and the hostile environment of the weak, failed states and rogue states. With the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the war once again returned to Europe: the vision of a "united, free and peaceful Europe" is moving even further away, with serious security challenges, risks and threats to be faced. With the re-annexation of the Crimean Peninsula; with the Russian support of the separatist forces operating "near-abroad"; and with the direct intervention of the Russian and Turkish military forces in Syria, the old historical thinking, *geopolitics,* is on its way to return to security policy. Cooperation is replaced by confrontation and predation, old-new fault lines and classical spheres of influence are emerging, and the use of military force has once again come into the forefront in power politics. The armed conflicts of the multipolar world did not remain within the conventional framework of traditional warfare between the rival states; wars, conflicts and warfare forms have become multicoloured, multifaceted and hybrid, and this requires the performance of complex tasks by the armed forces.

At the same time, the international security system (with the exception perhaps of the activities of the G20 grappling with the consequences of the economic crisis) has not done well in recent years. The collective ability of solving common crises and problems has weakened, a tragic example of which is the war in Syria going on for seven years. Although UN peacekeeping activities are constantly improving, the UN Security Council – due to the differences in the interests of the big powers – fails to pass a decision; it acts as a "lame duck" in the rapidly exploding, difficult crises. The issues of European security belong to too many international actors (United Nations, European Union, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe), tasks and competencies are divided, cooperation is not always effective, and the above actors lack the ability and intention to make decisions rapidly with regard to the exploding crises (the Ukrainian crisis, mass migration). The security architecture on other continents (the African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Rio Treaty, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ASEAN) is not strong either because the emerging Great Powers (the so-called BRICS countries or the GCC's capital-rich Arab states) "invest" much less in global security governance than they should. To improve international security requires the cooperation of many global, regional and local forces, because failing that it will be difficult to stop negative trends. Instead of the unpredictability of foreign policy, it is necessary to rebuild the international system to which the concept of order is to be developed, firstly, in the different regions and then the regions should be linked according to rules, with international cooperation and not with violence (KISSINGER, 2014: 379–382.).

It is difficult to construe wars, military conflicts and armed violence taking place in our world because "new" wars are often *fiercer, more dynamic and more complex* than those fought in the twentieth century. Representatives of a number of disciplines all over the world seek answers to the new questions. What does military security mean and what is the image of war in the 21st century? Can military forces in this competitive and conflicting global world play a conventional role established in the past? Will Western military superiority survive in an era in which democratic civilization is extremely vulnerable to unexpected, novel and asymmetric threats (terrorist attacks, migration, piracy, etc.)? What role does military force play in combating hybrid threats?

To answer these questions, this paper looks at complex processes, phenomena and events primarily from the point of view of military security. The security theory approach is based on the conviction that trends can be outlined applying multifaceted analysis to help assess future challenges.

We will be discussing four topics. *First,* we clarify the theoretical questions of military security, the role of military security in comprehensive security, and the new tendencies in external and internal security. *Then* we analyze the strongly fragmented international military security situation from the 2000s with the aim of identifying the most important characteristics of waging war and the development of armed forces. *Thirdly,* we give a survey of war theory in the period following the cold war and identify the main streams of the development of military thinking. Finally, we present an "inventory" of changes in warfare modes that have to be reckoned with for security studies and military science in the coming decades.

The theoretical approach to military security

Military security is "the ability of governments to maintain themselves against external and internal military threats" (Buzan et al., 1998: 50.). In an objective sense, it measures the threat against acquired valuables; in a subjective sense, it measures the lack of fear, in the belief that these valuables will not be put to threat. States take measures to avert military and non-military external and internal threats. A country feels safe if it is not in direct danger, no one and nothing is threatening its existence, operation, and values or, if it becomes necessary, can defend itself and achieve victory. As states operate in an anarchic international system (there is no world government), they are "doomed" to provide their own military security. *Therefore, the essence of military security has always been the ascertainment and management of a real or potential military threat posed by other states in such a way as to acquire the effective capabilities needed for prevention or resolution.*

Military security depends on a number of factors:

1. the agenda of military security (determining the relationship between external and internal security);
2. a reference subject whose security is examined (state, international organization, social group);
3. securitization actors (army, police, secret services, paramilitary organizations, etc.);
4. functional actors (actors of the defence system);
5. the perception of threat and vulnerability (weakness);
6. the security dynamics becoming regional.

Based on these factors, the state elaborates its defence strategy, shapes its military policy, and develops the armed forces.

War is the ultimate means of maintaining military security. War has always been a key topic of international relations, and it has a central place in security studies. Security theory has always recognized the Clausewitzian view on war that war is just as rational a political instrument as diplomacy or economic sanctions: it is the continuation of politics by other means. War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will" (Clausewitz, 2013: 39.). Of course, war *is a too risky option* for the state to often use this tool to preserve its security. In 70% of the wars of the last two hundred years, the countries that started the armed struggle won. But if we divide the two centuries into fifty-year periods, the chances of victory for the stronger party were steadily declining. Warfare became more and more risky and indirect strategies for breaking the will and the fighting spirit of the enemy came to the forefront. In the first half of the 20th century, only 65%, and during the 1950-1998 period only 45% of the countries starting a war were victorious (Arrequín-Toft, 2001: 5.). Although no such analysis has been made for this century, it is not difficult to anticipate further continuation of this trend in the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The number of wars and military conflicts declined further in the 21st century, but after 2014 it does not seem that military security has lost its significance.

States can ensure their military security in five ways:

1. unilaterally, with their own military force;
2, multilaterally, by joining an allied system;
3. unilaterally or multilaterally, by possession of weapons of mass destruction;
4. unilaterally, through neutrality; and
5. by unilateral, unique solutions, by “buying into” international treaties (Collins, 2010: 169–184.).

All political-defence strategies depend on a specific situation, conditions and choices, having their benefits and disadvantages. Although some military security solutions can in principle be separated, but in reality, in the case of a particular country they emerge not in pure form, but in combination, in the simultaneous use of multiple methods.

Table 1

The strongest military powers in the world

1. United States
2. Russia
3. China
4. India
5. France
6. United Kingdom
7. Japan
8. Turkey
9. Germany
10. Italy

Source: GlobalFirePower 2016, Military Balance 2016

Only the strongest military powers can ensure their defence unilaterally, relying on their own forces, although their security and defence policy does not lack the opportunities and obligations of joining an alliance (Table 1). According to assessments in the relevant literature, even the top ten of the world’s armies are of varying strength and quality. The United States has the world’s most powerful armed forces, *with all the characteristics of military with dominant capabilities* (high-tech quality, partially robotized; joint services, networked in nature; volunteer and professional, knowledge-based), capable of conducting fourth generation warfare. Russia, China and India have high-quality, partly automated, service-specific, conscripted armed forces with *asymmetric capabilities* that are capable of fighting third and fourth generation armed struggles. The Western countries (France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy) and Japan have *partially dominant* armed forces with limited capabilities but may be able to participate in third and fourth generation clashes. Turkey has a strong army with *symmetrical capabilities*, which is a conventional conscripted armed force capable of traditional, second and partly third generation warfare. The overwhelming development of the military power of a major power may pose a threat to neighbouring countries, it could break regional security, launch a spiral in the arms race, which could lead to a *security dilemma* (Herz, 2003, Jervis, 2011, Gartner, 2007). However, development and production of state-of-the-art military equipment can only be achieved by countries with the most advanced economy and technology.

The militarization of a country can have a wide variety of international effects; it is not just about arming, "violent peace", but also the pursuit of power-driven, authoritarian or oligarchic politics in the international arena and in domestic political life. The nation that arms itself has to contend with other actors on the international stage, with international organizations, with allies and partners. The changes in the boundaries of military security have to be accepted by domestic political forces, civil institutions and society. From the government's point of view, the imagined threats can come from the bottom (from various social groups), from the top (massive threats), but can come from outside (mass migration) and from inside ("traitorous" political opposition, "extraneous" minorities), which all have to be accepted by the public. Military security must protect all national weaknesses that can be exploited by the enemy (resistance fighters, terrorists, secessionists, saboteurs, etc.). This calls for re-regulation of the internal legal order, national security, state operations and the life of society, finding a balance between new threats and human rights. *But military power is a relative tool for solution in all situations where the state is trying to use it.* American president George Bush, for example, was mistaken in holding that delivering a crushing military defeat to the Talib regime or removing Saddam Hussein from power would result in a fatal blow on terrorism. It is impossible to know how the world would have changed if the president had chosen a political solution instead of military retaliation to address the threat. What we know for certain is that, as a consequence of the US military intervention, terrorism, both in terms of scale and quality, has entered a different phase, It has become a force to shape and influence international security: in the course of the "long war" even the United States turned to its allies for support. Fighting against the Islamic State has made it necessary to establish a global coalition under the leadership of the USA, currently consisting of 73 countries and 5 international organizations.

A prevalent mode of ensuring multilateral military security is *joining a military alliance* of some kind. Alliances are diverse and differ from each other in the cause, purpose and place of establishment, the military commitments, the number of participating countries, their geographic area, the level of integration of the military forces, the partnership policies and many more. Military alliances can be established for a single occasion (for war, for a campaign, for a military mission), or for a *permanent*, long-term strategy. States choose membership in an alliance if they believe their military capabilities are limited and they are inadequate to counter a potential threat. They believe that by joining the alliance they will increase the alliance's power and deterrent to ensure the country's security in the event of a military conflict. Allied formation is especially important when a potential hegemonic power threatens other states in the international system. It is by no chance that countries now on the western border of Russia are asking for enhanced military protection from NATO. Alliances are often linked by security theory to the theory of balance of power, because by joining an alliance "automatically" they want to counterbalance the threat of a potential adversary state (see, for example, the establishment of NATO) (Walt, 1997). Others argue that small states will join the regional military alliance even if there is no threatening power, merely using "bandwagoning" in the hope of benefits or they are afraid of missing out on an opportunity (the Treaty of Rio).

A well-functioning military alliance is undoubtedly a useful solution for states, since they do not need to sustain a military force above their economic means, and they can take into account the benefits of division of labour within the alliance (e.g. NATO's *Smart Defence* concept, EU's *Pooling & Sharing Initiative*). However, membership in the alliance also has problems that can be found in different interests, decision-making, burden sharing, and in the alliance-conform development of forces (following the example of large countries). Theoretical and concrete *ad hoc* discussions within the alliance should, however, not be exaggerated, since they are part of the problem of cooperation within the alliance. The literature of security theory (Snider, 1984) has already revealed the interconnections of the security dilemma within the operation of the alliance's complex value and interest system in the 1980's. This is especially evident in NATO's activity in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. The operation of the transatlantic alliance has always been *characterized by a balancing act* between participation in the alliance's missions (*entrapment*) and failure to keep the alliance's promises (*abandonment*) both at community level and at individual member states' level. If the organization fails to provide adequate assistance to a threatened member state, the state concerned feels abandoned, "an orphan", and this raises the issue of solidarity and credibility. The guarantees of Article 5 are also inflated if the NATO member requesting help does not receive the assistance guaranteeing its security. On the other hand, a state not specifically concerned with a security threat will consider the degree to which it gets involved in a conflict important from the alliance's perspective but marginal from the perspective of its own national interests. It may be able to avoid situations of entrapment by not delegating forces to conflict management, by not taking part in the operation foreseen, but it is not certain that it will not "lose on the swings what it gains on the roundabouts". If the alliance does not find the way to solve the problem, it can be easily discredited, lose relevance, ultimately risking its own future. So, helping those who are in trouble and feel threatened is an exceptionally important task because the expression of solidarity sends the message to the country concerned that it can count on the alliance. This is clear today when the 2014 NATO Action Plan (Readiness Action Plan, RAP) was unable to change the Russian aspirations but still had a reassuring effect on the countries of the eastern wing of the Alliance (minimal deterrence).

According to critical military studies, alliances do not add much to the military security of a given state, but by their very existence and their decisions they make the operation of regional security architectures and the co-operation of international organizations difficult. Others think that the balance between the alliances has a positive impact on peace and security as long as the alliance's strategy is subject to renewal, its organization and operation are flexible, and the alliance's obligations function as a bond between the member countries. Nevertheless, many states in the world today do not wish to associate with military alliances because they feel that the commitments and risks to undertake would outweigh the potential benefits, gains or they avoid membership because they do not wish to enter into military cooperation with the leading Western powers. The largest group is the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of non-aligned countries, where one of the membership criteria is that the country aspiring for membership cannot be a member of any regional or multilateral military alliance that can be linked to the Cold War era confrontation of the great powers. NAM countries build military security by leveraging national capabilities to draw on the collective self-reliance of developing countries.

Defence based on weapons of mass destruction is nowadays becoming *less and less of a realistic option to guarantee today's security,* as there is a strong international regulation to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (N. Rózsa–Péczeli, 2013) which does not constitute a real alternative. Today, nine countries have nuclear arsenals (Table 2), and at least a dozen have biological and/or chemical weapons (James Martin Center For Nonproliferation Studies, 2008). International conventions not only include the fact that signatory States relinquish the right to possess and possibly use nuclear weapons but have also announced their intention to prevent by all means at their disposal the access to nuclear weapons by other states. In the fight against nuclear proliferation, the *US plays the leading role* by offering a protective nuclear umbrella for its allies not in possession of nuclear weapons (Japan, South Korea, NATO, and Australia) in exchange for their relinquishment. After the Cold War, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction became *the top security policy priority* of the great powers (essentially the permanent members of the UN Security Council). With the help of the United States, the nuclear weapons that had been left in the former Soviet successor states were dismantled. In 2015, five permanent members of the UNSC and Germany signed a framework agreement with Iran on its nuclear programme in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions against Iran. In 2009, Barack Obama launched a new international nuclear disarmament forum (nuclear summit), where the issues of nuclear disarmament and the coordinated international action against nuclear terrorism were discussed at the Heads of State and Government level (April 4, 2016). This unparalleled international effort resulted in the fact that without the knowledge of the international community it is almost impossible to obtain fissile material and technology for the production of weapons of mass destruction or to employ the appropriate experts. The country violating the treaties (see the cases of Iran and North Korea) faces severe sanctions (economic and financial embargo, possibly a military strike against nuclear facilities – Israel, for example, delivered air strikes against nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981 and in Syria in 2006), the negative consequences of which are not in proportion with the deterrence capabilities expected of the possession of weapons of mass destruction.

According to the 2018 data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), nuclear powers today have a total of 14 465 nuclear warheads, of which 3750 weapons have been deployed. Although this is a modest reduction of 3% compared to 2016, nuclear weapons continue to play a decisive role in deterrence, and they are still being modernized. The production and maintenance of weapons of mass destruction is very expensive. According to US data, one state-of-the-art nuclear bomb will cost USD 20 to 200 million, and the production of delivery systems will cost even more. The cost of biological and chemical weapons (the "poor man's weapons") ranges from a few hundred thousand dollars to several million, and their production is not easy either. Additionally, the state must maintain the conventional armed force, so it is important for the state leadership to think twice before it wants to maintain nuclear and conventional deterrent forces at the same time to guarantee its military security.

Table 2

Nuclear powers

Self-declared nuclear powers
- USA (1945)
- Soviet Union/Russia (1949)
- United Kingdom (1952)
- France (1960)
- China (1964)

Verified nuclear powers
- India (1974)
- Pakistan (1974)
- North Korea (2006)

Presumed nuclear power
- Israel (1967)

Source: SIPRI, 2018

The fourth way to create military security is *to declare neutrality* when a state, by using international legal options, bases its defence concept on its neutral status (military neutrality). International law recognizes two types of neutrality: *wartime neutrality* and *permanent neutrality* (Kussbach, 2009). A neutral state in times of war must refrain from any act of war, it is bound to keep an equal distance from all the forces taking part in the war, but at the same time it can perform good offices to the warring parties. The content of wartime neutrality has changed somewhat with the establishment of the United Nations, as UN members cannot demonstrate impartiality towards a state breaking the peace, committing acts of aggression and towards the victim of aggression. The decisions on sanctions taken by the UNSC must also be enforced by a neutral state and under collective security must provide assistance to the State under attack. The essence of permanent neutrality is that the state is obliged to stand in an impartial manner not only in times of war, but also in peacetime, and cannot join military-defence alliance systems. Permanent neutrality is mostly guaranteed by international treaties or conventions, but there are countries that pursue traditionally neutral policies without such guarantees.

Currently 22 countries have neutral status, but their motivation is diverse. The smallest countries have confidence in neutral status because they think they are not important enough to influence any conflict, so war is avoided. In this group, the strategy of “laying low and staying unnoticed” prevails. Other countries declare neutral status because they want to counterbalance the possible military threat of the neighbouring powers. Finally, the decision of the states that chose to declare neutrality after the Cold War, was influenced by an overwhelming historical past, so, after the former forced membership in an alliance, all they wanted to do was remain independent. It should be noted that the idea of neutrality was seriously raised in Hungary during the change of regime. Historical experiences, however, show that *neutrality is only feasible when actors in a particular conflict/war recognize the existence of the status.* This recognition, however, is almost without exception based on power interests of the moment, and when the interests change, the status of neutrality is questioned. Today we know that the oldest neutral country, the traditional neutrality of Switzerland, depended on chance during World War II, because on two occasions Hitler planned to occupy the country. Declaration of neutrality in 2010 did not help Ukraine, either, because Russia did not respect the existence of the status along with the change in the political situation. For many countries, being a member of a regional political organization such as the European Union which has a common security and defence policy also weakens neutrality. However, it seems that these risks are also being recognized by neutral countries, and they also maintain *their own army* under the principle of "Trust in God and keep powder dry" (Oliver Cromwell). The legendary neutral Switzerland has a peacetime strength of 20,800 of her conscripted armed forces, supported by 148,500 well-trained and equipped reserve personnel and 70,000 civilians in the territorial defence concept. Of the 22 neutral countries, a total of four countries (Costa Rica, Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Panama) have no military power of their own. The "cheap illusion" of neutrality is denied by the 2018 GFP index, as we find Japan (8th place), Taiwan (24th place), Ukraine (29th place), Sweden (31st place), Mexico (32nd place) and Switzerland (34th place) among the 50 countries with the strongest armies. All this reinforces the conviction that not even military security based on neutrality *can do without* armed forces with adequate capabilities to ensure the survival of the nation.

Table 3

Countries that have been neutral for the longest

- Switzerland (1815)
- San Marino (1862)
- Liechtenstein (1868)
- Sweden (1918)
- Vatican City (1929)
- Ireland (1937)
- Mexico (1939)
- Japan (1947)

Source: www.adducation.info

Finally, military security can be ensured by a *combination* of the above methods, because, as we have indicated in the individual cases, there is no clean-cut solution. For example, critical military studies call for the waiving of a traditional defence concept, suggesting a transition to a professional non-traditional force (Fabian, 2013). Perhaps solutions of the countries following a military security policy without standing armies can be considered to be in line with the liberal concept of security and provides a good example for the reduction of demilitarization in the world. According to CIA statistics, 16 countries at present have no army at all, but this does not mean that they do not have paramilitary forces (special subunits, coastguards) within the police responsible for interior security (Gilsinan, 2014). For example, the security of Vatican City has been provided by the legendary (now 110-strong)

Swiss Guard for 510 years, but it is now considered a military parade unit, and the real protection is guaranteed by the Italian armed forces. Most of the non-armed countries are mini-states (island or mainland states) and all have their own history of "being unarmed".

A classic example in the literature is Costa Rica, which abolished its armed forces for fear of a possible military coup in 1949. In many countries that gained independence, it was obvious for them to seek military protection from a former colonial country or a protectorate. However, it is common for all these countries that they are located in *regions not afflicted by invasion and war* (the Caribbean, Oceania, and Europe), so a security solution without their own armed forces seems logical. The protection of countries without military force is endorsed by a power (USA, Spain, France, Australia, New Zealand) located close to country concerned, on the basis of the bilateral agreements or relying on a regional security arrangement (Iceland, for example, is a member of NATO), or an informal cooperation (in Vatican City, Italy, for instance) guarantees the sovereignty of the state. Although security solutions without maintaining armed forces appear to be inexpensive, they are not free: the countries that are protected must contribute to the cost or otherwise compensate the country providing defence.

After World War II, *security was for a long time equal to military security,* and the non-military arm of the security scissors began to open only from the seventies. The dominant military security in the theory of international relations was primarily concerned with the problems of *military confrontation,* armaments, *nuclear deterrence* and *power projection.* Military security in security theory was considered so general that it was almost *identified with strategic studies* that investigate the role of military power in the context of attainability of political goals. The realistic view typical of the bipolar world regarded the states as individual entities that provided "collective goods" to their citizens, including the "public good" called security, the most important of which was the protection from external attacks. The obligation of a state to provide military security is still valid, because if a country is unable to protect its citizens (think of Ukrainian citizens living in Eastern Ukraine), its sovereignty, operability is threatened, a lack of security emerges, ceding ground to non-state actors (in the case of Ukraine: secessionists sponsored by Russia) to operate in the security vacuum.

After the Cold War, the concept of security was enlarged with the topics of political, economic, social and environmental security, but all security theory trends – realism, liberalism, and constructivism –, included the study of military security (Gazdag, 2011). Although military security over the past decades have seemed to be pushed into the background compared to other sectors, events have repeatedly proved that *military security has an important role in the wider security concept.* For this reason, military power remains a major issue in the governmental policies of nation-states because a state and society can feel safe in their political, economic, social and environmental dimensions from their own perspective, but these results can be ruined in the face of a military defeat. The tragic events of 2014 (Russian intervention in Ukraine, the successful occupation of areas by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq) *confirm today the pertinence of the theorem.*

Armed forces, however, have not only the ability to defend the country from external attacks, but they can be used as a foreign policy instrument (an aircraft carrier is called simply "90,000 tonnes of diplomacy" in the relevant literature), as well as for internal defence purposes (counter-terrorism, disaster management tasks, border protection, support for civil authorities, etc.). The real tasks of the armed forces appear in government policy, in national security and military strategies, in doctrines and in law, they are expressed in military budgets and in the objectives of the sustenance development of the armed forces. Military security, like security in general, can be objective and subjective. In the objective sense, the military threat to the state and citizens is linked to the threat to the existing values that they see, feel and understand; in the subjective sense, there is a lack perception of threat and the fear of fundamental values being attacked. This ambiguity of security gives states large room for manoeuvre to influence the objective and subjective perceptions that are often achieved through securitization. Securitization describes a process that creates a situation where the government or other political actors treat a particular event as an existential security issue whether or not it is realistic, or it is only considered to be realistic in order to take urgent and extraordinary measures to end the threat (GARTNER, 2007: 178–179.).

After the Cold War, *military security is increasingly intertwined with human security,* because military interventions, "expeditionary wars" and humanitarian operations, despite all intentions, are accompanied by major destruction, losses in population, waves of refugees, and emergency situations affecting masses of people. Under the pressure of the United Nations, states are required to develop a "defence culture" which prepares the military force not only for the achievement of military objectives, but also for "peace-support", "peace-building", "state-building" and "nation-building" missions as well. Therefore, modern military policies are already preparing a *dual approach* for the armies to accomplish future missions: the "Rambo-type" combat missions and the "armed social worker" type of missions. This philosophy has developed a lot in the peaceful multipolar world, leading to Western-type forces increasingly becoming socialized for expeditionary operations. The shift from combat missions to peace-building missions was promoted by all major international institutions (UN, European Union, NATO, OSCE, African Union, and ASEAN), the need for a network-based or comprehensive security approach, the establishment of joint military and civilian (police) forces has come into the foreground. Although a number of initiatives have been implemented (UN, EU, NATO) in this area, a breakthrough has not been achieved, most well-intentioned proposals remained on paper. In 2004, the EU, for instance, planned to establish a new type of integrated *human security response force* (15,000 strong) in peacetime, one third of whom would have been military, one third police and one third civilians (development professionals, lawyers, social workers, teachers etc.) (Barcelona Report, 2004).

However, such solutions typically require consensus in all international organizations, which is difficult to achieve because of differences in interests and lack of resources, often resulting in failure to make decisions. However, it is clear that the Barcelona proposal is professionally well-founded because such a mixed security force would be able to provide all EU missions today.

However, implementation is hindered not only due to political problems but also due the resistance of international civil organizations and their low level of willingness to co-operate. Social organizations (INGOs, NGOs) see integrated solutions and comprehensive approaches as the "militarization" of other sectors of security. The end of the peace-support operation of NATO's ISAF (31 December 2014) shows that the concept of a comprehensive approach in the new Resolute Support Mission (RSM) of the Alliance has been *toned down to a modest coordination* between the international actors and the government and actors of local civil society. However, the Ukrainian crisis has pointed out that due to the "civilianization" of foreign military operations, *serious deficiencies have arisen* in preparing for traditional wartime missions.

Research also points out that *strategic culture* prevailing in a country, that is, the perception, the way in which that country creates, regulates and implements its security and defence strategies, plays an important part in the perception, regulation and provision of military security and the mission of the armed forces. National crisis management decisions and national "added value" are significantly influenced by historical forms of behaviour, social beliefs or convictions, national myths, political and social norms (Forgács, 2009; Tálas, 2014). It is not in the sense of making specific decisions relating individual crises or instances of co-operation, but on drawing the limits, the "red line" of what the government considers vital and less important, acceptable or unacceptable, feasible or impracticable, urgent or delayed.

Strategic culture has an influence on patterns of behaviour as the government seeks ways, methods and culture to realize its political choices. We have seen positive and negative examples of taking into account national strategic cultures, including in the recent past in policies related to Ukraine, in those related to Russia, or in the European migration crisis. Strategic culture, however, is not only developed at national level, but also in alliances, and this needs to be taken into account in crisis management.

Critical military security studies, however, argue that the missions of wars and armed forces have also changed in the 21st century, and the "real world" today is different from the one in the last century. In the wars against terrorism of our time, military forces use the force primarily for non-classical tasks (the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy, occupying and pacifying its territory), but to pursue and destroy the forces rebelling against the state, the terrorist forces (such as USA trying to destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; Israel trying to eliminate Hezbollah in Lebanon [1982, 2006], and Hamas in Gaza [2009, 2014]). National forces are involved in operations targeting rebel forces involved in drug trafficking (e.g. Colombia, Mexico) or terrorism (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan) in a number of countries. Not once they are faced with the fact that terrorists, tribal leaders, criminal clans have already occupied an area, create and operate a "state". The United States leads a global coalition of 73 nations against ISIS, within which 23 nations take part in a "shadow war" with air force and special operations units. The use of military force in this way differs significantly from the realistic concept of war between states, even though military forces fighting rebels (colonization) looks back on a long history. Since combat police forces were established only in the 19th century, the army also carried out the tasks now carried out by the gendarmery-style police forces against smaller terrorist, guerrilla and rebel groups.

The features of international military security

The large-scale political, social and economic changes after the Cold War *resulted in a shift* in international relations, from the state-centric system to mutually interdependent, interconnected and competing international forms of co-operation. In this competition, political, economic and military competition between the great powers and the regions, the strengthening of the emerging countries, the decline of the West, the strengthening of terrorism and the return of geopolitics denote the most important changes. In Europe, Russia pursuing violent politics, extremist Islam in the Middle East caused surprises. After the terrorist attack on the United States (9/11), the fight against terrorism has become a global war, which now takes on the features of a clash between civilizations and religions (Huntington, 1998). *Paradigmatic changes in security are culminating in the hybrid threat and the hybrid war phenomenon.* The limited military conflicts between states, the globalization of terrorism – and most probably, gaining global ground by the Islamic State (ISIS), deemed to be the most dangerous – have changed the Western perception of security. Antagonisms, tensions and confrontations related to crises have changed the environment of operation for modern states, changed the division of power and labour between states, regions, markets and civil societies, and *brought to the forefront the activities of the armed forces and law enforcement agencies.* It has also become clear that globalization is not a homogeneous process, because, paradoxically, processes and phenomena of convergence and divergence alike can be found in it. In addition to mutual interconnection and global "consciousness", the bridgeheads of polarization, particularism, nationalism, ethnicity and anti-globalism have also strengthened.

Figure 1 shows convincingly the changes in the world, as the number of wars and major military conflicts radically decreased after 1990. It also appears that inter-state wars have almost disappeared after 2010, but the number of wars (wars within a state, between the state and non-state actors, war at the so-called Community level) has also declined steadily in the nineties (60% reduction). After 2001, there was a slight increase, followed by a recession, but after 2010, mainly because of the war in Syria and Iraq, a further increase is visible, which was further strengthened by the Ukrainian crisis after 2014. According to an assessment by the Centre for Systemic Peace (CSP), there were 327 *major military conflicts* following the Second World War, the outbreak of which claimed at least five hundred casualties, and in the protracted armed struggle, at least a hundred people per year died. According to CSP assessments, there are *36 wars* going on in the world at the present.



Figure 1

Global Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2015

Source: CSP, 2016a

Six of today's military conflicts are still the legacy of the Cold War: Myanmar (1948–), India (1952–), Israel (1965–), the Philippines (1972–), Colombia (1975–) and Somalia (1988). After 2011, *12 new wars broke out,* which dominate international public life today (Table 4). CSP calculations take into account all types of political violence (international intervention, civil war, ethnic war, community conflict, genocide) and calculate the full impact of military conflicts: deaths, injuries, depletion of resources, destruction of the infrastructure, and migration of refugees, changes in individual and social psychological and political culture.

If we focus on organized violence regionally, the Middle East is at the forefront, and Africa – after 25 years – has fallen back to second place. Central and South Asia hold their third position permanently, although there is a rearrangement in the region: while the war in Sri Lanka ended in 2010, ethnic conflicts have decreased in India, Pakistan maintains its usual level, and Afghanistan is again gaining momentum. (At the NATO Summit in Warsaw, in July 2016, a decision was taken on the continuation of the Alliance's mission in Afghanistan.) The number of conflicts in East Asia and America has decreased, even though non-state violence in Mexico has risen. Finally, the conflict list in the continent is closed by Europe, although losses from the war in Ukraine have increased, they are substantially smaller than those in the Balkan wars (Melander, 2015).

Table 4

The most recent wars

2011: Iraq (ethnic)
2011: Syria (civil war, ethnic)
2011: Sudan (ethnic)
2012: Mali (civil war)
2013: Egypt (civil war)
2013: DR of Congo (ethnic)
2013: South Sudan (ethnic)
2014: Libya (civil war)
2014: Ukraine (civil war)
2015: Burundi (civil war)
2015: Cameroon (ethnic)
2015: Yemen (ethnic)

Source: CSP, 2016a

It should be noted that research results largely depend on the research philosophy applied, on methodology and databases. However, the surveys done by another famous institute, the Peace Research Centre of Uppsala University (Sweden)[1] also show that the Canadian

---

[1] The measurement and rating of military conflicts is not the same for each research institute – it depends on the databases used, the methods of calculation and the threshold limits of the conflicts followed. Uppsala University's Conflict Research Center measures conflicts starting from 25 casualties upward, and draws the lower limit of a *major military conflict* at 1,000 casualties. However, both research institutes speak of war at casualties in excess of 10,000, which is the result of co-operation between institutions. The Norwegian peace research institute PRIO (Peace Research Institute Oslo) also participates in the joint work. See http://ucdp.uu.se/.

CSP results are reliable and even methodologically adequate. The Swedish UCDP measures losses in excess of 25, so the Peace and Conflict Research Centre has already registered *70 organized and violent military clashes* in 2015, which resulted in a total of 118,435 deaths.

Figure 2 shows the regional location of military conflicts, combined with the functioning of the state. The countries in dark bourdon (20–25) show the inoperable or very poorly functioning states (16–19). Orange indicates countries with serious operational problems, and fading shades of yellow only indicate states requiring international attention. This six-grade scale of state fragility is only one method used by international literature. Research centres conducting in-depth research, such as the US Fund for Peace (FFP), present 11 categories, but there is no difference between the evaluation results.[2] For example, the FFP further breaks down the countries marked with dark bourdon by the CSP into two more categories: *in the four failed states and in the majority of the very poorly functioning countries, respectively, there are wars going on.* Somalia is worst off, which has failed in all of the 12 indicators measured. In the Fragile State Index (FSI) the worst-rated countries are at the top, while the well-functioning states are at the bottom. (For example, Hungary is a stable country with 135th place, while Finland is at the bottom of the list in the 178th place.)

The map shows spectacularly the theoretical context that *most of the military conflicts are typical of dysfunctional, fragile or weak states.* But it also points out that in these countries not only the military threat and the lack of internal security are the problem, but that the country is in a deep political, economic and social crisis. While fighting can be stopped relatively quickly through interventions and peace operations, dealing with non-military problems is much harder, it takes much longer, and no results are guaranteed, either.

---

[2] The FFP evaluates countries according to the following indicators: (1) demographic pressure; (2) the situation of refugees; (3) social group grievances; (4) migration; (5) economic inequality; (6) economic downturn; (7) the legitimacy of the state; (8) public services; (9) human rights and the legal system; (10) security forces; (11) the joining of forces by the elite; (12) external intervention. See http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2016.pdf.



Figure 2

The international military security

Source: CSP, 2016b

With September 11, 2001, the international security system virtually *split into two*: into the traditional 20th century state-centric defence system and into the 21st century, sub-state level, and supranational security layers. The global strategic schism has brought about the erosion of *differences between national and international conflicts, external and internal security, and public and social security, respectively.* In the world of new threats, not only the state but non-state actors (extremist groups, paramilitary organizations, terrorists, international criminals, drug dealers, warlords, etc.), too, have modern arsenals, media and advanced computer systems because they have foreign supporters, so they often wage proxy wars. For this reason, it is difficult to deal with civil war situations, terrorism, piracy, migration, international crime, cybercrime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and economic struggles only at state or regional levels. These threats *jeopardize* not only the sovereignty of the state, but also *the security of entire societies, regions and civilizations*, and become factors influencing international stability.

Among the new types of threats, terrorism, in particular, puts the use of military force to the test. After 9/11, the intervention of the US armed forces and their allies (including NATO in Afghanistan) in Afghanistan and Iraq was a combustible mixture for terrorism, especially jihadist terrorism, which reached its peak in 2007 (Figure 3). The US Department of State now records 61 terrorist organizations,[3] *of which ISIS is the strongest today,* even though its power, territory and resources are more and more tapering off. The CSP chart shows the most serious terrorist acts (High Casualty Terrorist Bombing, HCTB) in half-yearly intervals, each involving more than 15 casualties. In particular, the number of attacks using “smart bombs” (car bombs, suicide bombers) requiring low technical capabilities and aimed at soft targets (police forces, offices) and mass events (hotels, markets, beaches, etc.) have increased. In the last two years, however, professionally trained terrorist groups (“super-empowered terrorists”) and “death squads” capable of causing much more devastation have appeared in Western-Europe. There were 11 (HCTB) terrorist attacks in Europe before the Nice terror attack (July 2016), which claimed 278 casualties. However, most terrorist acts were committed in the crisis belt, where Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq belong, followed by Yemen, Somalia, Libya and Nigeria after the Arab Spring. If we include small-scale acts of terror perpetrated with small arms, knives, and cars, we can talk about a much larger number of cases[4]. *Although the frequency and devastating* effect of the terrorist attacks are on the increase, however, they are far behind the similar indicators of political or criminal violence.

---

[3] See: www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm



Figure 3

High Casualty Terrorist Bombings, 9/11/89–3/10/16

Source: CSP, 2016c

---

[4] In the wave of violence that started in September 2015 in Israel (knife attacks, car-ramming attacks and shootings), 21 Israelis and one US citizen were killed in Israel. Israeli authorities and armed civilians killed 139 Palestinians, most of whom were killed in clashes with security forces. See http://eu.euroons.com/2016/01/09/ujabb-keses-tamadas-tortent-izrael.

From the terrorist attacks against the United States to the present day, terrorist acts have claimed 40,860 casualties (only 3,691 from 1990 to 2011), 49% of which occurred in Iraq. The number of victims of political violence after 9/11 was 3.5 million. While the West has found the answer in within traditional warfare in the form of asymmetric operations, in the area of internal security (especially in Europe), successful prognostic, preventive and protective procedures have not yet been established. However, since the attacks in Europe, the development of security forces has begun, and as a part of it, the internal task system and organizational structure of the armed force (support for police and secret services in the event of terrorist threats, border protection duties, military technology, procedures, training provided for law enforcement agencies, creation of military gendarmerie etc.). However, all these steps and the pace of change are not satisfactory, the social roots of terrorism should be eliminated, and this requires the simultaneous, integrated management of the political, social, economic and military components of security, based on the principle of a comprehensive approach.

Changes in the international military security system are reflected in the *changing character* of recent wars and military conflicts, which are described in different ways by foreign and domestic literature. Confrontations after the Cold War, a broad spectrum of wars and conflicts in today's world are characterized differently by various authors. According to the internationally accepted typology drawn up by the British diplomat Robert Cooper, the new world order of the 21st century can best be characterized by *three kinds of states, i.e. a combination of modern, postmodern and premodern state* (Cooper, 2000). The premodern is essentially the world of the weakly functioning countries, *terra nullius* that is no longer needed by the post-developed world, so it does not interfere, so chaos zones are created. The modern world is the domain of the classical state system where old security policies (power balance, the *status quo* and state interests) and mindset dominate. Wars would only arise in this region if the situation threatened the regional security equilibrium (e.g. the first Gulf War). The postmodern world is represented by EU countries, Canada, and partly by the USA and Japan, which operate on the basis of the monopoly of power but of the sharing of interests and values, transparency, confidence building and voluntary respect for international law. Postmodern states reject the use of military force to resolve problems, they work with conviction on the codification of international peace and security, the borders of foreign and domestic policy merge, mutual interference in each other's internal affairs and monitoring are conducted in a regulated manner, and the relevance of borders is reduced. When assessing the security of the tripartite world, the British diplomat underlined that *all three worlds (the zone of European security, the danger zones, the zone of chaos) require different security policies and toolkits. In the postmodern world, security must be built on trust and cooperation.* He pointed out that Russia should be kept in the European Security Zone as far as possible. The world of the modern world operates in the old way, through states, but a military conflict would only take place if the rules of collective security were extremely violated. Therefore, postmodern states can only deal with the problems of the modern world on the basis of a dual value system, "if the fight takes place in a jungle, then the rules of the jungle must be applied". The management of the security of the premodern world (Somalia, Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, etc.) is the most problematic, since chaos could only be eliminated in an old way (colonization, hegemony), alien to a postmodern state. Chaos cannot be managed by traditional military means, the "by-products" (drugs, illnesses, refugees, terrorism) must be fought against, but intervention is risky. Managing threats to the premodern world is intertwined with the possibility of failure (*mission creep*). The developed West should function as a sort of "rehabilitation centre" (*halfway house*) and help the population of a country/region hit by the crisis improve the situation and restore state functions. Such interventions are not spectacular, the results are modest, and they pose many risks. According to Cooper, the Clausewitzian strategy does not work in the premodern world, the goal cannot be "victory", and operations require constant political guidance and support. Cooper suggests integration to today's postmodern states instead of nationalism. At the same time, the premodern world can endanger the postmodern state (states) because an unsuccessful intervention weakens the government, and the losses are not accepted by society after a while. In the case of postmodern failure, the *coup de gráce*, the finishing stroke comes along, because modern states "step into" the conflict resolution with the traditional solutions (seizing power, striving after autarchy, upsetting the balance of power, etc.), which in extreme form may also pose a threat to the postmodern region.

The "Cooperian" concept of new world order and security features have been translated into the language of warcraft by Australian experts (Evans et al., 2004). Postmodern war reflects Western views of limited war, peace-making operations, and humanitarian military interventions. Modern war means the traditional warfare between states, the civil war, and unilateral state violence. Premodern war is a mixture of sub-state level and transnational forms of warfare, a combination of conventional and irregular war that national or social groups wage for identity, ethnic goals, based on the traditional politics of extremism and particularism. It is important to note that none of the war types represent a distinctly separable form of warfare, but rather *overlap each other and interact with each other.* In particular, modern and postmodern wars and the mixing of modern and premodern wars, respectively, can be observed in today's interventions, antiterrorist activities and humanitarian operations, which are often associated with the world of asymmetric and ethnopolitical warfare. The essence of these complex interactions is captured by, for example, the US Navy's doctrine of the *three-block war,* which states that teams can participate in a specific operational area at the same time as conventional combat tactics, peace operations and humanitarian aid. But here we can also mention the *forms of Russian nonlinear (hybrid) warfare* when the armed forces have various missions and obligations to cooperate with other power branches of the state. According to my calculations, out of 36 wars and major conflicts today *four conflicts count as modern wars (11%), 13 clashes are of a postmodern nature (36%) and 19 belong to the premodern category (53%).*

Despite the fact that modern, postmodern and premodern forms of war are intertwined, each form of warfare form has its *distinctive features. Postmodern wars* do not risk national security; seldom threaten the survival of the nation, limited war policy goals are achieved without the state taking special risks. Postmodern war is fought by advanced armed forces, but warfare – such as, for example, the air war against Serbia – is based on a deliberate loss restriction and a cautious exit strategy. The model of postmodern war can be seen in the 1999 NATO air war against the Milosevic regime, a calibrated war where high-tech allied forces were opposed to modern Serbian armed forces, primarily Serbian air defence.

Modern war takes place in a classical form known from military history, characterized by the confrontation of the armed forces of rival countries on land, in the air and at sea. The evolution of this model of warfare, retrospectively, can be traced back to 1285 BCE when the Egyptians defeated the Hittites in a battle fought with war chariots (recorded in history for the first time) and infantry at Kadesh (Hahn, 1963). In Western perception, modern war is fought by high-tech, traditional forces. This approach is linked to the great all-out wars of the 20th century, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the Gulf Wars. Interstate wars between developing countries take place in a similar way; only the operational and military level of warring parties may differ.

During the evolution of war conflicts, the postmodern war created its own antithesis, which is called a *premodern war.* This form of war is more of a civil war-type conflict of social character and purpose, including the struggle of ethnic, religious, civilian groups, terrorists, separatists, insurgents, rebels, international interventions and stabilization operations. The military toolbox of the premodern warfare is mixed: on the one hand, the use of modern weapons and on the other hand a kind of "blood and iron" combat mode (see terrorist attacks claiming massive civilian casualties or ISIS's deterrent video executions), which is alien to Western civilization. Though fighters of the premodern war also use modern technology, modern media, effective organizational solutions, their thinking and behaviour are characterized by an antimodern approach, extreme religion, traditional tribal mentality, and the mix of elements of the old value system. *This form of warfare combines conventional or para-military activities with unconventional and asymmetric combat tactics.* Furthermore, it is also typical of this form of warfare to highlight for its purposes the cultural, religious identity policy and exploit the benefits of ethnic and religious conflicts. In the premodern world, the forces are usually recruited from nonstate actors, now, not only at national and regional level, but – as we have seen with ISIS – at regional and global levels. Premodern wars, in many respects, constitute a kind of *cultural rebellion* against Western liberal philosophy, their deliberate rejection of all the universal values represented by American and European societies. We have seen this argument from ISIS after the terrorist attacks in Paris. Premodern wars include nonstate and cross-border civil conflicts, ethnic cleansing, religious wars that take place in a *zone of chaos that runs from Afghanistan through the Middle East to Africa.* As a result, the counter-insurgency theory emerged in Western military thinking, which became an indispensable part of the preparation and development system of the Western armed forces.

Wars and military conflicts of the new type are already under the full publicity of the media. The most important feature of the development of military technology over the past one and a half decades is *the high degree of condensation of space and time*, which causes remote actions to exert local effects and vice versa. The international system that forms in the world of interdependence creates an interconnected world order in which regional and local military developments can become a potentially global phenomenon. Experts soon realized that any confusion and conflict in any part of the world could quickly be quickly broadcast anywhere by all-pervasive global communication media (CNN effect). The importance of the media has been learnt not only by the Western great powers, the emerging states *(Russia Today, Al Jazeera),* but by terrorist organizations (ISIS).

An important consequence of the development of information technology is *the change in the role of military geography,* which, of course, does not mean the end of military application of geography. From the point of view of operational planning, logistical and cartographic analysis, geography continues to play a decisive role in the art of war, just as geopolitics and geostrategies remain important in the art of state leadership. With all this, the weight of strategic geography, as a primary rationality in national defence and the determination of national security behaviour, has decreased. Globalization moves security *from territoriality towards a close interconnection*, and states can less and less afford to look only at events in their own "backyard". Although there are still many examples of local wars and conflicts today (Ukraine is a classic example), the regional and global relations have also appeared in *internal security tasks.* This is particularly noticeable today in the fight against terrorism and in mass immigration. Information technology further loosens territorial boundaries, cyberspace has become fully global. *The need to supplement the old forms of linear warfare with new nonlinear forms of conflict* is recognized by experts in the east and the west alike. *National security today can no longer be defined by the concept of borders alone.* As political, economic, infrastructural, media and psychological dimensions of the relationships between societies exist; attacks against them can no longer be characterized by the occupation or retention of the territory. Chinese military experts reached similar conclusions. According to Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, professors at the General Staff College of the PRC, we entered the era of unlimited warfare, in which "there is no difference" between what is the battlefield and what is not. Natural areas (land sea, air and cosmic) have all become an operational dimension, but social areas (military, political, economic, cultural and psychological) have also become operational areas. The cyberspace connecting the two big areas has also become a milestone for which the opponents do not spare any effort. "The new principles of war are using all means, including armed force or no armed force, military or non-military, and lethal or non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interest." Warfare can be a clash between professional military forces or between the professional forces and the new forces formed by ordinary people and specialists. This is the watershed between unlimited warfare and the traditional, which is the starting point for new types of warfare (Qiao–Wang, 1999: 7.).

New war theories

The diverse world of wars, their broad spectrum, common and different characteristics is reflected in the development of security theory and the art of war. Following the end of the bipolar world, *new theories of war* emerged, capturing different facets of different authors, capturing a characteristic feature of the military conflicts ever increasing in number and changing in content. A brief introduction to the authors and works of mainstream literature aims to provide an outline of the theoretical development related to warfare.

American political scientist John Mueller was the first to break with Cold War thinking in 1991, developing the theory of the obsolescence of the Great Wars (Mueller, 1991). Based on the analysis of the events of the bipolar world, he believed that in advanced democracies war was as obsolete as slavery and duelling. The view that democracies do not wage war against democracies later became one of the crucial presumptions of security policy of liberalism. Later on, on the basis of the experiences of the first Gulf War, Israeli historian Martin van Creveld argued that the age of wars between states characterized by Carl von Clausewitz at the beginning of the 19th century was over. According to his assessment, the Clausewitzian theory of war is no longer valid in the new era, and the theory of Western classical warfare has become obsolete. In his book entitled *Transformation of War,* he argued that small military conflicts put an end to conventional war, and a new model of warfare, a new pattern of *low intensity conflicts* is taking shape. The new wars are fought by guerrillas, terrorists, religious and secular forces, and various gangs wishing to achieve their most diverse political goals by the simultaneous use of the primitive and the most modern weapons (Van Creveld, 1991).

In 1993, American futurist Alvin Toffler enriched the literature with the concept of high-tech information warfare. The central metaphor of his book is an image of the waves of change clashing one another, which shows how the formations of successive periods, economic, social, political and cultural qualities are piling up, one on top of the other (Toffler, 2004). The so-called *"third wave theory"* has launched a debate on the new revolution in military affairs (*RMA*), still going on today. Toffler and the theoreticians of information warfare considered the first Gulf War to be a postmodern war fought on a high-tech basis (Haig–Várhegyi, 2005). In their view, the new equipment and methods used in the war (precision strikes, dominant battlefield knowledge, stealth equipment and technologies, GPS system, superfast weapons) will shape the conflicts of the future for a long time. RMA ideas are still decisive in long-term military planning, especially in countries with advanced military research, development and innovation. The United States stands at the forefront of developments defining future warfare (Szenes, 2015).

Contrary to the technological approach, from the mid-1990s several American technical writers have drawn a vision of a war in which the social organization of the countries at war was far more important than the level of technology used. *Robert Kaplan,* an American *journalist and security analyst,* describes the future war, for instance, as an *impending anarchy* of the Hobbesian world of *failed states*. Based on the analysis of the West African states, he came to the conclusion that the new world brings about the erosion of nation states, while developing countries slip back to the past due to illness, overpopulation, crime, exhaustion of resources, shortage of water and environmental pollution. This chaotic vision is further worsened by the clashes between civilizations, the colonial heritage, the general lack of security (Kaplan, 1994). American professor Philip Cerny says conflicts of the future are the result of the "new medieval" emergence of warlords and violent disintegrations. Globalization challenges and the new security dilemma will lead to the weakening of state functions, there will be more quasi- governments, cultural identity, social, economic and political spaces will need to be reconfigured. By doing so, chaos may perhaps be avoided, but the result is becoming more and more the "lasting mess of the Middle Ages" (Cerny, 1998). In his famous book, Samuel Huntington predicts the *clash of civilizations* emerging as a result of changes in the balance of power between different cultures and of new world order based on civilizations. Potential armed clashes are expected mainly along the borders of Islam, between the regional dominant states and along the default lines of conflict (Palestine, Ukraine, Ethiopia). In these confrontations, the role of religion and cultural identity is greater than in traditional wars, and they are characterized by prolonged, unpredictable and bloody combat activities (Huntington, 1998). According to Ralph Peters, a US military expert, a "new warrior class" is emerging in the modern war and the new adversaries (warlords, terrorists, rebels, international criminals, beneficiaries of conflicts, rogue armed forces) do not respect the historical rules of warfare. The new enemy fights both in the cities and in the information jungle, shouting "Allah Akbar!" and calling for revenge, and is driven by hatred and violence, and fights to the death. The new warfare will be no more than the conflict between the Western forces accompanied by the media, with various military cultures and paramilitary forces from Mogadishu to Grozny. The popular bestseller writer's conclusion is pessimistic; he believes the US forces cannot adequately prepare for the changes in the 21st century warfare (Peters, 1999).

By the late nineties and at the turn of the millennium, more and more articles and papers were published on *the war conflicts of the future, of the 21st century.* War has become a sought-after thing in the "cookbook" of the theories, be it about specific war descriptions or evaluation-analytical studies or books. Works on *asymmetric warfare and conditions of modern warfare* came to the forefront. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned in 1998 of the danger of terrorism, a change in the character of the war, which in the future would be fought by rogue states and nonstate entities under the threat of the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. General Mahmoud Gareyev, president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, says the 21st century war becomes *"multi-variational"*, with the armed forces needing to develop their multifunctional relationship to modern conflicts and local wars. The transformation of the forces should be carried out according to the changes in the international environment and the demands of the revolution in military affairs (Gareev, 1998). In 1999, Mary Kaldor, a UK professor, was discussing the new war which is based on the primacy of politics and the privatization of violence challenging the new world order. The new armed conflicts differ from conventional warfare in that they are fought by state and non-state actors and networks alike; they are not ideological but identity wars; the conflict is primarily about political rather than physical goals to be achieved through fear and terror; and their funding often involves "predator methods", making belligerents interested in pursuing political violence. Kaldor maintains her position after 15 years and emphasizes that new wars have been described as new concepts ("war between people", "third type wars", "hybrid wars", "privatized wars", and "postmodern wars"), but in substance they all use similar arguments. Modern wars are hard to describe in terms of peace and war, political or criminal violence (Kaldor, 2013).

After the turn of the millennium, following the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, *terrorism got into the focus of military security.* Professor Herfried Münkler, a German political scientist, similarly to Kaldor, has clearly considered the attacks to be acts of war and not a crime. Fighting terrorism is a completely new form of war, a low-intensity armed struggle against an enemy that has no body, with war becoming a form of life for terrorism, ambushing the civilian population and using it as a shield. The strategy of terrorism is directed against Western symbols and Western societies in fragile state of mind, and strives for its success with violence, arousing fear and terror. It flouts international law, breaks the rules and conventions of warfare; it operates covertly, insidiously and cruelly. In this way, terrorism has created a new form of the combination of violence, creativity and rationality, which gives the war a new shape. According to Münkler, the successful combating of thr "re-barbarianization" of the war requires broad international efforts, involving new types of "pinpoint precision style" military actions capable to destroy the terrorists' logistics system. Terrorist organizations also need territorial bases of withdrawal, just as "creeping plants need their rooting sites", so without having their resources dried up or exhausted there is little chance of success (Münkler, 2001).

The global war on terrorism, the war fought by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, highlighted the study of theoretical and practical issues of non-conventional and asymmetric warfare, assessing its impact on future wars. In Anglo-Saxon military theory, more and more people have recognized that in the multiplicity of threats the *conventional and unconventional conflicts* are increasingly mixed, the international legal and moral constraints defining warfare become blurred. *Huba Wass de Czege* and *Richard Hart Sinnreich*, US military experts, say that conventional and unconventional forms of warfare *are continually merging.* Any major military conflict in the future will most likely bear the common, interwoven features of these operations. Similarly, the demarcation line between the front and the rear (hinterland), between the battlefield and the strategic operations begins to vanish as the actors of the war become increasingly independent through the use of communication equipment and space-based systems. Due to changes in the world, general purpose forces, operational manoeuvres to be executed over strategic distances, multidimensional operations and adaptive superiority of forces will acquire particular importance (Wass De Czege-Sinnreich, 2002).

Military trends in *multidimensional operations* are increasingly referring to the *counter-war theory* or operational strategy of *the mastery of violence* “developed” by European military thinkers. In France, for example, counter-war theory says that *war in the 21st century has become a complex blend of phenomena.* According to French military theory, in today’s military conflicts it has become increasingly difficult to “treat” war as the clash of rival armed forces. The difficulty of delimiting conventional and unconventional warfare forms, methods and solutions has brought about the *blurring of the line of authority* between political and military responsibility. Nowadays, soldiers frequently have to undertake intervention operations under conditions that are not in line with classical warfare or conventional peace-support operations. Therefore, counter-war theory, which is based on the principle of *conscious and disciplined control of violence,* can be applied in special, extremely complicated political circumstances, where organized state operation is absent and the institutional system of law and order is not functioning; nevertheless, the legal regulations of international law and the laws of war must be observed. French military experts Loup Francart and Jean-Jacques Patry think that military operations today are fully integrated in political, diplomatic, economic and cultural activities. Strategy is no longer merely a military-defence issue. Today’s problem, compared with the past, is, rather, how we can plan military operations within the given policy framework. “A suitable strategy must be based upon a clear assessment of the different types of violence that can be met in the field” (FRANCART–PATRY, 2000: 146.)

General Wesley K. Clark, former SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) of NATO, in his book entitled *Waging Modern War*, has a similar view; he explains that in modern circumstances, politics not only defines the strategy, but *completely pervades all levels of the art of war,* strategy, operations and tactics. In the past, policy was essentially a strategic tool by which state leadership directed the military and the use of military assets. In the 21st century, however, politics enters into professional military affairs to such that, according to Clark, it is now necessary to think about what the political level of war in such circumstances really is (CLARK, 2001). If the US General were right about this issue, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) would have to be placed on a completely new footing in the future.

The versatile approach to research, discourse and results finally created the theory of *fourth generation warfare (4GW)*,[5] which has become a widely recognized, dominant concept in a decade and a half. The authors of the theory, *William S. Lind* and *Thomas X. Hammes* were US military experts who expressed their views in a number of studies. The initiator of the change of concept, the historian Lind had, along with his colleagues, outlined the theoretical framework of the fourth-generation warfare as early as in 1989 (LIND et al., 1989). In their opening argument, they argued convincingly that third-generation warfare, which had been dominant for seventy years, would be transformed by post-Cold War events. According to the findings of the research group, 4GW will no longer be based on Western traditions, but Islamic or Asian type of combat activity will be its central element. The driving force behind fourth-generation development will be information technology and ideology (religion) that will combine conventional types of warfare with terrorism. The new warfare will run on a transnational basis (ideology, religion), involving a direct attack on the enemy's culture, and physical operations will be coupled with extremely complex forms of psychological warfare in which the media are involved. Based on the experiences of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, under the term "fourth generation war" Hammes understands armed uprisings, which are difficult to cope with for modern armies by waging a third-generation war. The adversaries will do their utmost to convince the enemy leadership that their strategic goals are unattainable or too costly compared to the results obtained. To reach their political objectives they will use the "gaps" in the connections of the international system, the conflicts of different nation states, networks above and below states. With their combat activities they send different messages to different target audiences. As for their tactical toolbox, they will deploy all available weapons, information technology and new battlegrounds (e.g. suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, chemical and pathogenic substances). Since they do not want to win battles but war, the duration of fourth-generation warfare is much longer than that of previous wars and campaigns (HAMMES, 2005).

Debates about war in the future and the nature of warfare, pursuant to the mission-related deployment of the Hungarian Defence Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, were also published in Hungarian military journals. These publications did not confine to discussing the most well-known Western theories, but they also adapted them to the better preparedness of the Hungarian armed forces (DEÁK, 2005, 2013; HAJMA, 2005; SZENES, 2005; KŐSZEGVÁRI, 2009; TAKÁCS, 2016). A reference book was dedicated to asymmetric warfare, in which researchers not only elaborate the theory and procedures of fourth-generation warfare, but through various case studies (Budapest 1956, Punjab 1980–1994, Grozny 1995,

---

[5] The term "generation" used in military strategy and the art of war captures the way in which the features, dynamics and direction of development of a given war period can be described.
Military science linked the evolution of warfare to different historical periods and phases. In the *first generation* of modern wars (1648-1865), mass armies became dominant, whose development reached their peak in the Napoleonic wars. The *second generation* was defined by firepower and peaked in World War I. The *third generation* (1918-1991) was characterized by mechanized warfare which was combined with the possible use of nuclear weapons from the 1950s. The *fourth generation* (1991-) created forms of warfare that were t*he result of political*, economic and social *changes* that have taken place since the Cold War. *While Western literature is relatively uniform in defining the phases of the generations (although the need for* identifying *the fifth generation has appeared in several articles*), Russian military science is already talking about a *sixth generation* warfare that began in 2014.

Nablus [Palestine] 2002, Fallujah 2004, Basra 2003, 2007; Tal Afar [Iraq] 2006) they also demonstrate the diversity of uprisings (Resperger et al., 2013).

Following the Russian aggression against the Ukraine, the *concept of hybrid war* emerged, generating substantial debates in politics and in the reference literature, but since NATO has adopted the concept, and its use is increasingly widespread. The creation of the concept of hybrid war is associated with William J. Nemeth, a US military expert who has come to this conceptual conclusion after the Chechen wars had been analyzed (Nemeth, 2002). The leading theoretician of hybrid war is the researcher of the National Defence University of Washington, Frank G. Hoffman, who dedicated a monograph to the conceptual description of hybrid wars (Hoffman, 2007). According to Hoffmann, in the 21st century hybrid wars, i.e. the use of irregular (state) and irregular (non-state) forces and their combat techniques, merge with one another and are combined with terrorist acts and crimes against the civilian population living in the area of operation. It is an important feature of this complex warfare that all activities are coordinated to achieve the greatest physical and psychological impact for the stated political goals. Hoffman's concept of hybrid war, published in 2007, was subject to debate and was not accepted, let alone "translated" into military doctrines or regulations. However, the Russian aggression against the Ukraine in 2014 threw a different light on Hoffmann's concept. An article on non-linear warfare was published by Army General Valeri Gerasimov (Gerasimov, 2013). It was only after the Ukrainian military conflict that the world came to marvel at the article written by the Russian Chief of Staff, when it turned out that the annexation of the Crimea, the support granted to separatists in East-Ukraine, and the big politics of Moscow all followed the scenario described by the general (Berzins, 2014). Based on the events of the Arab Spring, the Russians thought that even in a prosperous state an armed conflict may develop in months or even in days, which could destabilize the country or lead it into a civil war and may cause a humanitarian catastrophe. Hoffman's concept has been extended to all dimensions of the country and society, politics, economics, commerce, communication, cyberspace, human relations, and the use of military forces. The role of non-civilian elements of power in achieving political and strategic goals has increased, the effectiveness of which often exceeds the firepower of the weapons. Civilian and military assets are being deployed in accordance with the protest potential of the population, supported by information and special operations carried out covertly. The open use of military forces takes place only at a specific stage, primarily in order to achieve success, and even then, only as peace-keeping, crisis-management forces granting support for humanitarian aid. The essence of the hybrid war, as Gerasimov wrote, is that the war is everywhere. There have been excellent papers written on theories of hybrid in Hungary (Rácz, 2014; Kajári, 2015). Many experts dispute the generality of the "Ukrainian case", although several civil wars in the MENA region (Syria, Libya and Mali) assumed a hybrid quality.

We end this overview of the new war theories, to give, as it were, a counter-point to what is written above, with the book entitled *Future Warfare* written by the British-American strategist Colin Gray. This book shows in a grand historical analysis that the nature of war has always been constant, *only its character* has changed, depending on time, technology, fighting opponents or motives of combat. The author has no confidence in the predictable future but believes in a tenet of history when he claims that our future lies in our past (Gray, 2005).

Based on the review of literature we can see that in the wars of the 21st century the cooperation between politics, the force and the civil power components is increasing. It is not certain that in all instances in the future the purpose of the use of forces will be the destruction or crushing of the enemy, rather the impact-based subdual of resistance or the freezing of the conflict by using force that is proportional to the aggression. *Forces in the future will be used more as a fencing foil rather than a claymore.* The requirement for the use of military force in a surgical way requires future military thinking and activity that is politically sophisticated, professionally correct and flexible, legally correct, and morally exemplary.

Asymmetric warfare and the hybrid war

From the military challenges of future war, a *diverse warfare scenario* can be constructed. It is likely that the modern war will remain the same "chameleon" (Clausewitz) as in the past; it always adapts to strategic circumstances and appears in inter-state, sub-state and cross-border warfare modes or in a combination of these. Perhaps it would be a mistake to say that in the future the war between states can be completely excluded. In some parts of the world (like the EU region in Europe, America, Australia), this is likely to be done with great certainty. But in other continents (Asia, the Middle East, Africa) the traditional war between states remains a real possibility. It can be said, however, that the coalescing modes of armed conflict bring a *new era of warfare*, in which old and new war actors can enter into alliance or confront each other. In the new war era, conventional and unconventional, symmetrical and asymmetric operations can be concurrently and simultaneously interwoven into a hybrid war in space and time. The hybrid clash will have a different role in the armed forces than in conventional warfare, military capabilities must be applied to the "master plan" of the war together with civilian means of power. Military conflicts will continue to be characterized by regular and irregular forces, which, however, work in coordinated action in different battlefields and organizational forms, and, in some cases, irregular forces will be of the utmost importance. In compound warfare, the various state sponsors, supporters and the "bandit solutions" providing logistic support for asymmetric warfare will have a key role.

The future (fifth) warfare generation will have a *networked joint* character. The evolution of information technology has brought tremendous changes to communication and command systems, created precision weapons, stealth technology, and "squeezed" the temporal and spatial parameters of combat activities. Technological progress in terms of width, depth and altitude has created a *non-linear battlefield*. The emergence of the *battleground concept* has also brought about a significant change in Western warfare techniques during the 1990s as it replaced the mass concept based on linear tactics with the idea of *simultaneous, five-dimensional* (land, sea, air, cosmic, information), *often no-contact, concentrated attacks*. The idea of impact-based warfare is especially effective when all strikes are delivered simultaneously in all dimensions. Less advanced forces will continue to use fourth generation warfare solutions.

The possibility of *simultaneous strikes* is provided by the computer-satellite information system, which allows strike groups to obtain a *more and more accurate picture* of the operational situation. In the advanced armed forces and at alliance (coalition) levels there will be *full network* connectivity between sensors, decision makers and the combat equipment delivering the strike because the reconnaissance and detection devices will be electronically connected with the strike forces. Due to the capabilities of delivering multidimensional strikes, *smaller forces* are expected to be deployed on land compared to today's processes. A soldier will have much greater impact on the events than now, because the precision, reconnaissance capabilities of his weapons, the communication system will be improved. That is why the individual soldier is called the *"strategic corporal"* in Western technical language (Krulak, 1999). The achievement of greater impact is also ensured, as we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, by the fact that land forces also act as a kind of combat sensor for the air force, and they help to achieve a more accurate strike.

The dominance of reconnaissance and of the delivery of strikes makes it possible for modern armies to plan joint operations as a series of wide-area ambushes. The new technology provides wide-ranging application of high-precision strikes and rapid manoeuvres across the entire operational area. As the enemy can be easily identified by instrumental detection and stealth technology, instead of closing with the enemy directly, destruction of the enemy can be accomplished by accurate, well-placed strikes, with *ambush* techniques and effective positioning of friendly forces. High-precision weapons, however, can only be used effectively in long-range, great depth air-land warfare. At low tactical depths, in close combat, the infantry and the special forces retain the lead role in the direct destruction of the enemy. In urban combat, the role of armoured forces and artillery is likely to remain, as otherwise it is not possible to provide effective fire support to the advancing infantry. Experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria show that high-precision weapons alone cannot destroy the enemy in stubborn defence, because although they are very good at point targets, they are less effective in frontal attacks on wide areas. On rough, high-mountain terrain, even conventional striking combat equipment cannot be used with maximum efficiency. The use of joint strike groups made up of infantry, armoured, artillery and air force components continue to have a key role because the air force in itself is not sufficient to win the war. The experiences of recent wars also confirm the old tenet of the art of war that not even the most advanced warfare can do without the modern use of land combat forces.

The impact of new threats on preparing for the forces

Numerous conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the rich and sometimes controversial literature dealing with the wars of the future. We must accept that in the war conflicts of the 21st century we encounter a wide range of *old, new and hybrid forms of warfare.* During the Cold War, the Western world faced the "one-dimensional" Soviet threat that was more or less predictable. In the new century *there are no such predictable circumstances* and we must be prepared for the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen threats. Therefore, security theory and military research should pay more attention to the study of the *full spectrum of conflicts*, to explore new forms of warfare between states, sub-state and cross-border, to identify the transit paths, overlaps and interconnections between them. The exploratory work has to be done by studying the conduct of *multinational military operations and hybrid warfare* in complex conditions. For military technical solutions, the novel tasks related to proportionality, coercion, dissuasion and support must be combined with the "conservative" tasks of conventional battlefield operations. In particular, it is necessary to prepare for the simultaneous, complex management of *symmetrical, asymmetric and hybrid threats*. Full-spectrum conflict management in the Western world is not entirely new, since the theoretical category of conventional (high intensity) and non-conventional (low-intensity) conflicts has long been used. As for hybrid warfare, the West first saw it in relation to the Ukrainian crisis and the southern threats, but preparation has already begun. It seems certain that adaptation will not be easy since the multidimensional and asymmetric nature of multidimensional and asymmetric nature of the hybrid threats and military conflicts, their intertwined features and the multiplicity of actors require other types of security and defence policy than dealing with the earlier, more predictable forms of war.

In the 21st century, managing complex security problems is no longer possible at the national level, with a single-scenario strategy, with forces with a rigid structure. Traditional threat concepts and defence must be complemented by new military doctrines of the *pre-emptive strike, counter-measures (prevention) and expeditionary warfare*. In addition, the armed forces must be prepared to carry out internal security tasks, to support the police forces and to carry out border protection tasks. States need to have armed forces with *a wide range of capabilities* to meet the challenges of the full spectrum of external and internal conflicts. Readiness should include *preventive deployment, pre-emptive strikes, defence tasks, counter-terrorism operations, military police and disaster relief tasks, traditional peacekeeping, peace building, or a combination of these.* Only versatile training provides the strength of the forces in high and low intensity operations (high-low mix), against any enemy, under any circumstances and during any task. According to historical military experience, a highly trained soldier can be assigned to carry out a simpler task (train down), but no personnel trained for low-intensity operations (train up) can ever accomplish a serious combat mission. What is more, all activities at home and abroad require combat readiness, combat support and combat service support capabilities that can only be obtained from military organizations prepared for conventional warfare.

The merger of the modes of armed conflicts brought along not only the fourth-generation warfare but started preparing for a new era of warfare. In the wars of the future, in addition to conventional modes of armed clashes, forces and equipment, hybrid organizational formations emerge, the specialized, specops (special operations) units, counter-terrorist forces, private armies, international organizations and non-governmental actors. Terrorist attacks can be transformed into classic guerrilla warfare and later escalate into a traditional war conflict. Continuous and sporadic armed conflicts are "blurred" in space and time, symmetrical, asymmetric and hybrid combat modes will be present in all (land, air, sea, space, and cyber) combat dimensions. It follows from all this that armed forces must be *multifunctional* in order to have the capability of averting the threats and adapting to the various modes of fighting wars in the entire conflict spectrum. These requirements will be met by the European Union's new global strategy for foreign and security policy, the adaptation measures of the NATO Summits (Wales 2014, Warsaw 2016, Brussels 2018) and the renewal of national defence concepts.

Preparing for hybrid threats has brought about the restoration and reinforcement of the power of resistance (resilience) that has already been forgotten after the Cold War, which must be created not only at armed forces and bodies, but at state, social, economic and infrastructure levels alike.

In order to meet the requirements of the future, networked joint forces with new generation weapons are necessary, which can be deployed in multi-dimensional, multinational, expeditionary, and defence-type operations. Power-projection and mobility are important because it is only in this way that it is possible to achieve dominance in certain operational areas, to counteract the *high-low* prevalent there, to meet the requirements of a wide range of different conflicts. The organizational size of the military forces involved in modern operations is steadily declining, with organizational structures of division and battalion level (or joint forces with equal strength) coming into the forefront, and the task-tailored *Task Force* type units and formations of varying strengths. The force structures of the future must become more and more *modular* in order to be able to create, at short notice, rapid response groups of forces that are adequate to the given mission. Modern military development aims to create *a wide range of military capabilities,* from which always that particular capability *can be retrieved,* which is necessary for the situation and the accomplishment of the mission. In both domestic defence tasks and expeditionary warfare, one of the most difficult tasks is to coordinate *versatility of deployment and organizational stability.* Modern forces, on their own, in alliances or in an ad hoc coalition, should be able to carry out complex, multi-dimensional tasks where the operational environment ranges from air-land, sea-land operations to total, conventional land warfare. Beside classic warfare missions, there emerges the need for the ability of the country to participate in the internal security tasks of the alliance, the need for suitability for the military constabulary, the special disaster relief and humanitarian aid tasks. An increased demand for *flexibility of deployment* will in the future reinforce (make it more frequent) the need for organizational change, the importance of technical modernization, the modification of preparation, training and education, and the creation of a multifaceted set of conditions. The creation of smaller combat formations (such as joint brigades, hybrid regiments, etc.) serves as a modular building block for the build-up of forces, which must co-operate with police forces, civilian authorities, social organizations and international institutions.

Conclusions

In the early 21st century, the world has entered an era in which the role of military security is constantly changing; the war between the classical states has been complemented with the non-state actors' threats, conflicts and combat modes without boundaries. Sub-state and cross-border "belligerent parties" can use the new technical achievements of our time just as "traditional" actors of warfare. Non-state actors (terrorists) can deliver unavertable strikes on any country or society.

Following the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, collective defence and deterrence duties have again been highlighted, the danger of military intervention by another state cropped up again. The states of the transatlantic area must now be prepared for the hybrid threats, not only to deal with possible external military attacks, but to deal with the multitude of threats (prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber defence, managing mass migration, combatting piracy in international waters, energy security tasks, etc.) and to increase the resilience of countries and alliances. National security increasingly depends on the *internal protection* of the institutional systems of the countries. The nation-state model of the war based on threat analysis by the traditional enemy must be complemented by strategic methods of *reducing vulnerability* to non-state threats. The wars of the future will stem not so much from the ambitions of the states, but rather from their weaknesses.

For purposes of addressing the military challenges of the future, modern states need *well-equipped, highly mobile and versatile armed forces.* Armies that on the one hand are capable of efficiently taking part in multidimensional, multinational, high and low intensity operations both at home and abroad, and on the other hand, they are capable of controlling the violence in the full spectrum of conflicts. These capabilities should be built by every state individually, but in the case of membership in an alliance the capabilities should be developed as part of the alliance, coalition. This does not mean copying and following some of the major powers, a servile policy of *bandwagoning* but also the use of military *know-how* of international security organizations (UN, EU, NATO, OSCE), the rational adaptation of alliance concepts (such as *Smart Defence* or *Pooling & Sharing*). The military force *is increasingly intertwined* with politics and becomes a means to shape, maintain, punish, pass, protect and influence the strategic environment of conflicts. It is therefore very important that the military be included in a broader (comprehensive) security strategy, which is intended to protect both the national and community interests and values. For the efficient implementation of this strategy, high-level international cooperation in intelligence and diplomacy, strong and purposeful national and international security and defence policy are needed.

Security theories and the art of war must synthesize the enormous amount of literature on military security, hybrid threats, future wars, conflicts and warfare. The conclusions must be compared with the changing world of newer and newer, conventional and non-conventional hybrid threats, and forward-looking proposals have to be developed. Only those approaches can bear fruit that cannot only demonstrate the increasing complexity of military conflicts, but also strive to capture the holistic and multidimensional character, sociological and technological dynamism of the phenomena. Conceptual development can only come from research that studies the relationship between war and society and the world, assesses the convergence of conflicts, monitors the requirement of the control over the forces in the world of global media broadcasts and, in the case of multi-purpose forces, keeps in mind the development issues of applying the whole spectrum of conflict. An important goal of studying military security topics is to include the results of international research not only in professional thinking and education, but to use them to meet the challenges facing the national defence, the theoretical support of the deployment and development of the Hungarian Defence Forces. *In this work, the Hungarian civil science disciplines also have their tasks, only multidisciplinary (civil and military) research helps to understand the complex problems of new wars.* We should listen to Thucydides' teaching: "The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools".

References

A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group in Europe's Security Capabilities. 15 Sept. 2004. Source: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40209/1/A_human_security_doctrine_for_Europe%28author%29.pdf (2006. 07. 10.)

ARREQUÍN-TOFT, Ivan (2001): How the Weak Win Wars. A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. *International Security,* Vol. 26, No.1. 93–128.

BERZINS, Janis (2014): *Russian new generation warfare: Implications for Europe.* Source: www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/russian-new-generation-warfare-implications-for-europe_2006.html (2015. 10. 12.)

BUZAN, Barry – WAEVER, Ole – DE WILDE, Jaap (1998): *Security. A New Framework For Analysis.* Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder–London.

CSP (2016a) Source: www.systemicpeace.org/CTfigures/CTfig03.htm (2016. 07. 10.)

CSP (2016b) Source: www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm (2016. 07. 10.)

CSP (2016c) Source: www.systemicpeace.org/CTfigures/CTfig22.htm (2017. 05. 04.)

CERNY, Philip (1998): Neomedievalism, civil war and the security dilemma: Globalization as durable disorder. *Civil Wars,* Vol. 1, No. 1. 36–64.

CLARK, Wesley K. (2001): *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of the Conflict.* Public Affairs, New York.

CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von (2013): *A háborúról.* Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest.

COLLINS, Alan (ed.) (2010): *Contemporary Security Studies.* Oxford University Press, Oxford–New York.

COOPER, Robert (2000): *The Post-modern State and the world order.* Demos. Source: www.demos.co.uk/files/postmodernstate.pdf (2016. 06. 02.)

DEÁK János (2005): Napjaink és a jövő háborúja. *Hadtudomány*, Vol. 15, No. 1. 29–49.

DEÁK János (2013): Háború és hadsereg a 21. században, különös tekintettel a Magyar Honvédség jövőképére. *Hadtudomány*, Vol. 23, No. 2. (e-version) 41–84.

EVANS, Michael – PARKIN, Russell – RYAN, Alan (ed.) (2004): *Future Armies, Future Challenges. Land warfare in the information age.* Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest. 26-45.

FÁBIÁN Sándor (2013): Alternatív védelmi stratégia „kis" államoknak. *Seregszemle*, Vol. 11, Nos. 2–3. 131–141.

FORGÁCS Balázs (2009): *Napjaink hadikultúrái. A hadviselés elmélete és fejlődési tendenciái a modern korban.* PhD-értekezés, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem, Budapest.

FRANCART, Loup – PATRY, Jean-Jacques (2000): Mastering violence: an option for operational military strategy. *Naval War College Review,* Vol. 53, No. 3. 144 –185. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2584&context=nwc- review (2018.09.18)

GAREEV, Makhmut (1998): *If War Comes Tomorrow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict.* Routledge, London–New York.

GARTNER, Heinz (2007): *Nemzetközi biztonság. Fogalmak A-tól Z-ig.* Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest.

GAZDAG Ferenc (ed.) (2011): *Biztonsági tanulmányok – Biztonságpolitika.* Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem, Budapest.

GERASZIMOV, Valerij (2013): *The Value of Science in Prediction.* Military-Industrial Kurier. Source: https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/ (2015. 10. 12.)

GFP (2018): *Countries Ranked by Military Strength (2016). The complete Global Firepower list puts the military powers of the world into full perspective.* Source: www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp (2018. 09. 18.)

Gray, Colin S. (2005): *Another Bloody Century. Future Warfare.* Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London.

Hahn István (ed.) (1963): *A hadművészet ókori klasszikusai.* Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest.

Haig Zsolt – Várhegyi István (2005): *Hadviselés az információs hadszíntéren.* Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest.

Hajma Lajos (2005): A háborúval kapcsolatos elméletek változásai. *Hadtudomány,* Vol. 15, No. 2. 27–36.

Hammes, Thomas X. (2005): *Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation.* Source: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/sf214.pdf (2016. 03. 20.)

Herz, John H. (2003): *The Security Dilemma in International Relations: Background and Present Problems.* Source: www.academia.edu/3444141/The_Security_Dilemma_in_International_Relations_Background_and_Present_Problems (2016. 06. 10.)

Hoffman, Frank G. (2007): *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.* Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington. http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf (2018. 09.18)

How Much Does it Cost to Create a Single Nuclear Weapons? (2013) Source: www.ucsusa.org/publications/ask/2013/nuclear-weapon-cost.html#.V8KkcN7r2M8 (2016. 08. 15.)

Huntington, Samuel P. (1998): *A civilizációk összecsapása és a világrend átalakulása.* Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest.

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2008): *Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs, Past and Present.* Source: www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2008-Chemical-and-Biological-Weapons_-Possession-and-Programs-Past-and-Present.pdf (2016. 08. 15.)

Jervis, Robert (2011): Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. *Security Studies. A Reader,* Hughes, Christopher W. – Meng, Lai Yew (Eds) , Routledge, London–New York, 137–141.

Kajári Ferenc (2015): Hibrid háború Ukrajnában? *Honvédségi Szemle,* Vol. 143, No. 5. 36–44.

Kaldor, Mary (2013): In Defence of New Wars. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development,* Vol. 2, No. 1. 1–16.

Kaplan, Robert D. (1994): *Coming Anarchy.* The Atlantic Monthly. Source: www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/ (2016. 09. 21.)

Kissinger, Henry (2014): *Világrend.* Antall József Tudásközpont, Budapest.

Kőszegvári Tibor (2009): Gerilla-hadviselés a városokban. *Hadtudomány,* Vol. 19, Nos. 1–2. 63–71.

Krulak, Charles C. (1999): *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War.* Marina Magazin. Source: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm (2016. 01. 31.)

Kussbach Eric (2009): Semlegesség. *A fegyveres összeütközések joga,* Ádány Tamás Vince – Bartha Orsolya – Törő Csaba (eds.), Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 105–126.

Lind, William S. – Nightengale, Keith – Schmitt, John F. – Sutton, Joseph W. – Wilson, Gray I. (1989): *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.* Marine Corps Gazette. Source: www.dnipogo.org/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm (2016. 03. 19.)

Mandelbaum, Michael (2011): *The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era.* Public Affairs, New York.

Melander, Eric (2015): *Organized Violence in the World 2015.* An assessment by the Uppsala Conflict Date Program, USDP Paper N. 9. Source: www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/61/61335_1brochure2.pdf (2016. 08. 15.)

Mueller, John (1991): *Is war still becoming obsolete?* American Political Science Association. Source: http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/apsa1991.pdf (2016. 09. 10.)

Münkler, Herfried (2004): *Háborúban vagyunk? Terroristák, partizánok és a háború új formái.* Source: http://epa.oszk.hu/02500/02565/00041/pdf/EPA02565_poltud_szemle_2004_3_059-069.pdf (2016. 03. 20.)

N. Rózsa Erzsébet – Péczeli Anna (2013): *Egy békésebb világ eszközei. Fegyverzet-ellenőrzés, leszerelés és non-proliferáció.* Osiris Kiadó – Magyar Külügyi Intézet, Budapest.

Nemeth, William J. (2002): *Future War and Chechnya: a case for hybrid warfare.* The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.

NIC (2004): *Mapping the Global Future. Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project.* Source: www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global%20Trends_Mapping%20the%20Global%20Future%202020%20Project.pdf (2016. 03. 30.)

Peace Operations 2015/2016. (é. n.) ZIF Center for International Peace Operations, Berlin. Source: www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyze/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_World_Map_Peace_Operations.pdf (2016. 08. 18.)

Peters, Ralph (1999): *Fighting for the future. Will America Triumph?* Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg.

Porkoláb Imre (2014): A hadviseléssel kapcsolatos elméletek és elvek változása napjaink tükrében. *Honvédségi Szemle,* Vol. 142, No. 6. 6–14.

Qiao, Liang – Wang, Xiangsui (1999): *Unrestricted Warfare.* PLA Publishing House, Beijing. http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf (2018.09.18)

Rácz András (2014): *Oroszország hibrid háborúja Ukrajnában.* KKI-tanulmányok. Source: http://kki.gov.hu/download/2/80/c0000/R%C3%A1cz%20Andr%C3%A1s%20hibrid%20h%C3%A1bor%C3%BA.pdf (2014. 11. 30.)

Resperger István – Kiss Álmos Péter – Somkuti Bálint (2013): *Aszimmetrikus hadviselés a modern korban. Kis háborúk nagy hatással.* Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest.

Snider, Glenn H. (1984): The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. *World Politics,* Vol. 36, No. 4. 461–495.

Szenes Zoltán (2005): Katonai kihívások a 21. század elején. *Hadtudomány,* Vol. 15, No. 4. 19–30.

Szenes Zoltán (2015): Tudomány és a haderő. *Magyar Tudomány,* Vol. 176, No. 2. 194–201.

Takács Attila Géza (2016): A posztmodern háborúk jellemzői. *Honvédségi Szemle,* No. 3. 20–36.

Tálas Péter (2014): Nemzeti katonai stratégia és a magyar stratégiai kultúra. *Nemzet és Biztonság,* Vol. 7, No. 2. 3–16.

Thucydides: Peloponnesian War (cca 410 BCE) Quotes about scholars and warriors. Vigerati & Technology Reports. August 4, 2010. https://mhreviews.wordpress.com/2010/08/04/thucydides-quote-scholars-and-warriors/ (2018.09.18)

Toffler, Alvin (2004): *A harmadik hullám.* Typotex Kiadó, Budapest.

Van Creveld, Martin (1991): *The Transformation of War.* The Free Press, New York–London–Toronto–Sydney.

Walt, Stephen M. (1997): Why alliances endure or collapse? *Survival,* Vol. 39, No. 1. 156–179.

Wass de Czege, Huba – Sinnreich, Richard Hart (2002): *Conceptual Foundations of a Transformed United States Army.* Source: www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/LWP-40-Conceptual-Foundations-of-a-Transformed-US-Army.pdf (2016. 04. 03.)

Internet sources

http://hu.euronews.com/2016/06/13/kevesebb-az-atomfegyver-de-szo-sincs-leszerelesrol (2016. 08. 16.)
http://hu.euronews.com/2016/01/09/ujabb-keses-tamadas-tortent-izraelben (2016. 06. 30.)
http://ucdp.uu.se/ (2016. 07. 30.)
http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015 (2016. 07. 25.)
https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en (2017. 05. 04.)
http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2016.pdf (2017. 05. 03.)
www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp (2018. 09. 18.)
www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/ (2016. 06. 25.)
www.state.gov/s/seci/ (2017. 05. 03.)
www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/ (2016. 07. 28.)
www.adducation.info/general-knowledge-politics-religion/all-neutral-countries/ (2016. 08. 16.)
www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml (2016. 07. 15.)
www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (2017. 05. 04.)